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In this dissertation project, I explore the effect that exposure to uncivil 
political talk has on deliberative attitudes and behavior. I hypothesize that incivility in 
political discourse can induce anti-deliberative attitudes among the public, and 
increases the use of incivility in political talk. I argue that an anti-deliberative spirit 
among the public helps fuel mass partisan polarization, and limits the positive effects 
that come from public deliberation. 
Using survey data, I find that use of incivility bythe public when talking 
politics has increased. This trend has come alongside changes in partisan polarization 
and media over the last few decades. A separate analysis confirms the tie between 
exposure to partisan, uncivil media and uncivil political talk; using panel data, I find 
that exposure to political talk radio and pundit-based television programming leads 
audience members with like-minded political views to mimic uncivil language and 
tactics when expressing their own political opinions. 
  
I use experimental methods to explore incivility’s effects more in-depth. 
Drawing from affective intelligence theory, I hypothesize that political incivility has 
the ability to induce anger, which in turn reduces d liberative attitudes.  In one 
experiment, I manipulate the amount of incivility in an online message board. I find 
that uncivil political talk induced feelings of anger in individuals when one’s partisan 
in-group was targeted, and led to an increased use of incivility when the partisan out-
group was targeted. When feelings of anger are stimulated in people, they reprimand 
the uncivil “perpetrator” on the message board, and display anti-deliberative 
attitudes—including a reduced propensity to consider alt rnative views and lower 
levels of satisfaction with interactive online communication.  
A second experiment, embedded in a national survey, confirms that 
disagreeable incivility and like-minded incivility have different effects.  Uncivil 
messages that are disagreeable induce feelings of anger, decrease willingness to 
compromise, and boost use of incivility. While the connection between like-minded 
incivility, anger, and anti-deliberative attitudes is less clear, uncivil messages lead 
like-minded messages to mimic uncivil and anti-delib rative behavior. 
My findings show that incivility limits political deliberation. I conclude by 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
There is no shortage of political debate in the United States. We can easily find 
examples of political talk on television between pundits. Quaint as it sounds, passionate 
discussions still occur at the dinner table between family members, and in pubs, between 
friends. And, in the early 21st century, political talk between masses of strangers is a 
constant occurrence in the fast-changing forums of the Internet. That social media has 
made it so easy to connect with others who are passionate about politics is nothing short 
of a marvel. For democracy in America, this should be great news.  
The Great American Experiment was founded on the idea that discourse is the 
lifeblood of democracy; the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly are protected so as 
to ensure differences of opinion can be expressed. Ma ison’s reflections in Federalist No. 
10 illustrate that the American system of government was designed to benefit from a 
diversity of views, rather than be hampered by factionalism (Hamilton et al. 1787/1788). 
Madison is advocating for efficiency, more than anything else—instead of government 
wasting energy trying to restrict conflicting views that threaten to bog it down or rip it 
apart, the republican system of the United States would allow differences to be collated 
and filtered through the democratic process so as t improve society. Sunstein (2009) 
argues, “…the framers’ greatest and most original contribution to political theory [was 
that]…heterogeneity, far from being an obstacle, would be a creative force, improving 




better policy could be produced. As Jefferson reflected, “Differences of opinion lead to 
inquiry, and inquiry to truth.”1 
 Although there is much of it, differences in opinio  in contemporary American 
political society are not producing better outcomes. And political talk does not seem to be 
bringing us any closer to “truth.” Instead, we are witnessing an American politics that is 
stalemated by factionalism, in the form of partisanship. Partisan polarization in 
government is nearing historic highs,2 and partisan conflict among the electorate has 
surged since a mid-twentieth century decline (Brewe 2005). With these partisan conflicts 
has come increased confrontation, and reduced compromise in government (Abramowitz 
2011). The 112th Congress (whose term ended three months before the time of this 
writing, in January 2013) was so bogged down by partisanship, that its legislative output 
makes the infamous “Do Nothing Congress” of 1947-48 look productive. 3 
Certainly, the two-party systems that have dominated American politics since the 
Constitution came into effect have restricted the heterogeneity of views that enter 
political conversations and are considered in governm nt. Yet avenues through which 
people can directly communicate with others who differ from them have never been 
greater. This is a conundrum—if it is getting easier to openly debate politics with people 
from across the country, why has American democracy been increasingly bogged down 
by partisan conflict? Why does political heterogeneity serve as a hindrance, rather than a 
marketplace of ideas from which good policy is drawn?   
                                                
1 Jefferson stated this in a letter to Peter Wendover (Jefferson 2012, 340). 
2 As demonstrated by Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-Nominate scores: 
http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp 




 These questions are less about the origin of contemporary partisan polarization—
much research is dedicated to answering that question. I am instead asking what it is 
about that polarization prevents political talk from becoming deliberation.4 My answer to 
this, and the central contention of my dissertation, s that the presence of incivility in 
mass political discourse deserves substantial blame. Incivility impedes political discourse 
from advancing the democratic process. Rather than exchange ideas and update positions 
in light of new information, incivility leads those most passionate about politics and most 
willing to discuss policy to reject alternative views and become more dedicated to the 
views they already hold. Despite all the modes through which we can communicate, and 
despite all the energy that is put into political talk, American democracy benefits little. In 
fact, I argue that political discourse, beset with incivility, is currently more harmful than 
helpful.  
 Throughout this project, I will present information that demonstrates the negative 
effects incivility has on political deliberation. I utilize both survey data and experimental 
methods to show that exposure to uncivil political talk can lead people to adopt incivility 
into their own political comments. Additionally, I argue that people reduce their 
willingness to deliberate and hold deliberative values. There are some important 
caveats—such as whether a political message is like-m nded or disagreeable. Questions 
remain as to how much like-minded incivility affects deliberative values, and more 
research is needed. Yet what should be plainly clear is that incivility consistently has a 
negative impact on political discourse. In the next section, I will overview the layout of 
my dissertation. 
                                                





Layout of Dissertation 
  In the next chapter, I will define what I mean by “incivility,” explain how I will 
operationalize uncivil political talk throughout this project, and lay out a theory that ties 
exposure to uncivil political talk to feelings of anger. I will introduce research from 
affective intelligence theory which ties anger to anti-deliberative attitudes, including 
increased reliance of preexisting views and a refusal to compromise on policy matters. I 
will present a theory that suggests exposure to uncivil political talk will increase the 
chances of people using incivility themselves, and  I will also argue that incivility can 
have these effects, whether we identify with the target of an uncivil claim or not.  
Based on the theory laid out in chapter 2, I will test three chief hypotheses in the 
remaining chapters. First, (H1) I hypothesize that use of incivility by the American public 
when expressing political opinions has increased over the last few decades. This 
hypothesis is grounded in the substantial empirical evidence of a changing political 
culture in the United States: over the past forty years, partisan polarization has increased 
and a disaggregated, hyperbolic media environment much has developed. These trends 
result in the reinforcement of preexisting views among the public and a reduced respect 
for the “other side.” Additionally, the rise of the Internet as a communication tool 
provides increased opportunities for the public to offer and be exposed to uncivil political 
talk. Using American National Election Studies data, I track the use of uncivil language 
in describing presidential candidates and the major parties among the public from 1972 to 
2004. The results of this analysis are presented in chapter 3. 
I also hypothesize that (H2) exposure to uncivil political talk leads to an increased 




behavior of the elites one is exposed to is well-established in the political communication 
literature. Furthermore, work in several literatures suggests that those offended by uncivil 
attacks on their “side,” retaliate by “returning the favor.”  In chapter 4, I use panel data 
from the 2008 National Annenberg Election Survey to test this. I examine how changes 
in exposure to uncivil political media affect people’s propensity to use uncivil language 
when discussing what they like and dislike about the 2008 presidential candidates. 
I additionally test this hypothesis in two experiments. In chapter 5, I present 
results from an experiment in which exposure to inciv lity is manipulated in an online 
forum, and subjects are asked to make their own posts. In chapter 6, I present results from 
an experiment embedded in the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, in 
which exposure to uncivil statements said to have been made by a “party leaders” is 
manipulated, and subjects are again asked their opinion.  
The experiments are also used to test two “sub-hypot eses” related to H2. 
Previous studies have found that incivility can reduce respect for the opposing side, but 
they do not discriminate between scenarios when the views and politicians one is aligned 
with are the target of uncivil attacks and when the views and politicians of the opposed 
side are targeted, leaving a theoretical void.5As political incivility often means intensely 
negative, hyperbolic statements about the out-group, I expect a political comment to 
affect partisans on both sides. Specifically, I expect (H2A) exposure to disagreeable 
incivility—in which one’s in-group is targeted by an uncivil comment—induces the use 
of incivility in retaliation; and (H2B) exposure tolike-minded incivility—in which the 
“other side” is targeted—induces the use of incivility. I explore whether exposure to like-
                                                
5 Mutz (2007), for example, exposes individuals to a mock debate where individuals of opposing sides 
attacked each other. Mutz argues that it is the demonization of the other side that reduces respect for the 




minded incivility has this effect due to partisans feeling anger upon hearing how “bad” 
the other side is, or if partisans merely mimic the behavior of like-minded individuals.  
I also use the experiments presented in chapters 5 and 6 to test a third hypothesis, 
which is central to my theory: (H3) when exposed to uncivil political talk, individuals 
will indicate less deliberative potential. As substantial research links incivility to negative 
political emotions, and individuals who experience anger are less willing to compromise 
in political debates, retreat to prior political attitudes, and limit information searches to 
sources that reinforce these attitudes, there is reason to belief that exposure to uncivil 
political talk should reduce deliberative attitudes. 
 Finally, the experiments are used to test two more sub-hypotheses, related to H3. 
As I expect that exposure to disagreeable and like-minded incivility should affect use of 
incivility, I also expect that disagreeable and like-minded incivility will both affect 
deliberative attitudes. Specifically, I anticipate that (H3A) exposure to disagreeable 
incivility will induce anti-deliberative attitudes; and (H3B) exposure to like-minded 
incivility will induce anti-deliberative attitudes. 
 In chapters 6 and 7, I summarize my findings. I conclude in chapter 7 by 
suggesting future directions for research on uncivil political talk. Two appendices follow 
chapter 7, which include expanded discussions and additional table and figures.6  
Before showing that incivility negatively affects deliberation, an essential 
question to answer is why it is important for the public to hold deliberative attitudes in 
the first place. In the next chapter, I discuss the eff cts that a public holding anti-
                                                
6 Appendix 1 contains expanded discussions of subjects not included in the chapters. An expanded 
discussion from chapter 4, for example, is referred to as A1 4-1, indicating it is included in the first 
appendix (A1), and related to chapter 4 (4-1). Appendix 2 contains additional tables and figures that were 
not included in the chapters, with the tables coming before figures. An extra figure from chapter 5, for 




deliberative views is likely to have on democratic processes. In addition to examining the 
theoretical and empirical support for the importance of public deliberation, I detail the 




Chapter 2: Incivility, Emotion, and Deliberation  
 
Consider the following scenario. The United States government is broken.  The 
country is crippled with an enormity of issues, including serious debt problems and a 
poor economy. Frustratingly, the leaders in the natio ’s capital are incapable of 
implementing any solutions. Some members of Congress b gin to believe that radical 
changes need to be made if the country is to survive. A new domestic crisis emerges, and 
the federal government seems incapable of dealing wth it, convincing many more that 
something drastic needs to be done. So the nation’s most preeminent politicians, political 
insiders, and political thinkers agree to meet to discuss the nation’s future. There is talk 
of dramatically overhauling the government in order to make it more efficient.   
 As the meeting of political elites begins, the discussions are tempestuous, wrought 
by ideological clashes. Heated debates occur over what the size and scope of the federal 
government should be, and many refuse to compromise on their principles. Over a period 
of months, however, compromises and bargains are mad . Although no one is completely 
satisfied with the final result, a massive restructuring of the American governmental 
system is agreed upon, in order to address the major problems the country faces which 
threaten to tear it apart. 
 This anecdote is a true story. As you might have gu ssed, the “meeting” was the 
Philadelphia Convention of 1787, in which the American Founding Fathers debated, 
designed, and passed the United States Constitution, aba doning the “broken” Article of 
Confederation.  To create the Constitution, a group f men, deeply divided on many of 
the issues they debated, came to agree upon its principles, and completely reorganized 




“broken,” and incapable of dealing with a number of difficult issues that the country 
faces. Among the most cited reasons for why is that Democrats and Republicans are 
bitterly divided and refuse to find middle-ground solutions (Mann and Ornstein 2012). 
The Constitutional Convention saw delegates, also bitterly divided (small states versus 
large states, the north versus the south, Federalists versus Anti-Federalists), manage to 
produce the most important document in American history, and the longest lasting 
constitution in the world. What lessons can we learn from the discussions that produced 
it? What elements made the Constitutional Convention a political environment conducive 
for compromise and problem-solving? 
 An important, oft-repeated lesson for contemporary political debates, and the 
focus of my project, is the need for civility in political discourse. Incivility in political 
talk and its purported consequences has become a bêt  noire of sorts for American 
politicians, pundits, and social commentators alike. From the calls for civility in the wake 
of the January 2011 shootings in Tucson, Arizona, to  rally on the National Mall hosted 
by political satirist Jon Stewart to restore “sanity” n politics, the idea that uncivil 
discourse has harmful effects on American politics ha many adherents.  As President 
Barack Obama explained in a speech during the memorial f  the victims of the Tucson 
shooting, “…only a more civil and honest public discourse can help us face up to the 
challenges of our nation…” (Hayes 2011).  
 Evidence of this can be found in the way the founding fathers conducted 
discourse throughout the Convention of 1787, during which efforts were made to keep 
the debates civil. John Jay reflected that civility was crucial to creating a deliberative 




concessions” in various areas (Jamieson and Hardy 2012). When none other than James 
Madison began to make ad hominem attacks on men opposing his Virginia Plan, 
Benjamin Franklin proposed a break in debate so as t let cooler heads prevail, and 
deliberation ensued more smoothly afterwards (Jamieson and Hardy 2012 ). Many more 
examples such as these provide anecdotal evidence that civility in discourse was an 
essential element to the success of the Philadelphia convention. The attitude many of the 
delegates held was that when discussions became uncivil, agreement and compromise 
became much more difficult, if not impossible. 
 In the contemporary era, the deleterious effects of uncivil political discourse 
among elites are well-known. First and foremost, it produces an environment in which 
governing becomes more difficult and legislative productivity is reduced (Uslaner 1993; 
Jamieson 1999, 2011; Maisel 2012). Political scientists argue that it becomes more 
difficult to recruit and retain individuals to run for office when elite discourse is 
characterized by incivility (Maisel 2012), and uncivil discourse is responsible for delays 
in official activities, such as the confirmation of federal judicial nominees (Schraufnagel 
2011). This regards elites, of course—the people actually governing. When scholars and 
social commentators lament an “incivility crisis,” however, they are not just talking about 
the discourse on Capitol Hill, but also the political discussions among the general public. 
Why does the public need to be civil? This is the qu stion I attempt to answer in the 
discussions to follow.  
 A central claim that I make is that what people say to each other in political 
discussions—or how they say it—affects how much consideration alternative views are 




political discourse, I argue, induces feelings of anger in those exposed, and leads them 
use anti-deliberative behavior. By anti-deliberative behavior, I mean close-mindedness, a 
refusal to find a middle-ground in policy areas, and the adoption of uncivil tactics. 
Incivility in political discourse limits the extent to which individuals consider political 
views alternative to their own, and decreases theirrespect for these views. This is 
important for a couple of reasons, which I will expand on later in this chapter: 1) an anti-
deliberative public will negatively affect elite negotiations, and 2) the extent to which 
public deliberation can produce a “wisdom of the majority” which contributes to policy 
creation is inhibited if members of the public are unwilling to listen to and consider views 
alternative to their own.  
 Understanding the connection between incivility and ti-deliberative behavior 
has become all the more important, as current media trends have added another level of 
significance to the study of incivility; byproducts of “new media,” such as narrowcasting 
and interactivity, have created an atmosphere primed for uncivil political discourse at a 
time in which American politics are already affected by high levels of partisan 
polarization. The current media environment not only allows individuals to tailor their 
news exposure to reaffirm and intensify preexisting views, but the increasing presence of 
social media and interactivity on the web allows for c mmunication between many 
people with few social repercussions for disreputable behavior. These media trends raise 
the possibility for commonplace, popular uncivil political discourse to unprecedented 
levels. If exposure to (and use of) uncivil discourse does produce an anti-deliberative 
spirit among the public, then a fix for a “broken” government may begin with changing 




 In the next section, I detail what is known (and, more accurately, what is 
unknown) about how the presence of incivility affects political discourse. I then present 
evidence from affective intelligence research that connects negative emotional reactions 
to information with anti-deliberative behavior, and present existing research which 
suggests that the presence of incivility in the presentation of political information induces 
negative emotions. Following that, I detail the effects that a public which holds anti-
deliberative views is likely to have on the functioning of government, before providing an 
overview of the theoretical and empirical support f the importance of public 
deliberation. I then explain the definition of “incvility” I use throughout this project and 
introduce the “incivility index” I have designed to identify and operationalize incivility, 
before offering some concluding thoughts.  
How Does Incivility Affect Political Discourse? 
The usual argument regarding the need for civil discourse goes like this: when 
discourse is not civil, political deliberation cannot occur; when discourse is civil, 
deliberation is possible, from which benefits to society can be derived. Although 
anecdotal evidence is aplenty, a direct empirical assessment of what effects the presence 
of incivility has on individuals’ inclination to engage in pro-deliberative behavior7 has 
not been made. The same is true for the claim that uncivil political talk has been 
increasing over time—for as many who point out we are in the midst of a civility crisis 
(i.e., Mutz and Reeves 2005; Kamber 2003), there are others who point to the lack of 
empirical support to back it up (i.e., Sigelman andPark 2007; Herbst 2010). 
                                                
7 For example, keeping an open mind to alternative vews, showing a willingness to compromise, and, 




 The lack of direct empirical support for the effects of uncivil political talk on 
deliberative processes invites doubt as to whether discourse must be civil in order for it 
produce positive results. For instance, the argument has been made that ‘civil discourse’ 
as a democratic norm is not as black and white as sometimes suggested; oftentimes, some 
activities qualified8 as “uncivil,” such as civil disobedience, are necessary behavior in 
order to defend civil rights and liberties (Chafe 198 ; Sapiro 1999; Mendelberg 2009). 
Simply put, what counts as incivility is entirely subjective and much in the eye of the 
beholder. 
 Furthermore, as incivility is context dependent, showing that there has been an 
uptick in its use is theoretically challenging. Because of this, Herbst (2010) argues that 
trying to determine what counts as political incivility, if incivility has increased with 
time, or if incivility is bad for democracy, are not productive initiatives. Herbst goes so 
far to say that the argument that, “[i]ncivility is destructive and blocks proper democratic 
debate…is a banal and unsophisticated answer, one that ignores the reality of politics, 
communication culture, and the social environment of the twenty-first century” (9). 
 There is reason to believe, however, that incivility n political talk takes some 
common forms that affect most individuals in a similar fashion—that is, it deters 
individuals from engaging in constructive deliberation, and instead promotes obstinacy. 
Experimental research suggests that exposure to uncivil political talk induces emotional 
reactions in those exposed. Relatedly, research in affective intelligence links feelings of 
anger9 to anti-deliberative behavior. The central goal of my project is to connect the dots 
and show that incivility restricts deliberation by ways of inducing anger in individuals. 
                                                
8 Often, such actions become qualified as “incivilities” by the repressors. 
9 While political psychologists do not always make distinction between “anger” and “aversion,” I will 




The claim I ultimately make is a simple one: that incivility in political talk has increased, 
and this has negative ramifications for democratic life. 
 If incivility indeed inhibits pro-deliberative behavior—such as openness to other 
views and maintaining civility in one’s own remarks—then trends such as the growing 
presence of polarizing, vitriolic discourse in political media and interpersonal 
communication should give us pause, and will raise dditional questions as to the utility 
of uncivil talk by elites.10 It is not clear, however, that incivility does do this. In the next 
section, I summarize arguments from research on affective intelligence, which explain 
how emotions affect information processing. I also present some evidence that suggests 
that uncivil political talk likely induces the type of negative emotions which lead to anti-
deliberative behavior. 
Incivility, Emotion, and Information Processing 
 What reduces individuals’ willingness to consider alternative ideas in a 
democratic society? Within the subfield of political psychology, research in affective 
intelligence theory has shown that emotions induced through the presentation of 
information affects how individuals process that information (Marcus et al. 2000; 
Redlawsk et al. 2007). With political information, appeals to emotion can affect the 
political behavior of those exposed; Brader (2005, 2006), for example, finds that the type 
of emotion induced by campaign ads affected how ads were processed and subsequent 
voting behavior.  
MacKuen et al. (2007, 2010) advance the research on t e effects of emotions on 
willingness to deliberate, arguing that two types of idealized citizens exist, both of which 
                                                
10 There is debate as to whether uncivil campaign advertising, for example, mobilizes or demobilizes the 




are necessary in certain circumstances: the deliberat v  citizen, whose norms include 
consideration, balance, open-mindedness, and a willingness to collaborate and 
accommodate; and the partisan combatant, whose pursuit of victory impels citizens to 
stand fast and reject middle-ground compromises. Each of us are capable of acting like 
one these two types, and it is the emotions we experience which affects whether we act 
more as deliberative citizens or partisan combatants in political discussions.  
 MacKuen et al. detail the specific emotions associated with both modes of 
idealized citizenship. The citizen “mode” is determined by whether we experience 
feelings of anger, produced through encounters with “known threats,” or feelings of 
anxiety, produced through encounters with conditions of uncertain risk. As MacKuen et 
al. explain,   
When familiar aversive stimuli are encountered, peopl  rely on previously learned 
routines to manage these situations, just as they do for familiar rewarding 
circumstances. They often simply ignore uncomfortable information or, 
alternatively, bolster their own views by seeking conforming information…the 
kind of citizenship people practice will depend on the kind of negative emotion 
politics evokes. 
 
 When individuals are angered by policy-related content, they practice anti-deliberative 
behavior associated with the partisan combatant, including a reduced willingness to 
compromise, a withdrawal from open consideration of different views, and a reliance on 
prior attitudes. Research in political and social psychology shows that anger suppresses 
the extent to which individual seek out political information (Valentino et al. 2008), and 
anger felt towards an out-group produces a desire to argue with, oppose, and attack the 
out-group (Mackie et al. 2000). Alternatively, being made anxious by new and 
uncommon stimuli leads to pro-deliberative behavior associated with the deliberative 




and compromise. The key to understanding how to limit anti-deliberative behavior is to 
understand what about the presentation of political information produces anger. 
Incivility as a Negative Political Stimulus 
What is not clear from the affective intelligence lit rature is when negative 
political information produces anxiety and when it produces anger. Sociologists, 
however, have made inroads to linking exposure to incivility directly with anger. 
Focusing on incivility in everyday life (rather than in political discourse), sociologists 
have found that the most common emotional responses to uncivil behavior are anger and 
outrage, far outranking fear, disgust, and blasé reactions (Philips and Smith 2004; Smith 
et al. 2010). Philips and Smith (2004) also find that individuals angered by incivilities 
attempt to “sanction” the perpetrator of incivility through “retribution”—that is, returning 
the favor and acting uncivil themselves.  
 Work in political philosophy also alludes to the idea that incivility in political 
discourse leads to anger and undermines the deliberativ  process. Kingwell (1995) argues 
that the smooth interactions necessary for benefits to be derived from deliberation can 
only come when individuals act civil to an extent—specifically, when they are willing to 
hold their tongues and not say any and everything that comes to their minds. Pointedly, 
he writes, “…a policy of strict truth-telling and tru h-seeking is at odds with a life lived 
among other humans,” (1995, 199-200). That is not to say that it is plain honesty which 
derails deliberation; dishonest deliberation is anything but helpful and the opposite of 
what is needed, and etiquette that bars honest discussion is exactly the type of censorship 




offend and add little additional information to an idea, attempts at deliberation are more 
likely to produce positive results. As Papacharissi (2004) explains,  
…it is not civility that limits the democratic potential of conversation, but rather, 
a confusion of politeness with civility. It is adherence to etiquette that frequently 
restricts conversation, by making it reserved, tepid, less spontaneous. Adherence 
to civility merely ensures that the conversation is guided by democratic principles, 
not just proper manners. 
I would not go so far as to claim politeness and civility are two distinct things—rather, I 
would argue that civility in political talk is a form of polite behavior. However, I agree 
that it is a break from honesty that is the problem, and equating incivility with honesty (or 
civility with dishonesty) is inaccurate. Comments can be both uncivil and honest, but 
they can also be civil and honest. But incivility, even when it is honest, poses a threat to 
deliberation because it generates feelings of anger. 
 Substantial research suggests incivility in discourse may produce anger. Incivility 
has been found to heighten arousal and induce negativ  emotions—for instance, when 
exposed to uncivil discourse, individuals’ political trust in politicians, political parties, 
candidates, Congress, and the overall system of government is reduced (Mutz and Reeves 
2005; Forgette and Morris 2006; Fridkin and Kenney 2008). Exposure to political 
incivility does more than induce negative emotional re ctions towards government and 
political figures. As Mutz (2006) demonstrates, it affects the utility of deliberation itself; 
the benefits of exposure to oppositional views (exposure to views different from one’s 
own) are maximized when discussions have a civil orientation.11 
 This is partly because, as Neblo et al. (2010) find, conflict aversion substantially 
deters people’s willingness to deliberate. Individuals who are uncomfortable with debate 
and argument are not going to benefit from deliberation. Conflict, to an extent, is intrinsic 
                                                
11 By civil orientation, I mean discussions that do not completely avoid conflict, but value the maintenance 




to deliberation, and the truly conflict averse are lik ly to never be active participants. But 
what people are averse to in contemporary political alk is unlikely to be conflict, per se; 
disagreement on its own does deter people from deliberation (Stromer-Galley and 
Muhlberger 2009).  Herbst (2010) finds substantial evidence that discomfort surrounding 
political talk is produced by incivility, especially among young people. In a survey of 
undergraduates in a state university system, a sizable portion of students characterize 
discourse among people of different political stripes as disrespectful. Open-ended 
responses reveal fears of verbal assaults when talki g politics and a perception that others 
approach discussions with “arrogance and certainty.” This research suggests it is not 
debate or argument or even conflict which undermines a willingness to engage in pro-
deliberative behavior, but rather the uncivil, anti-deliberative tactics that are employed in 
discourse. 
Theory: Two Modes by Which Incivility Induces Anti-deliberative Behavior 
MacKuen et al. (2010) include fidelity to preexisting views, failure to seek and 
listen to alternative opinions, and a reduced willingness to compromise as examples of 
anti-deliberative behavior produced through feelings of anger. I argue that exposure to 
uncivil political talk produces such anti-deliberative behavior, via anger. Additionally, I 
argue that incivility is further detrimental to the d liberative process in that it propagates 
even more uncivil political talk. Exposure to incivility breeds more incivility.   
  There are two modes through which political information can, via anger, induce 
anti-deliberative behavior and breed an increased propensity to utilize uncivil language 
and rhetoric: (1) the vilification of views and politicians of the opposing side rallies 




offending partisans of the other side, who react by retreating to existing views and 
responding with incivility. 
Mode 1: Target Aversion and the “Mob Effect” 
Mimicking the language and behavior of the media that one is exposed to is well-
established in the political communication literatue (i.e., Zaller 1992; Layman and 
Carsey 2002; Jamieson and Capella 2009). Media elites have a significant influence on 
the opinions of their audiences, and when commentators target certain individuals, 
groups, or ideas, this antipathy is relayed to the audience (Barker 2002). As Mutz (2007) 
argues, incivility creates disdain for opposing views, with more intense incivility 
correlated with views that the opposing side has insid ous motives. A willingness to listen 
to or actually consider the views of the other side is not like to happen when the views are 
considered illegitimate (Mutz 2006, 2007), and an end consequence is a refusal to 
compromise.  
 Beyond convincing audiences that the opposition is “bad” and that their views 
should not be weighed, uncivil discourse also legitimizes the use of uncivil language and 
behavior in political talk—after all, if elites one trusts are engaged in such behavior, it 
follows that such behavior is acceptable or even necessary. Herbst (2010) argues that 
incivility is used as a weapon of sorts, to rile audiences up in anger concerning the “other 
side” by reminding followers how “bad” the other side is; negative words and 
associations (i.e., “socialism”) are used strategically to mobilize because they are cues the 
audience understands, and are averse to.  By connecti g these concepts to opponents, 
elites create disdain for their targets, legitimize th  use of uncivil language and set it as 




“mob effect” as individuals are induced to “join in” on the targeting of opposition views 
and individuals in an uncivil fashion by the demonizat on of the opposing side by like-
minded individuals.  
What is not clear is if the “mob effect” is the result of negative emotions, where 
incivility generates aversion towards a target, or if it simply a mimicking effect, whereby 
witnessing like-minded individuals utilize incivility legitimizes and inspires others to 
adopt uncivil language. I call the strong, negative feelings towards a target that are 
potentially induced by like-minded uncivil comments “target aversion.” I will investigate 
whether a “mob effect” occurs with exposure to like-minded incivility, and, if so, whether 
target aversion is the driving force. 
Mode 2: Perpetrator Aversion and the “Retaliation Effect” 
Partisanship is much a part of many people’s identity (Schuessler 2000), and like 
any type of personal identity—whether it be gender, race, or geography—blanket insults 
about partisans of certain stripes are likely to offend, especially when coming from 
partisans of the other camp. It is not a great leapto expect people who are offended to be 
unwilling to carefully weigh the claims made, and to reject any notion of finding 
common ground. This point, though not empirically backed, has been suggested by many 
scholars; Strahan and Wolf (2012), example, suppose that, “[i]nteractions characterized 
by challenges, name-calling, disagreements, and interruptions usually lead to entrenched 
positions rather than compromise. When opponents feel attacked, especially when those 
attacks are made public, they respond by digging in to defend their own position rather 




 It is also not a great leap to expect the offended to respond in kind. Philips and 
Smith (2004) have found the most common emotion experienced by individuals offended 
by incivility in everyday life is anger, and that angered individuals react with 
retribution—perhaps with incivility. Thus, due to its offending nature and ability to 
induce anger, one uncivil act breeds another. This is not surprising; as anyone who has 
been insulted by a personal attack or an attack on his or her views knows, there is an 
impetus to return the favor, not to concede the perpetrator has a point. And, when, 
conditions are right, it only takes a spark to create a fire. I call the strong, negative 
feelings towards a person who makes a disagreeable uncivil comment “perpetrator 
aversion.” When a person experiencing “perpetrator version” feels compelled to “return 
the favor” and act uncivil in kind, I refer to this a  the “retaliation effect.”  
 There is some empirical evidence to suggest this occur when incivility is present 
in political discourse. Papacharissi (2004), utilizing a natural experiment of politics-
themed Internet newsgroups (which are like Internet cha  rooms but feature asynchronous 
responses and thus tend to be more deliberative and thoughtful) finds that discussions of 
policy are generally civil and polite in the newsgroups, until an uncivil post is made by a 
discussant. Following this, other respondents react hea edly, utilizing incivility 
themselves, before the conversation eventually returns to a more civil tone following 
interventions by members of the discussion.  
 This “retaliation effect” can be seen at the macro level as well; as Herbst (2010, 
53-57) notes, Sarah Palin’s use of incivility on the 2008 campaign trail had the effect of 
electrifying and bonding supporters (in accordance with the “mob effect”) while 




one side via anger by reminding them how bad those they disagree with are, those whose 
identify with the “other side” are angered as well by the charges and insults made. The 
other side, in a sense, is instigated into reacting in an uncivil fashion. Ultimately, aversion 
to the claims being made, despite who or what the targe  is, connects the presentation to 
the political information to the use of incivility in the expression of political views. 
 Having established what exactly anti-deliberative behavior is, and provided an 
argument as to exposure to uncivil political discourse might induce anti-deliberative 
thinking in individuals, the “so what?” question still remains. So what if the public is 
close-minded? So what if they do not compromise with each other in message boards? 
Why should we care if they are uncivil to each other and cannot find any middle ground? 
In the next two sections, I explain that a public wth anti-deliberative views will affect the 
functioning of government, via influencing elites, and restrict the “wisdom of the 
multitude” that comes about through open deliberation. 
Holding Their Feet to the Fire: How an Uncivil Public Influences Elite Behavior 
While the public may take its cues from elites (Zaller 1992), less willingness 
among non-elites (especially active partisans) to compromise with opposing arguments, 
and even regard them as legitimate, can reinforce these sentiments among elites (or bind 
them to them). As Jacobson (2000) contends, the “relationship between mass and elite 
partisan consistency is inherently interactive.” Saunders and Abramowitz (2004) argue 
that the growing polarization and involvement of active partisans may “reinforce 




ideological principles and to eschew moderation in pursuit of electoral success12.”  
Because the electoral (especially in party primaries and caucuses) and financial support 
of party activists is needed, polarization among these individuals has a polarizing effect 
on party politics (Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz 2006). 
 The extent to which partisans in the electorate esch w any thoughts of 
compromise with the “other side” is problematic should not be understated. Scholars 
have found that the transparency of debate among elites affects policy decision-making 
(Chambers 2005; Levy 2005); because representatives feel pressure to placate their 
partisan base when speaking in public, openness in elite deliberation has been shown to 
increase partisan polarization.  As Stasavage (2007) states, “[p]ublicity of debate may 
prompt representatives to use their actions or statements as signals that they are being 
faithful to constituent interest… [and therefore] rp esentatives are much more likely to 
engage in a free exchange of opinions and information if they express these opinions in 
private.” Stasavage adds that this does not just apply to elected officials, as all members 
of government likely have a “more intrinsic need, psychological or other, to retain the 
esteem of a constituency by adhering to an ideological line.” Thus, public debates are 
limited in their usefulness. As elites’ efforts to please constituents derail their 
negotiations with each other, and can potentially make the situation worse, the use of 
incivility and fidelity to party views by one side to please the base will likely lead to 
greater polarization on the issue at hand.  
 The knowledge that the public can influence sensitive negotiations between elites 
is not new, and attempts have been made to insulate elites from public opinion during 
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debates over divisive issues. For example, during the Constitutional Convention, all 
deliberations were to be conducted in complete secrecy, outside of the public eye 
(Chambers 2005). Secret deliberations were deemed necessary because the delegates felt 
honest discourse was needed--and that meant delegats should feel free to offer their 
thoughts, and change their minds, without fear of rebuke. Today, the public is likely to 
reject the process of “secret” negotiations, and moern news media and technology 
enable the public’s ability to do this. The republican system the founders intended, in 
which the opinions of the public would be “filtered” through their representatives in the 
government, has over time been replaced with a more direct role for the public in 
influencing policy. U.S. senators are now directly elected by the public, slates of electors  
cast their votes for presidential candidates in accordance with the popular vote in each 
state, and the development (and dramatic growth) of scientific public opinion polls 
provide a means for the public to give feedback to their representatives in between 
elections.13  In short, the public expect their representatives to vote, think, and act as they
do, and they have means of enforcing this. 
 In the summer of 2011, for example, Congress formed a bipartisan “super 
committee,” charged with reducing the federal deficits by $1.5 trillion over a decade.14 
Debt talks between President Obama and Speaker of the House John Boehner had failed 
earlier in the year, resulting in Standard & Poor's downgrading the United States’ triple-A 
credit rating. Aware that the message of “no comproise” from the bases of both the 
Democratic and Republican parties had  derailed the Obama-Boehner negotiations, the 
White House hoped that  “back-room” negotiations outside of the public eye between a 
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(and is) occurring, where the public can provide daily feedback and instructions to the government. 




committee of six Democrats and six Republicans could lead to a “grand bargain.” Faced 
with impending automatic, across-the-board “trigger” r ductions if an agreement was not 
made, much was at stake in the “super committee” discussions.  Other lawmakers, 
lobbyists, and the public were angered by the fact that the discussion were being held in 
secret, sheltered from public feedback—and a push for much more transparency was 
made.15 However, details of the negotiations were leaked16 and lobbyist and activist 
groups trying to protect benefits and tax breaks met with members of the super-
committee throughout negotiations.17 When the negotiations ultimately failed, liberal and 
conservative groups alike hailed it as a triumph, for their side did not “compromise.”18  
“Public Speakers” and Web 2.0 
 The “super committee” failure teaches us that elect d officials conducting 
important negotiations in secrecy is not going to be a solution for getting around a 
divided public. Given that some “open government” will occur with such negotiations, 
whether intended or not, the public will have a role. A polarized public, unwilling to 
accept compromise, can derail these negotiations by insisting officials on their “side” 
sticks to their guns. Constituents who reject compromise and middle-ground solutions are 
expected to hold their representatives in government to these same standards.  Obduracy 
alone among the public puts pressure on their repres ntative to avoid compromise in 
policy debates; however, when people believe that the views alternative to their own are 
illegitimate or dangerous, compromise becomes equatd with something like treason. To 
the extent that it induces an anti-deliberative spirit among the public, uncivil political 
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16 See Parkinson (2011) and Bouldan et al. (2011). 
17 See Pear (2011) 




discourse has the potential to significantly limit and complicate elites’ negotiations on 
sensitive, controversial policy matters. 
 This is especially important given that the constituents most likely to provide 
feedback to politicians (via the voting booth, letters, and checkbook) are those who are 
most likely to engage in political discussions (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). It is true 
that most people do not actively engage in politica deliberation. Yet, in the age of the 
Internet, they become the audience of those who do. If y u use the Internet to read news, 
or utilize a social networking site like Facebook, it is very difficult to avoid seeing other 
people’s political comments. When these comments are imbued with incivility, you 
become the audience to uncivil political talk. 
 For example, you could right this moment visit thewebsite of the New York Times 
(nyt.com), the “paper of record,” and open up a political opinion piece. Scroll down to 
the end of the article and look at the comments section. In all likelihood, many of the 
comments will feature incivility. Twenty years ago, political opinion pieces featured in 
the New York Times probably did not sound or seem too different than the one you just 
opened; what has changed is the prominence and ubiquity of other people’s political 
thoughts—which more often than not include incivility, ad hominem attacks, and little 
filter.  
 The incredible democratization of political communication via Web 2.0 that has 
redefined the “public sphere” has serious drawbacks. Individual people’s willingness to 
use incivility has extended beyond private conversations, and is now available for public 
consumption. Hyperbole and uncivil rhetoric are not restricted to the dinner table or 




types, every day, all of the time. It is not an overstatement to say avoiding uncivil 
political talk on the Internet is much more difficult to do than finding it, nor is it to say 
that most political talk on the Internet will invole some incivility.19 As bad and as 
plentiful as incivility may be in elite-run political media (and, as I will show, it has a 
significant role in inducing the use of incivility), a public willing to use incivility, armed 
with the means to broadcast their political opinions to large audiences, adds some 
permanence to the connection between political talk and incivility—there is almost no 
escaping it. Even if you do not respond to any of the comments you see in a New York 
Times opinion piece, you were exposed to the uncivil claims of others. Perhaps most 
Americans are merely in the audience of nasty online conversations, rather than active 
participants. Yet if incivility does affect people’s willingness to compromise or whether 
or not they see legitimacy in views different from their own, then the use of incivility in 
the political talk of some has the power to affect the behavior and viewpoints of many.  
The ubiquity of incivility in online political discussions can affect the political 
behavior of those in the audience--whether it is in the voting booth or with their pocket 
book. An anti-deliberative spirit amongst a divided electorate, with both sides unopened 
to compromise and considering the other side’s views, are more likely to send 
representatives to Washington who share the “no compr ise” spirit (Wolf et al. 2012). 
Mann and Ornstein (2012), addressing the hyper-polarized and dysfunctional Washington 
climate, write:  
Paradoxically, the public’s undifferentiated disgust with Congress, Washington, 
and “the government” in general is part of the problem, not the basis of a solution. 
In never-ending efforts to defeat incumbent officeholders in hard times, the public 
is perpetuating the source of its discontent, electing a new group of people who 
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are even less inclined to or capable of crafting compromise solutions to pressing 
problems. 
“Confrontation” rather than “compromise” has been the spirit of the most recent 
Congresses, and has been increasing (Abramowitz 2012); however, I disagree with Mann 
and Ornstein that the driving factor of this is an “u differentiated disgust” with 
Washington and politicians in general among members of the public. Rather, it is disgust 
focused on the politicians and the party opposite on ’s own. As Mann and Ornstein point 
out, the Tea Party Republicans elected to Congress during the 2010 midterm elections 
were done so in part because they promised to under no circumstances compromise with 
Democrats and the Obama Administration. The Tea Party’s mantra, more or less, is “no 
compromise,” and a central goal of the movement is to “defeat” policy initiatives (and 
politicians) believed to morally wrong and illegitimate.    
 It is easy to single out the Tea Party as the essence of the problem, but the spirit of 
no compromise extends beyond (and predates) Tea Party supporters. A public that wishes 
to see one side defeated rather than problems solved will get what it asks for. And a 
public that utilizes uncivil tactics in discourse can affect elite behavior even more 
directly: through the open use of incivility, constituents can disrupt public deliberative 
forums or compel politicians to avoid them altogether—as was the case with the summer 
of 2010 health care reform “town meetings” (Herbst 2010). 
  To the extent that incivility and polarization are both a function of each other, 
then use of incivility by the electorate has the potential to disrupt, complicate, and 
prevent negotiations between elites in both parties over issues in which little common 
ground exists to begin with. If the voting public clamors for red meat, and want their 




Furthermore, the public’s use of incivility in the rare instances when representative and 
constituent can directly communicate is likely to lead to representatives avoid direct 
interactions with constituents—a cornerstone of republican government—and pursue 
policy without this input. If elite negotiations over important but controversial issues are 
to be transparent and successful, the public is requir d to be open to middle-ground 
policies. Partisans must be open to their representatives compromising with the “other 
side”—or at least willing to accept instances when their representatives do compromise.  
 
The Importance of Public Deliberation 
Public input in policy debates is important—but its quality too depends on civility 
in discourse. Within the many arguments made by social commentators and academics 
alike for why civility in political talk is important is the idea that it is good for public 
deliberation. Scholars have expressed the sentiment that a lack of civility in political 
discourse can be detrimental to deliberative processes (Kingwell 1995). When norms of 
civility are adhered to, Jamieson and Hardy (2012) explain, “areas of agreement and 
disagreement are clarified, the collective understanding of the issue at hand is reinforced, 
and judgment is based on prejudice, force, or fear.” But why is deliberation amongst non-
elites important? Public deliberation, which Luskin a d Fishkin (2002) define as “a 
process of learning, thinking, and talking about policy and electoral choices,” is an 
essential component for a well-functioning democracy.  The idea that the public can 
collectively produce better public policy through deliberation has a long and illustrious 
history of supporters, including John Stuart Mill, Jurgen Habermas, and Hannah Arendt. 




quality is in part based on the extent to which policy is based on superb deliberation—the 
“wisdom of the multitude” (Wilson 2011).  
 Perhaps the most influential argument for the importance deliberation was made 
by John Stuart Mill in On Liberty. Mill (1998/1859), writing that “[a]ll silencing of 
discussion is an assumption of infallibility,” worried about the loss of individuality and 
creativity in the face of collective identity. He makes the case that no opinion should be 
suppressed, should that opinion actually have merit d spite being held by a minority. Mill 
draws directly from Aristotle and the Athenian experience in developing his argument for 
wisdom en masse (Mansbridge 1999), proposing that when individuality, subjectivity, 
and creativity are unrestricted, and when the range of opinions are “collated” together, we 
can expect the best possible collective outcomes to be produced. The American 
constitutional system was designed with a similar thought it mind, where, through 
deliberation, a heterogeneity of views and interests would collate together to produce 
policy “for the general benefit of the whole community,” (Sunstein 2009, 36). 
 It is from this line of thought that many make thecase for deliberation—that true 
innovation can occur when various ideas and views are openly exchanged and 
considered. Less abstractly, more practical ends have been attributed to deliberation, 
namely better citizens and better laws. As Warren (1996) explains, deliberation is a 
process, “wherein the point is to increase the quality of democratic judgments through 
widespread citizen participation in multiple public spheres, both within and between the 
institutions of state, economy, and civil society.” I will briefly go over some of the 





Better Citizens, Better Laws 
The concept that “public spiritedness” or active engagement in the public sphere 
can make citizens “better” is a view promoted by Mill, with roots in the observations of 
Alexis de Tocqueville (Mansbridge 1999).  Contemporary political science research 
provides empirical evidence that deliberation produces higher levels of political efficacy, 
more informed judgments, and more participation (i.e., Gastil 2000; Guttmann and 
Thompson 1996). Political sophistication levels of individuals increase when they take 
part in deliberation, with individuals becoming more consistent in the rationality they 
apply to political issues (Gastil and Dillard 1999).  
 If deliberation improves democratic citizens and citizens affect public policy, then 
it follows that political deliberation can also improve public policy. More informed, 
reflective participatory citizens make more informed, reflective democratic decisions. In 
contemporary studies of political deliberation, widespread support has been made for the 
idea that better public policy is a likely result of deliberative citizens (i.e., Gastil 2000, 
Page 1996). After analyzing the results of a “Deliberative Polling” event in Britain, 
Luskin, Fishkin, and Jowell (2002) conclude that “participating in deliberations and other 
aspects of the event provide the opportunity and some incentive for citizens to spend time 
working towards their own, more considered opinions. The result, in the aggregate, is a 
picture of a better informed and more thoughtful public opinion.” 
 Luskin and Fishkin (2002) claim deliberation produces more sophisticated, 
tolerant, and participatory citizens, by first helping them to better understand their own 
interests, providing them with a better understanding of the “public interest,” generating 




and helping to increase appreciation and support for democratic processes. However, the 
work of Luskin and Fishkin has received a fair amount of criticism, usually concerning 
the nature of deliberative polling (i.e., Parkinson 2006), which raises the question of 
whether people want—or even can—deliberate and improve their political sophistication 
in the process (Hibbing and Theiss-Moore 2002).  
 Mutz (2006) notably argues that there are drawbacks to public deliberation. She 
demonstrates that rather than producing a vibrant, par icipatory citizenry, exposure to 
alternative views leads to less participation. Mutz shows that when people are cocooned 
within an environment where their preexisting views are reinforced and the views of the 
“other side” are portrayed as wrong or illegitimate, their willingness to participate is 
bolstered by a certainty in the “correctness” of their views. When people are exposed to 
alternative views, and consider them viable, that certainty is reduced, along with the 
motivation to participate. Mutz concludes, however, that it is the fear of social 
repercussions which limits the extent to which individuals speak freely, and that the 
tension that exists between participatory and deliberative practices can be reduced should 
norms be developed for handling differences respectfully in discourse (149-150). 
Integrating civility into political conversations would be a big step towards making the 
exchange of views more respectful. Additionally, Stromer-Galley and Muhlberger (2009) 
find that disagreement per se is not related reduced motivation to deliberate. This 
suggests that another factor —which I contend is the presence of incivility in discourse—
is responsible for reducing the motivation to delibrate. Civility in political talk, 
therefore, may be the key to generating productive deliberation, as well as reconciling a 




 Becoming politically active via deliberation is meaningful, as participating in a 
political event once can lead to more habitual participation—although studies have linked 
habitual participation with casting a vote (Gerber, G een, and Scahcar 2003), talking 
about politics helps individuals overcome rational ignorance, an informational 
impediment to participation (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Even if deliberation fails to 
improve or motivate democratic participation, however, there is an argument that it can 
still have a positive effect on public policy. In their seminal work on the rationality of 
collective policy preferences, Page and Shapiro (1992) make the argument for collective 
deliberation:  
… in which the public as a collectivity reasons about policy, and collective public 
opinion becomes something more than the a sum of  it individual parts…Given the 
limited effort and resources that any one individual can—or would want to—
devote to politics, a system of collective deliberation is needed so that people 
arrive at preferences  reflecting the relevant facts nd the realities of political 
causation: that is, preferences for policies that appropriate means to achieve the 
ends they seek (363) 
This point highlights the importance of deliberation n democratic society; if citizen 
competence is low, public discourse becomes even more necessary to organize and guide 
collective preferences. 
 Deliberation can also serve as a means through which policy on controversial 
issues gets crafted. As Delli Carpini et al. (2004) write, 
In an era of great divisiveness over policy issues and partisan positions, the 
traditional tools of electoral and legislative avenu s to collective decision making 
remain essential. But they have also become deadlocked or have alienated large 
parts of America. Public deliberation has emerged as a potentially valuable way 
of breaking (or at least sidestepping) this deadlock. 
This last point relates to the discussion to follow: in an era of high partisanship, might 
public deliberation be the key to compromise when vi wpoints are entrenched?20 If 
                                                
20 Luskin and Fishkin (2002) make a slightly different point that deliberation is a means through which 




discourse is kept civil, might the public be able to encourage and contribute to solutions 
to the country’s gravest problems—such as reducing federal spending deficits—rather 
than contributing to partisan deadlock? An avenue through which to “fix Washington” 
may not begin with changing Washington culture directly, but increasing pro-deliberative 
behavior among the public.  
 The public’s ability to collectively produce “bettr policy” is limited if the public 
is largely polarized into two camps and neither is willing to consider what the other camp 
has to say. In sum, the use of incivility by non-elites inhibits the extent to which 
“collective wisdom” is produced through public deliberation. If incivility in political talk 
induces anti-deliberative behavior, then understanding what induces the use of incivility 
is an important question to answer. First, however, it is necessary to define what is meant 
by “political incivility,” which I do in the next section.  
Defining and Identifying Incivility 
What counts as incivility in politics is said to bein eye of the beholder (Herbst 
2010). A central issue in works dealing with incivility in political discourse is defining 
what it means to be uncivil—specifically, the point at which discourse has crossed the 
line of merely being negative to being uncivil. Sobieraj and Berry (2010) define civil 
political discourse as “political argumentation characterized by speakers who present 
themselves as reasonable and courteous, treating eve  those with whom they disagree as 
though they and their ideas are worthy of respect.” This vies with the definition used by 
Mutz (2006) that “a civil orientation [in discourse] is one that does not duck conflict 
                                                                                                                                      
assumption that true, real deliberation is possible in a hyper polarized society where respect for views 
opposed to one’s own is anemic. As I argue below and show throughout this project, respect seems far 




entirely, but that simultaneously embraces the importance of maintaining social 
relationship,” (75). 
 Yet, when discourse is “reasonable” and “embraces th  maintenance of social 
relationships” is still subjective. However, as a study on public perceptions of incivility in 
American politics conducted by Allegheny College shows, the American public is largely 
in agreement over certain types of claims in political discourse qualifying as uncivil21 
(Shea 2010). Furthermore, theoretical directions for identifying incivility has begun to 
emerge over time; a number of studies in the campaign dvertising and media and politics 
literatures have considered the effects of incivility on the electorate, differentiating “civil 
negative” claims from “uncivil negative” claims. Fridkin and Kenney (2008), 
distinguishing between “mudslinging” and “legitimate negativity,” define mudslinging as 
the “presentation of campaign information that is irrelevant to governing, and the 
presentation of campaign information in harsh, strident, and shrill manner.” Brooks and 
Geer (2007), distinguishing civil negative claims from uncivil negative claims, define 
uncivil statements as those which include “claims that are inflammatory or superfluous.” 
In an experimental test of how exposure to mediated uncivil discourse affects individual’s 
level of political trust, Mutz and Reeves (2005) operationalize incivility as exchanges that 
include “gratuitous asides that suggested a lack of respect and/or frustration with the 
opposition.” 
                                                
21 The Allegheny study asked individuals if they believed various activities to qualify as incivility. The 
following behaviors were widely viewed as uncivil: Belittling or insulting someone (89 percent), comments 
about someone’s race or ethnicity (89 percent), personal attacks on someone you disagree with (87 
percent), shouting over someone you disagree with during an argument (85 percent), comments about 
someone’s sexual orientation (81 percent), interrupting someone you disagree with in a public forum (77 
percent), manipulating the facts about an issue to persuade others (77 percent), and questioning someone’s 





 What the public generally seems to believe counts as uncivil political talk is 
largely in agreement with what has been identified an operationalized as uncivil political 
discourse in the above studies. Collectively, three common themes emerge from these 
definitions: uncivil claims must be disrespectful towards their target, must do so in a 
purposeful, confrontational manner, and must be presented in a hyperbolic nature. 
Suggesting that you do not have respect for a person or people is the most basic element 
of uncivil discourse. Making it clear through comments that you do not hold a person or 
persons in high esteem is not equivalent to disliking someone—it is possible to dislike 
someone but still respect her or certain qualities she possesses.  
 Uncivil comments can be thought of as those that cannot be consistent with 
suggesting respect for the candidate. If a person were to comment that, “the candidate’s 
policies are bad, and are not what the country needs right now, but I generally respect 
her, and believe her to generally be an honest, well-int ntioned, and reasonable 
individual,” she is saying something negative about the candidate that is still consistent 
with the latter part of the sentence that suggests r pect. However, if she were to 
comment, “[t]he candidate is a lying, foolish radical bent on destroying America, but I 
generally respect her, and believe her to generally be an honest, well-intentioned, and 
reasonable individual,” the negative assessment in the first part of the sentence is entirely 
inconsistent with the latter half.  
 Lacking respect for an individual, in it of itself, does not qualify as uncivil 
behavior—for a person to engage in uncivil discourse, he or she must be “actively 
disrespectful.” Incivility is therefore not synonymous with disrespect, as it is possible to 




disrespect in which contempt is made clear through actions, where something 
disrespectful is done. Being uncivil is not a passive enterprise; if uncivil discourse 
involves claims that are gratuitous, strident, and inflammatory, then it is expected that the 
nature of such claims are obvious and deliberate. 
 Uncivil language is words and phrases that are clearly meant to insult and 
demonstrate a lack of respect. It is here that the diff rence between disliking and 
disrespecting becomes clear—for example, if a person’s response when asked what she 
likes and dislikes about Candidate A is “nothing” and “everything,” she is suggesting she 
does not hold a favorable view of Candidate A, but is not saying anything disrespectful 
about Candidate A. Uncivil behavior is thus different from other types of behavior that 
are considered disrespectful, such as rudeness—which may be unintentional—and 
passive aggressive behavior, which may not be obvious and may go unnoticed. 
 Incivility in political discourse also tends to have a hyperbolic nature. 
Deliberately saying something bad about Candidate A might suggest you do not like or 
even respect her, yet it also might be a legitimate point—it could qualify as a claim that is 
civil negative. With few exceptions, what differentiates a civil negative claim from 
uncivil negative claim is hyperbole—uncivil talk tends to be an exaggerated, embellished 
version of civil negative talk and the “disrespectful” element is made clear. For example, 
claiming “Candidate A lacks many of the qualities necessary to be successful in office, 
and her policies are not impressive,” is negative but civil. However, adding hyperbole, 
the claim becomes, “Candidate A is a horrible, lying, bad person who is the worst 
candidate in the history of the office and has the dumbest policies I have ever seen.”  




unimpressive policies remains intact, just how bad she is has been exaggerated to an 
insulting and unrealistic extent. 
Operationalizing Incivility 
 While civil negative language has been differentiated from uncivil negative 
language (Brooks and Geer 2007; Fridkin and Kenney 2008), the methods of 
operationalizing such have been a matter of debate. Fridkin and Kenney (2006) critique 
the operationalization of mudslinging by Jackson and Sides (2005), arguing some topics 
such as references to the Washington establishment and seeming out of touch with voters 
qualify as legitimate negativity, as long as they are presented in an otherwise civil 
manner. Sigelman and Park (2007), critiquing the subjective element involved in coders 
judging a statement as civil or uncivil (specifically the work of Brooks and Geer 2007), 
use a computer program that functions as a dimensional scoring system to determine 
whether presidential campaign ads cross the line into incivility by rating the words in ads 
on how “unpleasant” and “nasty” they are. The method of relying on a computer program 
to code incivility in considerably limited as it cannot take context into consideration.22 
Given my wish to evaluate the opinions of individuals, which are likely to include 
content far more heterogeneous and dissimilar than campaign ads, accounting for context 
is all the more important. However, it is accurate to say that the “I know it when I see it” 
approach is not a rigorous enough test of civility.  
 Fortunately, studies on incivility provide some thoretical directions for how to 
identify uncivil discourse by describing specific elements that characterize it. Brooks and 
                                                
22 By Sigelman and Park’s own admission, their program identifies words deemed “unpleasant” but not 
negation, a claim such as, “I do not think the candidate has a dishonest bone in her body,” would be 





Geer (2007) operationalize incivility by adding pointed insults to civil negative, 
opponent-focused messages, including “dishonest,” “heartless,” and “cowardly.” Mutz 
and Reeves similarly operationalize incivility through the addition of gratuitous asides to 
otherwise civil exchanges. These elements are incorporated into the list of ways civility 
can be breached in mediated political discourse devloped by Sobieraj and Berry (2010). 
Table 2-1: Incivility Index 
 
Criteria of Incivility Example 
Claim 
Type Example Statement 
Criterion 1: “Namecalling, 
Mockery, and Character 
Assassination” 
Additional superfluous 
adverbs and adjectives 
which add no new 












“The candidate has not told the 
truth to the American people about 
his voting record.” + 
Uncivil 
Negative 
“The unethical and deceitful 
candidate has not told the truth to 
the American people about his 
voting record.” + 
Criterion 2: “Spin and 
Misrepresentative 
Exaggeration” 
Use of a much more 
extreme, inflammatory 
word or phrase which 
makes individual or action 
seem more radical, 
immoral, or corrupt 
Candidate’s 
issue positions 
were out of 
sync with 




“The candidate had effective and 
convincing advertisements and 
more money to spend.” 
Uncivil 
Negative 
“The candidate manipulated the 
public and essentially bought the 
election.” 
Criterion 3: “Histrionics” 
Language suggests 
individual or group should 
be feared or is responsible 
for sadness. Also includes 
thoughts that are 
purposefully exaggerated 
through uppercase letters 









“The election of the candidate has 






“I fear for what will happen to this 
country if the candidate is elected. 
It will be a sad day for America. 
                      -and- 
“WE SHOULD ALL BE 
SCARED!!!!!!!” 
 
                                                
+ The civil/uncivil claims are adapted from an example used by Brooks and Geer (2006); Brooks and Geer 






Both of the descriptions provided by Sobieraj and Berry (2010) and Mutz and 
Reeves (2005) include elements that describe visual examples of incivility (i.e., eye-
rolling, raised voices, violent waving of the hands, etc.). However, my concern in this 
study is only with use of uncivil language and emotional displays that are made through 
text, which is increasingly relevant in the world of new media and social networking. It is 
therefore sufficient to develop an index to gauge incivility that specifically applies to 
language. Utilizing the definitions and dimensions f incivility that apply to language 
developed in these studies, I have developed an incivil ty index to follow (as well as 
constrain) when coding statements, which can be seen in full in Table 2.1. 
Following Brooks and Geer (2007), I contend that within nearly every uncivil 
claim exists a civil, central message. What differentiates civil discourse from uncivil 
discourse is the extent to which certain ideas are stressed or radicalized. Superfluous 
adverbs and adjectives with the sole purpose of insult g are added into these claims. It’s 
not just what people say but how they say it which differentiates incivility from civility 
(Mutz and Reeves 2005; Brooks and Geer 2007). An exception is conspiracy theories 
(Criterion 4 in my index), which paint an individual in a negative light without any civil 
negative basis for such a claim; while conspiracy theories have not been included in 
measures used by other incivility studies, Sobieraj and Berry (2010) note, retrospectively, 
that they should be considered examples of incivility. A more detailed description of how 
to identify occurrences of incivility in accordance with each of the criteria is includes in 





There is no shortage of issues of concern in American politics. We are also not 
lacking for discussion of these issues—from cable news programs to online forums, 
problems like the national debt are debated ad nauseum. What is missing, however, is 
compromise and consideration of views which differ rom preexisting ones. My goal is to 
shed some light on how incivility keeps mass political discourse full of partisan 
combatants, but few active deliberative citizens. I the chapters to follow, I will explore 
how the presence of incivility in political talk affects people’s willingness to deliberate.  
Producing a better understanding of how incivility in discourse affects the 
deliberative process is worth undertaking for theoretical reasons, but there are practical 
reasons for this analysis as well. Incivility has come to be utilized more in political 
discourse among the populace than it has in the recent pasts. Changes in political and 
media culture are the likely culprits, with polarized parties and hyperbolic, niche political 
media encouraging the use of incivility among the public. Furthermore, the ability for 
mass interpersonal communication via the Internet ad social networking sites makes an 
uptick in incivility more important than it has been in previous eras. In the next chapter, I 
will show evidence of an uptick in the use of incivility in political talk since the 1970s, 








Chapter 3: Incivility over Time 
 The media often report that the public believes civility in politics has declined,23 
and studies indicate that this is largely true (Shea 2010; Herbst 2010). References to a 
“civility crisis” abound, and communities have taken steps to rectify what they perceive 
as a civil discourse deficit.24  As Sapiro (1999, 3) explains, a crisis in civility is one in 
which “civility has declined in such a way as to have unfortunate effects for the 
functioning of democracy by making members less fit for engaging in democratic 
politics, and less able to deliberate with each other democratically.” Are we experiencing 
a “civility crisis”? The first step to answering this question is to determine whether the 
use of incivility in political discourse has actually increased. 
  Political scientists also assume that a decline in political civility has taken place, 
without empirically testing this claim (Sigelman and Park 2007). This is in part because 
showing an uptick in incivility is an empirically challenging thing to do, due to changes 
in context and norms over time (Herbst 2010, and Sapiro 1999). Even studying incivility 
statically poises challenges; as Sapiro (1999) state , “[c]ontemporary social science 
research on civility practices and perceptions findsystematic evidence that what 
constitutes civility is culturally constructed, contextually driven, and depends on the 
social standing and placement of those involved.” Similarly, Herbst (2010) contends that 
strict standards of civility do not exist, and differences in context over time make it 
                                                
23 For instance, in a piece by CNN news personality Jack Cafferty, a poll indicating that Americans believe 
civility has declined is presented as evidence of civility disappearing in American politics: 
http://caffertyfile.blogs.cnn.com/2011/06/21/why-is-america-becoming-nastier-2/ 
24 Howard County, Maryland, for example, recently launched a “civility initiative” in order to encourage 




impossible to determine if contemporary American politics is less civil than it has been in 
the past.  
 These arguments have merit—demonstrating that American culture in 2012 is 
more uncivil than American culture in 1812 or 1912 is a very difficult, if not impossible 
thing to do, and egregious examples of incivility can be found in almost any era of 
American history. Oftentimes, whether some activity qualifies as “uncivil,” such as civil 
disobedience or an accusation of racism, is entirely subjective (Mendelberg 2009; Sapiro 
1999).  Yet an examination of trends in incivility should not be completely abandoned. 
Specifically, an examination of whether incivility n political discourse has grown more 
common within the contemporary era can and should be completed rigorously for the 
following reasons: 
1. Trends in party polarization and media narrowcasting in contemporary history 
provide theoretical expectations for an increase in the use of incivility within the 
last four decades 
2. Empirically assessing whether or not use of incivility when talking politics among 
the general population has increased within the contemporary era is possible, as 
modern scientific surveys provide data to test this hypothesis, and contexts such 
as language are more or less consistent within the era (i.e., terms such as “war 
monger” and “radical” are as much relevant as negative references in 2012 as they 
were in 1972).  
3. Whether people are more uncivil when talking politics nowadays might matter 




communication between many different peoples can be an veryday occurrence 
for a common person.  
 In this chapter, I present evidence that incivility in political discourse is on the rise. I 
describe two trends that that would lead us to expect an uptick in political incivility has 
occurred, review existing research suggesting incivlity has increased, before presenting 
evidence that the use of incivility among the general population when talking politics has 
grown over the last few decades. The data I use are respondents’ evaluations of 
candidates and parties from the cumulative time seri  data file from the American 
National Election Studies.  
Why might incivility among the electorate have increased? I next describe the two 
trends—partisan polarization and substantial changes in the media environment—that 
scholars25 suggest may be driving up uncivil political talk among the public. 
Party Polarization since the 1970s 
 In the last four decades, elite polarization has accelerated. Formerly cross-cutting 
issues have come to be entrenched partisan disputes, and the two major parties have 
become more ideologically consistent (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Layman and 
Carsey 2002). Polarization in Congress is now the highest it has been since the end of 
Reconstruction, as demonstrated by Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-Nominate scores.26 This 
trend in polarization is not limited to officeholders and candidates; activists associated 
with the parties are moving farther apart and becoming ore ideologically extreme as 
well (Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). Reflecting elite polarization, parties in the 
                                                
25 See Shea and Fiorina (2013). 





electorate are also growing more polarized, with the deepest divisions existing between 
the most politically interested and informed on eith r side of the political spectrum 
(Layman and Carsey 2002; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008; Claassen and Highton 
2009).  
 Numerous studies find that the growing political divisions between Democrats 
and Republicans in the electorate began in the early 1970s (Abramowitz and Saunders 
2008). Hetherington (2001) shows (using DW-Nominate scores) that increases in the 
ideological gap between House Democrats and House Republicans began in the mid-
1970s, accelerating since that time, with growing polarization among the electorate 
occurring subsequently. Part of this can be traced back to realignment in Congress--
ideological polarization in Congress sharply began to i crease with conservative southern 
Democrats moving to the Republican Party and liberal northeastern Republicans moving 
to the Democratic Party, Additionally, Abramowitz (2013) argues that polarization has 
been augmented by the rise of social issues and the growing racial and ethnic diversity of 
the base of the Democratic Party.  
Incivility in Congress 
Given that polarization at the elite level likely triggered polarization among the 
parties in the electorate, it makes sense to review evidence of growing incivility among 
the former before examining incivility trends among the latter. It has been said that 
politics has always been uncivil, at least amongst those who practice it. Political 
campaigns especially have a penchant for getting down and dirty, regardless of the era 




history (Herbst 2011), and there is a debate as to whether negativity and incivility in 
presidential campaigns in the contemporary era has been on an increasing trend.27  
 The day-to-day behavior of elites is another story. Uslaner (1993) finds that by the 
1980s, use of incivility within the Senate (which has typically been considered more 
collegial than the House), had become much more common. Uslaner (1991) argues 
“…the digeneration of civilized discourse makes compromise more difficult. On issues 
that are marked by cross-cutting cleavages, statemate ensues. Compromise requires 
particularly delicate negotiations and willingness to give competing claims their due.” In 
addition to legislative stalemate, Uslaner points out that inciviliy among members of 
Congress can result in bad policy, if it is the shrillest voices which get their way. 
Relatedly, Schraufnagel (2011) finds that the ongoi decline in comity and increase in 
incivility in Congress leads to delays in the confirmation of federal judicial nominees.  
Mann and Ornstein (2012) and Uslaner (1993) argue that lawmakers publicly 
attacking their colleagues has become common practice since the 1980s, and Jamieson 
(1999, 2011) finds that attacks on the integrity of the president have been common on the 
House floor since 1976, which were unheard of beforehand. Jamieson suggests that a 
change in political campaign culture occurred following the Vietnam War and 
Watergate—both Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon were considered liars, and Gerald 
Ford’s pardon of Nixon invited additional questions regarding morality and candor of 
presidents. Both Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush were marked as liars following 
the Iran-Contra Affair, and the presidential campaigns of 1988 and 1992 brought about 
new dimensions of uncivil attacks heretofore not present in contemporary elections: the 
                                                
27 Geer (2006; 2012) argues negativity in campaigns has increased, while Buell and Sigelman 2008 and 




questioning of patriotism and accusations of extramarital affairs, respectively. As 
Jacobson (2012) argues, growing party polarization has increased the propensity of elites 
in the party out of the White House to regularly challenge the president’s legitimacy—
each of the last three presidents have faced organized efforts to prove that they in some 
way “stole” the election that put or kept them in office.  
 As the head of government and state, an uptick in uncivil attacks on the president 
is not an innocuous change. For one, as with anythig to do with the president, it invites 
lots of national attention—Arizona Governor Jan Brewer’s infamous “tarmac spat” with 
President Barack Obama and Rep. Joe Wilson (R-SC) shouting “you lie!” at the president 
during a 2009 speech in front a joint session of Congress are prime examples. Incidents 
like these suggest that a line once though sacred is now regularly crossed, and the 
changing (or the demise of) norms dictating what is cceptable discourse.  
Changes in the Media since the 1970s 
Several trends over the last three decades, all of which have grown at the expense 
of the traditional journalism seen in newspapers and national network newscasts, have 
resulted in a media environment considerably different from that of the 1970s. Among 
the changes are the development of cable news, the explosion in popularity of political 
talk radio, and the revolutionizing effects of the Internet and social media. In the sections 
below, I explain how each of these media trends have altered political communication 
and might contribute to increasing use of incivility among the general public. As the 
subsequent data analyses focus on the public’s use of incivility in political talk during 
presidential election years, I make note of which elections became the first to 




New Media and Narrowcasting on Television  
 Mainstream television news has undergone significat hanges since the advent of 
cable television. As Prior (2007) describes it, the broadcast era of television presented 
viewing audiences with limited choice, and thus indiscriminate viewing of news occurred 
frequently.. However, with increased choice in programming provided by cable 
television—overwhelmingly entertainment-oriented—individuals gained the ability to 
create their own individualized media “diet.”  
 One result of the spread of cable television has been a new political knowledge 
and participation gap between politically interested “news-junkies” and those with 
limited interest in politics and currents events who prefer entertainment (Prior 2005; 
2007). A second consequence, with the launch of the Cable News Network (CNN) in 
1984 and the addition of two more cable news heavyweights in MSNBC and the Fox 
News in 1996 (both presidential election years), has been the emergence of an era of high 
octane, partisan news. The “fragmentation” of once-large network news audiences into 
niche populations of news-watchers, often divided by political orientation, has left media 
figures free to say and do things that they could not do were it necessary to maintain a 
broader, heterogeneous audiences.  Furthermore, incased competition in news—as well 
as entertainment options--pushes television news media to feature uncivil, nasty political 
commentary because it draws viewers in. This occurs even (or perhaps especially) among 
those who become angered by what the information presented (Mutz and Reeves 2005, 
Fallows 1996, Prior 2005, 2007;  Delli Carpini and Williams 2001;  Sobieraj and Berry 
2010; Zaller 1998). Thus, the expansion of television news media allows for selective 




biased to support these views (Stroud 2008; 2011; Jamieson and Capella 2009), and 
market factors have pressured these news media to become increasingly vitriolic and 
uncivil. 
 Mutz and Reeves (2005) find that opinions of opposing partisans and opposing 
views become extensively more negative when arguments are presented in an uncivil 
fashion, and, as I argue in the next chapter, the exposure to uncivil political news induces 
individuals to utilize incivility when offering their own political opinions. The rise in 
nasty, uncivil discourse on cable news not only induces incivility, but likely feeds into 
and increases party polarization; As Mutz (2007b) argues, “uncivil discourse increases 
party polarization by helping partisans think even less of their opponents then they 
already did.” Beyond narrowcasting, increases in horse-race and game-centered coverage 
also have led to perceptions by partisans whose side “lost” an election that the winning 
side won by illegitimate means (Mutz 2007b). Even if presidential campaigns themselves 
have not become more negative, increases in the coverage of negative ads in the “new 
media” have made them far more salient (Geer 2012; Iyengar et al. 2012).  
Talk Radio 
In 1987, the Federal Communications Commission ended th  “Fairness 
Doctrine,” leading to the explosion and continually-growing popularity of political talk 
radio over the last 25 years, dominated by conservative talk shows (Pew Project for 
Excellence in Journalism 2010). The end of the Fairness Doctrine was critical to the rise 
of the contemporary political talk radio, as it freed media personalities from having to 




1992 presidential election on,28 political talk radio has played a major role during the 
campaign season. 
 Sobieraj and Berry (2010) find that talk radio, along with pundit cable news 
produce high-levels of “outrage” political content. Exposure to emotionally-charged, 
hyperbolic political talk radio programming, such as The Rush Limbaugh Show, has an 
influential effect on listeners’ political opinions and political behavior, including visceral 
reactions to targets of the programs’ hosts by means of ridicule, caustic  language, and 
radicalizing positions of their targets (Barker 1999, 2002; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 
1998; Jamieson and Capella 2009). As Owen (1997) notes, “[b]ecause of the unique 
characteristics of the medium, talk [radio] shows are imbued with an exceptional 
potential to impart information in a manner that is often emotionally charged.” Owen 
argues that talk radio likely intensifies preexisting abstract feelings into strengthened, 
emotionally-strident opinions.  
In addition, talk radio likely plays a role in imbuing listeners with uncivil rhetoric 
for reuse; as Barker and Knight (2000) point, out, “…talk radio’s most salient 
contribution to the national dialogue may be in providing listeners with rhetorical 
ammunition that can be employed in attempting to win over spouses, friends, and 
acquaintances. In essence, political talk radio can be thought to serve the same function 
as earlier media in a 1990s version of the two-step flow of communication.” Listeners use 
the language and arguments they hear on political talk radio in political persuasion 
efforts.  
                                                
28 As noted by Hollander (1999), political talk radio managed to grab the attention of the public, press, and 
politicians during 1992 presidential election. It marked the first presidential election in which talk radio 
pundits had large national audiences; Rush Limbaugh’s national program, for instance, began right around 
when the 1988 presidential election was taking place, but did not draw 5 million national listeners until 




The Internet and Interactivity 
 Following changes in television news and the growth of talk radio, an even more 
revolutionary trend in media would begin in 1990s: u e of the Internet. The Internet’s 
potential influence as a political communications ad mobilization tool was thought to 
have been realized during the 2000 presidential election—but observers were left 
underwhelmed (Schaefer 2002). However, the 2004 election would see the use of blogs 
and news aggregators (Rainie 2005), online grassroots c rdination29 (Best and Krueger 
2005), and use of the Internet as source for politica  information30 (Pew Research Center 
2004) all came to a head.  The 2004 campaign can be thought of as the first presidential 
election to witness the Internet “come of age” as an information source and 
communications tool (Johnson 2004).  
 Widespread access to the Internet brought about an explosion of choice for the 
public; for those choosing to use the Internet to browse politics, selective exposure is 
even more pronounced with a much larger selection of views (including radical views) 
than are offered on cable news (Bimber and Davis 2003).  The “blogosphere” is a 
particularly notable element of the Internet, as blogs are less professional, more radical, 
and more uncivil than “traditional” news sources, and create what Lawrence et al. (2010) 
refer to as “cloistered cocoons of cognitive consonance” where “blog authors tend to link 
to their ideological kindred and blog readers gravitate to blogs that reinforce their 
existing viewpoints.” Partisan bias is not limited to obscure, amateur blogs; content 
                                                
29 In 2004, Online grassroots campaigning was notably utilized by Howard Dean’s campaign,  and put into 
practice on websites like Meetup.org (Best and Krueger 2005) 
30 As reported by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, over 1 in 5 Americans reported 
using the Internet for campaign news in 2004, nearly doubling the rate in 2000 (about 11 percent) and 
seven time the rate for the 1996 election (about 3 percent). In the same poll, 41 percent reporting using of 
the Internet for general news, a 33 percent increase from 2000, and a 300 percent increase from 1996 (Pew 




analyses show that online news sites (such as Foxnews.com) and mainstream blogs with 
large readerships (such as DailyKos.com) present blatantly biased accounts of current 
events (Baum and Groeling 2008) 
  Beyond selective exposure, another element of the Internet revolution has 
become increasingly influential—interactivity. For perhaps the first time in human 
history, regular interaction with masses of complete strangers from one’s own living 
room is possible. This includes commenting on articles, chat rooms, and news groups, 
and communicating through social network sites (SNS). The virtual anonymity provided 
by the Internet leads to much more socially deviant and uninhibited behavior than 
individuals would attempt in face-to-face interaction (Derks et al. 2008).  
One popular behavior, known as “trolling,” involves the purposeful attempts to 
anger or rile up others by posting inflammatory claims and use of impolite language. As 
Chmiel et al. (2011) demonstrate, much of the emotional posting stems “from reactive 
messages, especially prolonged quarrels between pairs of users with opposing views.” 
Chmiel et al. note that negative, emotional posting have the effect of raising the 
emotional “temperature” of discussion boards, fueling others to react similarly. 
Papacharissi (2004), utilizing a natural experiment of politics-themed Internet 
newsgroups (which are like Internet chat rooms but feature asynchronous responses and 
thus tend to be more deliberative and thoughtful) finds that discussions of policy are 
generally civil and polite in the newsgroups, until an uncivil post is made by a discussant. 
Following this, other respondents react heatedly, utilizing incivility themselves, before 
the conversation eventually returns to a more civiltone following interventions by 




 With Web 2.0, social media and open-sourcing have added identity to postings. 
However, social media may also enhance the chance of exp sure to nasty politics, even 
when identity is attached to the posters. As noted by Derks et al. (2008), there is some 
evidence that negative emotions and uncivil behavior are common on political 
discussions and postings on Facebook, where individuals are not shielded by anonymity; 
this may be partially explained by a false sense of an nymity and privacy on Facebook 
and other social networking sites (Acquisti and Gross 2006), feelings which are not found 
when individuals interact online through other means, such as email. That is, the 
impersonal nature of social networking make uncivil behavior much easier than face-to-
face interaction (Shea and Fiorina 2012). The ubiquity of camera phones allow for spur-
of-the-moment, uncivil actions by politicos (i.e., George Allen’s “macaca moment”) to 
go viral, thanks to SNS such as YouTube and Facebook. Events, previously witnessed by 
few, now live on for perpetuity, and can gain views by the millions (Shea and Fiorina 
2012).  
Looking at Incivility over Time 
 The decades since the 1970s have seen increased polarization coupled with major 
changes in the media environment; in an era when partisans are divided, news exposure is 
increasingly tailored to reaffirm preexisting views, and in which individuals can interact 
through online social media with few social repercussions, the possibility for 














* The 1992 election was the first contemporary presidential election in which talk radio was a 
major source of campaign information 
**The 2004 election marked the first time the Intert played a major role as a tool for political 
mobilization and communication in an election campaign. 
 
Note: The trend lines are not on the same scale, but have been placed side by side to illustrate 
their covariation over time. The polarization numbers refer to the gap in DW-Nominated scores 
between the Democratic and Republican parties in the House of Representatives. This measure is 
taken from the latest Poole and Rosenthal party polarization estimates available at 
http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp. The m dia change timeline displays the growth in 
new media options by the presidential election year in which they first became relevant. 
 
 
Figure 3-1 displays these changes, side-by-side, on a temporal scale. The media 
trend line is a measure of the “new media” changes described above, by the presidential 
election year in which the change first became relevant. This is not a measure of incivility 
in media per se, but rather a visual aggregation of all the changes expected to influence 
mass use of incivility as they occurred over time.31 As 1972, 1976, 1980 predate any of 
these changes, they each score a “0.” The 1984 election receives one point, with the 
                                                
31 Essentially, it is a timeline, except the line moves up the Y-axis as each change occurs, to show how 




launch of CNN earlier in the year, and 1992 receives a score of 2 with the presence of 
political talk radio joining CNN. The launch of the Fox News Channel and MSNBC in 
1996 would fully usher in the cable news era, and earns 1996 and 2000 a 3 on the media 
scale. Finally, 2004 earns a “4,” having been the first true “Internet election.” The party 
polarization trend line displays the distance betwen the two parties in the House of 
Representatives on the first dimension of DW-Nominate scores over time.32  As can be 
seen, polarization between the two parties has increased with each Congress since the 
1970s, and has grown more rapidly since the late 1980s (McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal 
2006).  
 The media trend line and party polarization line correlate together remarkably 
well; a regression of the house polarization trend o  media changes, for example, shows 
that the polarization gap jumps ten percentage points with each additional change in the 
media environment (a relationship significant at the 0.000 level). It is unlikely that the 
changes in both are completely endogenous to each other—for example, the initial 
growth in party polarization probably had little to d  with the launch of CNN, and vice 
versa. The case can be made (and has been) that eac tr nd has influenced the other over 
time;33 for example, polarized elites may encourage narrowcasting, and narrowcasting 
can encourage the polarization of elites. Determining to what extent the relationship 
between the two trends is covariational rather thancausal is something of a chicken-or-
                                                
32 These measures are from the latest Poole and Rosenthal party polarization estimates available at 
http://voteview.com/political_polarization.asp. 
33 Hetherington (2001) suggests that polarization, stemming from institutional changes, has clarified the 
parties’ ideological positions, making party positions more salient and selective exposure to media which 
reinforce party views a tempting option for partisan . However, other research suggests selective exposure 
is the cause of polarization, or has at least amplified ts effects; Prior (2007), for one, argues that greater 
media choice was the impetus of polarization in Congress. There are many specific examples of 
narrowcasting contributing to declining bipartisanship, as well; for instance, Baum and Groening (2008) 
report that the failure of a 2007 immigration bill was attributed to “grassroots conservative revolt incited by 




the-egg scenario, and is outside the scope of this analysis. However, what is important to 
recognize is that the trends have changed concurrently over time, in a way expected to 
encourage incivility.34 
 But has incivility increased? I hypothesize that use of incivility by the general 
public should have increased over time as a functio of these two contemporaneous 
trends: 1) a rise in partisan polarization, and 2) the increasing presence and availability of 
partisan, vitriolic news in a media environment that also makes selective exposure and 
mass interaction possible.  
Data 
 The American National Election Studies survey has asked Americans to provide 
verbatim responses to questions asking what they particul rly like and dislike about the 
Democratic and Republican parties, as well as the Democratic and Republican nominees 
running for president. Since 1972, these responses have been coded into the same 
categories, and, as most analyses of party polarization restrict their analysis mark 1972 as 
the beginning of the trend,  using data from 1972 onwards is appropriate (Layman and 
Carsey 2002; Hetherington 2001; Abramowitz and Saunders 2008). There have been 
issues with the coding of these open-ended questions by ANES coders, the concern being 
different years have had different standards for coding (Krosnick et al. 2008)—the 
principal investigators went so far as to recall the 2008 data, which, as of Feburary2013, 
is currently unavailable. As I am interested in clustering the numerous categories into 
                                                
34 A Pearson’s r correlation produces correlation coeffici nts of 0.96 between time (measured in years) nd
both house polarization and media changes, as well as a 0.98 coefficient between house polarization and 
media changes. Including any two of these variables together in a regression model results in 
multicollinearity issues; thus, for both theoretical and methodological reasons, it makes sense to estimate 




large categories--an uncivil category and a civil category--the coding issue is minimized 
in my analysis. 
 To identify which response categories qualified as uncivil, I utilized the Incivility 
Index presented in the previous chapter (Table 2-1); if a category fit any of the criteria in 
the index, it was marked as uncivil. Table 3-1 displays the response categories identified 
as uncivil, organized by criterion.  
Using the ANES data from 1972-2004 of respondents' "likes/dislikes" of 
candidates and parties, I created a dichotomous “incivility” variable, which is essentially 
a measure of whether or not a respondent made an "uncivil" reference in any of their 
responses. As my theoretical expectation is that an uptick in incivility is a function of 
increased partisan polarization and changes in media that accentuate the polarization gap, 
looking at how much incivility is fueled by partisanship makes sense.  
One way to see if incivility is more partisan-based in recent elections is to look at 
the percentage of all uncivil comments that were aimed at the party and the candidates 
opposite those of the respondents' party identificaion. Taking the percentage of all 
uncivil comments that Democrats (strong Democrats, weak Democrats, and Democrat 
leaners alike)  made about the Republican party and its candidate, and the percentage of 
all uncivil comments made by Republicans (strong, weak, and leaners Republicans) about 








Table 3-1. Uncivil Categories by Incivility Index Criterion  
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   










affective terms   applied 
to party--bad/lazy people; 
lack of patriotism; etc. 
 
*Can't trust them; they 
break their promises; 















*General reference to him as "a 
bad man or a bad guy"; heard 
bad things about 
him/qualifications; general 
ability; negative reference to his 
"personality"  
 
*Irreligious; "immoral" (in 
religious sense) 
 









thy/ Unreliable; a man you 







breaks promises; no 
integrity; doesn't mean 
what he says; tricky; not 
open and candid; not 
straightforward 
 
*Negative references to 
candidate's children or 
extended family 
 
   
   
   
   
   



















out; not too moderate/not 
a fence-sitter; for change 
 
*Controlled by party 
regulars/ bosses/ machine 
 
 
*Not humanistic; favor property 
rights over human beings 
 
*Pro-Far Left/radicals/Yippies/ 
SDS; encouraging anarchy/ 
guerilla state 
 
*Pro-Extremists (No specific 
direction)/nuts/bomb-throwers 
 
*Not independent; run by  
























*Will ruin America; last 
thing America needs 
 
 
*Bad for country; don't have  
country's interests at heart; only  
looking out for their own interests;  





Trends in Incivility among the Electorate 
 Examining the ANES data in aggregate, some trends become apparent 
immediately. Figure 3-2 displays the percentage of ANES respondents who offered an 
uncivil comment when asked about their “likes/dislikes” of candidates and parties by 
election year. The average throughout all nine elections in the analysis was 33.5 percent. 
This raw look shows a general increase over time. One year stands out in Figure 3-2; the 
election of 1976, until 2004, appears to have had te highest levels of incivility among 
the electorate. However, the 95 percent confidence intervals for each year’s mean, also 
displayed in Figure 3-2, show that difference in means between 1976 and the means for 
1992, 2000, and 2004 are not statistically significant.35 In fact, these four elections appear 
to be in a class of their own, as each was above average in terms of the percentage of 
comments featuring incivility, with differences in means statistically significant from the 
other years in the analysis. The election years of 1980, 1988, and 1996, all featured about 
“average” levels of incivility among voters, and 1984 appears to have been below-
average for use of incivility, with a mean statistically different from all other years 
(excepting 1988). The 1972 electorate is in a class of it  own, with by far the lowest level 
of incivility use among the electorate.36  
 
                                                
35 Bonferroni, Scheffe, and Sidak multiple comparison ANOVA tests confirm that each set of overlapping 
confidence intervals displayed in Figures 3-2 and 3-3 indicate that the two means are not statistically 
different from each other. 
36The election was uncivil, but not polarized in a partis n manner. This finding is consistent with other 
accounts of the 1972 campaign (although not the electorate) as being less nasty than elections since. As 
Iyengar et al. (2012) argue, “Despite its title, Hunter S. Thompson’s (1973) classic account of the 1972 
presidential campaign described, at least by contemporary standards, a relatively soft-spoken campaign. By 
any relevant measure – length of time, amount of campaign finance, scope and reach of television ads, 
volume of news media coverage – American presidential campaigns have since become more antagonistic 
and harder to ignore…There can be no doubt about the increased negativity of campaign 
rhetoric…Virtually every study of campaign advertising documents the steep increase in the frequency of 




Figure 3-2: Percentage of Incivility by Year and Decade (1972-2004) 
 
 
Note: The mean percentage of uncivil comments for all ye rs was 0.34, with a standard deviation 
of 0.47. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.  
 
 Also displayed in Figure 3-2 are averages for the four decades included in the 
analysis. The average by decade was 34.5 percent. Looking at the trends by decade, the 
average level of incivility among the public in election years during the 1970s was nearly 
identical to that of the 1980s, hovering around 30 percent. However, the average jumped 
up to 37 percent for the two elections in the 1990s, a statistically significant increase from 
the two previous decades. Use of incivility by the el ctorate reached 41 percent during 
the elections of the 2000s, a statistically significant increase from the 1990s average. 
This uptick in the average level of incivility over the last two decades, along with 
the fact that three of the last four elections in the analysis are in the group with above 




the hypothesis that incivility among the public has increased. The question remains why 
1976 had such a high level of incivility, if this hypothesis is indeed accurate. Coming in 
the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate, 1976 was an outlier election in some notable 
ways, as it was the only election since 1952 in which the dominant subject of both 
candidates’ campaigns involved personal traits (Vavreck 2009) and it was the first 
contemporary election (from 1936 on) where dishonesty and lying were central themes of 
both campaigns (Jamieson 2011, 16).  
The inclusion of a “theme” based around the failures of politicians in 1976 
opened up the doors for widespread use of terms (such as “lying”) generally considered 
uncivil. This suggests that incivility in 1976 was le s partisan-based, and more an angry 
reaction to recent political events. This is meaningfully different from partisan-based 
incivility: an electorate united in anger at elites has much different repercussions for 
democracy than an electorate divided and angry at those with views different from their 
own. 
To see if this is the case, I look at the extent to which partisanship explains this 
general trend in increasing use of incivility, using the measure of uncivil attacks on the 
opposing side. Not only has use of incivility increas d in recent elections, but, as shown 
in Figure 3-3, it has become significantly more partis n. Until 1984, the percentage of 
uncivil attacks aimed at the opposing party never crossed 70 percent, with 1976 having 
the lowest percentage of the entire analysis, at just below 66 percent. The smaller samples 
produce larger margins of error, so not all the differences in means are significant. 
However, the percentage of uncivil attacks aimed at the out-group has been increasing; 




excepting 2000 and 1996, the two elections which immediately preceded it. The averages 
for each decade also provide support for this trend: the 1990s mean is significantly 
different from that of the 1970s, and the 2000s mean is significantly different from the 
means of the 1970s and 1980s.  





Note: The mean percentage of uncivil comments made towards the opposing side for all years 
was 0.72, with a standard deviation of 0.45. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 3-3, every election since 1984 is statistically different 
from 1976, with the exception of 1988, whose interval barely overlaps with that of 1976. 
The low percentage for 1976 is meaningful, suggesting that the high-levels of incivility 
among the public in 1976 was a reaction to actual preceding events (Watergate and 




percentage hovered right around 72 percent. However, th  percentage shot up in 1996, 
getting to about 81 percent in 2004. While the 1970s elections’ “opposition incivility” 
constituted about 67 percent of all uncivil comments i  those years, the 2000s elections 
averaged about 78 percent—an uptick of about 16 percent. 
Modeling the Change over Time  
 What the 1976 case highlights is that macro-level ff cts, such as the 
idiosyncrasies of the various campaign and election years, can be distorting this trend—
presidential scandal, for one, might invite partisans to make uncivil comments about their 
own side, and could explain why 1976 (coming after Watergate) and 2000 (coming after 
“Monicagate” and Bill Clinton’s impeachment) have lower percentages of opposition 
attacks than the elections surrounding them. To address these concerns, I turn to 
regression analysis. 
 To produce a more rigorous assessment of the trends in use of incivility, I created 
a logistic model (referred to hereafter as Model 1) with the election year as the primary 
independent variable and general use of incivility in the ANES data (again dichotomous) 
as the dependent variable. To control for factors that varied among the elections that 
might influence the public’s use of incivility, a number of other variables are included in 
the model.  First, I have controlled for whether an incumbent Democratic president is 
running for reelection (the years 1980 and 1996) or an incumbent Republican president is 
running (1972, 1976, 1984, 1992, and 2004), as boththe incumbency status (Vavreck 
2009) and partisanship (Geer 2006) of candidates are thought to be factors affecting 




 I also control for a pair of factors that might account for the public being more 
cynical or negative in certain campaigns--and thus more likely to utilize incivility. 
Declining economic conditions may anger the public (Conover and Feldman 1986), and 
thus it is likely that they might react with incivility towards the incumbent party and its 
candidate. Therefore, I control for whether an election year followed a significant 
economic decline--both 1980 and 1992 fit this bill (Vavreck 2009).37 As major scandals 
might increase the likelihood that respondents use uncivil terms like "crook," "liar,” et 
cetera, when evaluating the candidates and parties because there is a is a grain of truth  to 
the references, I include a measure of whether or not a major scandal occurred during the 
previous four years involving the incumbent administration. Presidential leadership 
literature indicates that three elections in my analysis followed what could be considered 
major scandals: 1976 (Watergate), 1988 (Iran-Contra), and 2000 (Clinton's impeachment) 
(Simonton 2001).  
 The final election-level element I control for is the level of negative campaigning 
in a given election, which could induce incivility. Buell and Sigelman (2009) look at 
negative campaigning in presidential elections over time and find that there has not been 
a linear increase in negativity. Their analysis includes measures indicating how 
"negative" a given election year was, with (from highest to lowest) 1992, 1972, 1988, and 
                                                
37 Vavreck (2009, 36-38) uses several election forecasts models (which take economic and political factors 
into account) to sort all Democratic and Republican presidential candidates into to campaign types: 
“clarifying” candidates, whose election chances are boosted by the state of the economy, and “insurgent” 
candidates whose chances are hurt by the economy. Onl  three times during the period of 1972 to 2008 has
an incumbent president or member of the incumbent party qualified as an insurgent candidate: 1980, 1992, 





1984 receiving the highest “negativity” scores among election years in the analysis.38 
Controlling for campaign negativity is also necessary in order to distinguish peculiarities 
of particular campaigns (i.e., close elections might feature more negativity) from the 
larger trends I am interested in. I used Buell and Sigelman’s measures of negativity for 
each election year in my analysis. 
 I also controlled for a series of individual-level characteristics which are 
understood to be factors which influence political opinions and behavior, including: age 
(Zukin et al. 2006, Wattenberg 2008), education,39 (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), and gender (from male to female) (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter 1996, Kaufman and Petrocik 1999).  I also include political interest40  and partisan 
identification41 in the model, as both are well-established influences on political media 
consumption and behavior (Zaller 1992; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002).   
  Additionally, I generated several models to examine if targeting uncivil remarks 
towards the presidential candidate and party opposite respondents’ partisan identification 
has increased over time. Model 2 includes the same slat of independent variables 
included in Model 1, but uses uncivil attacks on the “other side” as its dependent 
variable. The final model, Model 3, replaces whether or not respondents made uncivil 
attacks on the “other side” with whether or not they made an uncivil comments about the 
party or candidate of their own party identification as the dependent variable.  
 
                                                
38 To determine the negativity of a campaign, Buell and Sigelman (2009, 245-247) sum up the amount of 
statements by major party candidates and their surrogates that featured an attack, and divided it by the total 
amount of campaign statements made.  
39 Education is measured on a seven point scale, from “eighth grade or less” to “an advanced degree.” 
40 Political interest is measured as interest in the presidential election, on a four point scale from “not 
interested” to “very interested.” 




Table 3-2: Effects of Change in Time on Use of Incivility  
 
 
Dependent Variable  General Use 
of Incivility  
Uncivil Attack 
on Other Side 
Uncivil Attack on 
Allied Side 
 
Election Level Variables Model 1      Model 2 Model 3 
  
Year 0.02*** 0.02*** -0.00 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Incumbent Democrat 0.76*** 0.66*** 0.67*** 
 (0.133) (0.144) (0.200) 
Incumbent Republican 0.75*** 0.62*** 0.62*** 
 (0.095) (0.103) (0.138) 
Incumbent Scandal (last four years) 0.88*** 0.67*** 0.81*** 
 (0.100) (0.110) (0.148) 
Economic Decline (last four years) 0.41*** 0.25*** 0.43*** 
 (0.049) (0.054) (0.073) 
Campaign Negativity  -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) 
Individual-Level Variables    
    
Party Identification (7 categories)    0.09*** 0.12*** -0.06*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
Ideology (7 categories) 0.03 0.04* 0.02 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.023) 
Education 0.23*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) 
Election Interest 0.45*** 0.51*** 0.21*** 
 (0.024) (0.027) (0.036) 
Age 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.00** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Gender (Male to Female) -0.21*** -0.11** -0.27*** 
 (0.034) (0.037) (0.050) 
    
Constant -41.09*** -50.19*** -0.45 
 (4.942) (5.425) (7.561) 
    
Observations 18,082 18,082 18,082 
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.08 0.04 
    
Entries are logistic regression coefficients. Standard errors in parentheses 





Model 1 in Table 3-2 shows that, controlling for election-level and individual-
level factors, election years (or time) has a positive, significant influence on use of 
incivility, indicating that use of incivility among the electorate has increased over time. 
With the exception of campaign negativity and ideology, the various control variables 
also reached significance; an incumbent Democratic president in the race, an incumbent 
Republican president in the race, economic decline within the last four years, and a major 
scandal within the last four years all have positive effects on use of incivility by the 
public. Party identification (flowing from strong Democrat to strong Republican), 
education, interest in the election, and age also have significant positive effects on use of 
incivility, and gender had a negative relationship—ndicating that men are more likely to 
offer uncivil comments than women.  
If the uptick in incivility is a function of partisan polarization and changes in 
media, then I expect that members of the public have increasingly directed incivility 
towards the “other side.” Model 2 in Table 2 displays the effect of election years (time) 
on the change in uncivil attacks on the opposing side, controlling for the same election-
level and individual-level factors as in Model 1. As with general use of incivility, uncivil 
attacks on the party and candidate opposite one’s partisan identification has a positive, 
significant relationship with time. All control vari bles are significant in this model, with 
the exception of campaign negativity; in a change from Model 1, ideology has a 




“Very Conservative”). That uncivil attacks on one’s own party have not increased42 
emphasizes that the increasing use of incivility is largely related to partisanship, where 
polarization and changes in the media environment together encourage uncivil political 
discourse. 
 
Figure 3-4: Predicted Probability of Using Incivility by Year 
 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated using the observed values approach (Hanmer and 
Kalkan 2012). The 95% confidence interval lines were calculated using the simulation method 
 
 
To better understand the substantive significance of these results, I calculated the 
predicted probability of using incivility over time. As displayed in Figure 3-4, the 
predicted probability of offering an uncivil response about a candidate or party was just 
about 20 percent in 1972, hovered around 30 percent for the two elections in the 1990s, 
before rising to just about 36 percent in 2004--an increase of over 80 percent from 1972. 
                                                
42 Model 3 in Table 3-2 shows that there is no signifcant relationship between time and uncivil attacks on 
the party and candidates associated with one’s partisan identification;  the election year variable, ideology, 




Also displayed in Figure 3-4 are the predicted probabilities of making an uncivil 
comment towards the opposing side over time. Beginning at about 10 percent in 1972, the 
probability of using incivility when talking about the “other side” reached the high teens 
for the two elections in the 1990s, before rising to about 24 percent by 2004—an increase 
of 140 percent from 1972.  Keeping in mind that the propensity to make an uncivil 
comment about the side one identifies with has not increased over this same period, this 
trend highlights the intertwining of partisan attacks with use of incivility.  
These results lend strong support to the idea that use of incivility by the general 
public when talking politics has increased—and significantly so. Over a period which has 
seen growth in elite partisan polarization and a fragmented, partisan, and interactive 
media environment develop--conditions thought to bring about more incivility in political 
discourse——the rates with which 1) individuals made uncivil comments about 
presidential candidates and the major parties and 2) directed the uncivil comments at the 
out-group have grown tremendously. The probability of utilizing incivility generally 
when evaluating candidates and parties nearly doubled over the course of the eight 
elections since 1972, and the probability of making a  uncivil comment about the “other 
side” over this period more than doubled. 
Conclusion 
 There are theoretical reasons for expecting a growth in incivility in contemporary 
American politics. Growing partisan polarization and massive changes to the media 
environment have occurred throughout the period of 1972 to 2004 (and correlate strongly 
with changes in time within this period), and research on both of these phenomena 




has yet to be shown. Through use of coded, verbatim responses to ANES questions 
regarding individuals’ feeling towards presidential c ndidates and parties, I have 
provided evidence which strongly supports the idea that political talk is becoming 
increasingly uncivil in the United States. 
 Collectively, the results presented above provide evidence that there has not only 
been an uptick in incivility, but that use of incivility has increasingly become entwined 
with partisanship. From the early 1970s on, when th party polarization gap began to 
grow and the media environment began to change, use of incivility by the general public 
in discussing political parties and their presidential candidates has increased quite 
significantly. Looking at presidential election years over time, the average percentage of 
comments that featured incivility was about 30 percent in the 1970s and 1980s, but had 
increased by a third in the 2000s. Perhaps more indicative of the partisan nature of 
increasing incivility in political talk, the increased propensity to use incivility has been 
directed at the party and candidate opposite an individual’s partisan identification. The 
average percentage of uncivil comments aimed at the “ot r side,” already high in the 
1970s elections, had increased by 15 percent in the years of the 2000s elections, 
indicating that use of incivility has not only increased, it has become more partisan.  
 The predicted probabilities based on a logistic regression model show that in 
2004, individuals were 80 percent more likely to use incivility generally and 140 percent 
more likely to use it when discussing the party andcandidate of the “other side” than they 
were in 1972. That the probabilities of utilizing inc vility when discussing presidential 
candidates and parties has increased this much, even while controlling for a number of 




speaks to the idea that a cultural change has occurred since the early 1970s, in which 
incivility in political discourse by non-elites has steadily become the norm, rather than 
the exception. 
 Incivility has been a part of politics in some way or another throughout American 
history, and there likely have been eras when upticks in its use have occurred before, 
coinciding with growths in party polarization. An argument can be made that increased 
incivility always brings with it negative ramifications for political discourse, and 
democratic processes more generally. Certainly, when elites utilize incivility, things like 
legislative productivity are reduced (Uslaner 1991, 1993; Jamieson 1999; Mann and 
Ornstein 2012). But non-elites utilizing incivility in their political discussions is 
problematic, too; for one, incivility is believed to restrict deliberation (Kingwell 1995), 
and the quality of public policy is dependent on the quality of collective deliberation 
(Page and Shapiro 1992, 363) Furthermore, while the public may take its cues from 
elites, less willingness among non-elites to comproise with opposing arguments, and 
even regard them as legitimate, can reinforce these s ntiments among elites (or bind them 
to them); if the public clamors for red meat, politicians will give them what they want. 
 What makes this particular period of increasing incivility among the mass public 
interesting (or disconcerting), however, is the addition of an interactive element to 
political communication within the last decade and  half, via the Internet. Not only does 
the Internet likely play a role in inducing incivility, but it makes its use more potent. 
Anonymity, or at least the false sense of such, encourages individuals to engage in more 
uncivil political discourse than they would if they had been interacting face-to-face. 




quite large) in a way that was not possible 25, 100, or 200 years ago—something I will 
discuss more in chapter 5.  
 It is difficult to dismiss the current uptick in use of incivility as an innocuous 
phenomenon, commonly appearing at various points in American history, which will sort 
itself out over time. Use of incivility by non-elites matters in a way it has not mattered 
before. Upticks in incivility may not be unprecedented in American history, but in 
today’s media environment, it will likely have unique repercussions for the foreseeable 
future. The Internet provides uncivil political conversation with an environment in which 
it can flourish, and partisans with a battleground to keep the fight alive. Incivility now 
has something of a symbiotic relationship with polarization, rather than being a mere 
result of it. Should elites wish to dispense with the red meat and vitriol, will the 
interconnected denizens of political message boards an  threads follow suit? Or, induced 
by uncivil online interactions, will they reject this departure and constrain elites into 
keeping the rhetoric heated, and thus keep polarization live? I will attempt to address 
these questions by examining the role that elites—both in the media and in government—
play in inducing uncivil and anti-deliberative behavior in the public. I begin in the next 
chapter by examining how exposure to uncivil political media influences the propensity 






Chapter 4: Uncivil Partisan Media and the Use of Incivility in 
Political Talk 
 
In the previous chapter, I revealed that there has been an uptick in the use of 
incivility in Americans’ political opinions, which as coincided with increases in party 
polarization and significant changes in the media environment since the 1970s. Party 
polarization and the explosion of media “choice” are likely to some extent related, with 
both trends contributing to the rise of uncivil, partisan media. Despite this evidence, the 
role that the media has played in the mass public adopting caustic, antagonistic, and 
corrosive language in political talk remains unclear. Does exposure to polarized, uncivil 
media truly lead to use of incivility by the public?  
Research in media and politics has shown that exposure to uncivil mediated 
political discourse can induce a number of negative political emotions and behaviors. 
Furthermore, media elites can influence the opinions f audiences through priming, 
framing, and agenda-setting. My purpose in this chapter is to establish a direct connection 
between exposure to uncivil political media and use of incivility when talking politics. I 
use the incivility index (introduced in Chapter 2) to gauge whether or not respondents 
included elements of incivility in an open-ended survey item asking them to evaluate 
then-presidential candidates Barack Obama and John McCain. Using panel data 
regression methods, I show that exposure to uncivil media, specifically pundit-themed 
cable news and talk radio programming, has a positive effect on the use of incivility, but 




Selective Exposure and Uncivil Political Media 
First, I will quickly summarize the reasons presented in chapters 2 and 3 as to 
why we might believe political and media elites arebehind the decline in civil political 
discourse. Scholars have demonstrated that there has been a decline in civility at the elite 
level, in day-to-day discourse on the floors of Congress (Uslaner 1993; Mann and 
Ornstein 2012). Furthermore, many have argued that increased incivility in news media is 
the product of increased competition for audiences (pu hing media figures to say more 
outlandish and controversial things)  and the “fragmentation”  of once-large network 
audiences into niche populations, leaving media figures free to say and do things that 
they could (or would) not do were it necessary to preserve a more heterogeneous 
audience (Mutz and Reeves 2005; Fallows 1997; Prior 2005, 2007;  Delli Carpini and 
Williams 2001;  Sobieraj and Berry 2010). The result is a partisan “new media” 
dominated by bias, emotionality, ridicule, and ad hominem attacks (Jamieson and Hardy 
2012). 
In a move away from the “minimal effects” theories that dominated the early 
years of mass media research, there has been a reinvigorated debate over media effects. 
Questions as to whether people advertently choose plitical media with certain political 
leanings and what the effects of such exposure are remain unsettled (Bennett and Iyengar 
2008; Mutz and Young 2011). Yet, in recent years, numerous studies have found that in 
the fragmented media environment, viewership of particular cable news networks and 
talk radio programs are driven by viewers’ partisan and ideological views (i.e., Stroud 




As prominently argued by Sunstein (2009), selective exposure of this kind is not 
innocuous. Even if audiences tune into partisan media because it aligns with preexisting 
views, exposure can reinforce and intensify these “priors.”43 A number of studies 
utilizing panel data and experimental methods have provided credence for this argument. 
Among the effects of partisan selective exposure are reduced regard for out-groups and 
the legitimacy of their views (Stroud 2008, 2010, 211; Jamieson and Capella 2009; 
Barker 2002), suggesting that even when individuals se f-expose themselves to political 
media, this exposure affects political opinions andbehavior. To the extent that certain 
messages, knowledge, and affect can be relayed to an audience, it follows that those who 
tune into uncivil partisan media will adopt some of the uncivil elements and tactics of the 
uncivil media. In the following, I lay out two ways in which uncivil partisan media 
exposure might induce the use of incivility in political talk. 
Emotion and Information Processing 
With political information, appeals to emotion can ffect the political behavior of 
those exposed, and the manner in which they process political information (Marcus et al. 
2000; Brader 2005, 2006; MacKuen et al. 2010; Valentino et al. 2008). Media elites have 
a significant influence on the opinions of their audiences (Zaller 1992), and when 
commentators target certain individuals, groups, or ideas, this antipathy is relayed to the 
audience (Barker 2002). For at least the period immediately following exposure to uncivil 
media, individuals have been found to have negative, visceral reactions towards political 
                                                
43 As Jamieson and Capella (2009) state regarding the polarized views of Rush Limbaugh listeners, the 
radio program either directly influences viewpoints, draws in listeners with similar viewpoints and 
reinforces these dispositions, or some combination of the two. They find evidence that the former occurs 




figures, institutions, and government (Mutz and Reeves 2005; Forgette and Morris 2006; 
Fridkin and Kenney 2008; Hibbing and Theiss-Moore 1998).  
As Mutz (2007) finds, incivility creates disdain for pposing views, with more 
intense incivility correlated with views that the opposing side has insidious motives.  
Herbst (2010) argues that incivility is used as a weapon of sorts, to rile audiences up in 
anger concerning the “other side” by reminding followers how “bad” the other side is; 
negative words and associations (i.e., “unethical”) re used strategically to mobilize like-
minded individuals because they are cues the audience u derstands and are averse to.  By 
connecting these concepts to opponents, elites create disdain for their targets, and urge 
audiences to “join in” on the targeting of opposition views and individuals in an uncivil 
fashion.  Uncivil television programs (Mutz 2007) and political talk radio (Owen 1997) 
are particularly potent in inducing intensified, emotionally-strident opinions in audiences. 
Talk radio commentators such as Rush Limbaugh have been implicated in attaching 
negative emotion to their targets by using ridicule, “caustic and primal” language, and by 
radicalizing their targets’ positions (Barker 2002; Jamieson and Capella 2009). Pundit-
dominated cable news and talk radio stand out among other forms of media when it 
comes to the use (and extremity) of incivility (Sobieraj and Berry 2010).  
There is also the possibility that for some, negative political emotions are 
preexisting, and exposure to uncivil political media oes not generate more disdain for an 
out-group than which already exists. However, the media, through priming, framing, and 
agenda-setting, can legitimize and promote certain political opinions without altering 
preexisting attitudes (Iyengar and Kinder 2010). This is especially true of like-minded 




“McCain/Obama is a dangerous extremist”), then repetition of this message must be 
acceptable or even necessary. Furthermore, recent exposure to an uncivil political 
message will increase the odds that it is reused (Zaller 1992, 48), and partisan “echo 
chambers” are particularly effective in relaying messages to audiences for reuse 
(Jamieson and Capella 2009). Thus, even if it is partisan, politically interested people 
with preexisting disdain for the “other side” who tune in to uncivil partisan programming, 
exposure can provide particular phrases, tactics, and arguments to utilize, and will 
sanction the use of incivility more generally. 
 In sum, there is strong reason to believe that selective exposure to uncivil political 
media will affect the way audience members talk politics--whether exposure to uncivil 
political media generates genuine negative emotions in individuals, spurring them to react 
with incivility, or individuals are merely receiving “permission” and “instruction” from a 
trusted, like-minded media elite and uncivil material to mimic--or some combination of 
both. Distinguishing between these processes—emotional arousal versus mimicry—is 
beyond the scope of this chapter (but I will address this in chapters 5 and 6), but in each 
case, audiences are being endowed with something from exposure to the incivility. To 
this extent the propensity to use incivility should decline when exposure to the media 
source is interrupted, and increase when exposure begins. 
Hypotheses  
 To recap from chapter 2, my definition of incivility in discourse is the presence of 
claims that are disrespectful towards their target in a purposeful, confrontational manner, 
and presented in a hyperbolic nature. I argue that there are two modes through which 




rhetoric: (1) the “mob effect,” in which the vilification of views and politicians of the 
opposing side rallies together partisans of the same ilk. Attacking the “other side” can 
also simultaneously produce (2) the “retaliation effect,” in which partisans of the other 
side become angered by the attacks, and react with inc vility. 
I hypothesize that exposure to uncivil political media leads to an increased 
propensity to use and exhibit uncivil behavior (namely, language) when talking politics. 
As previous studies have shown that behavioral and psychological responses to uncivil 
media can be induced immediately following exposure, I add to this hypothesis that the 
effect of changes in exposure to uncivil media can le d to uncivil talk in the very short-
term. A change in exposure to uncivil media will cause an increase in the propensity to 
use uncivil language by individuals; likewise, a change in exposure from uncivil media to 
no uncivil media will decrease this propensity.44 
(H1): Exposure to uncivil political media leads to an increased propensity to use and 
exhibit incivility when offering political opinions. 
 I have previously detailed two modes through which individuals may potentially 
be induced to use incivility: the “mob effect” and the “retaliation effect.” However, 
selective exposure limits the extent to which a “retaliation effect” occurs. 45 In all 
likelihood, if an individual becomes exposed to uncivil media, it will be uncivil media 
which does not conflict with their preexisting political viewpoints, and is not cognitively 
displeasing to hear (Iyengar and Hahn 2009). If selective exposure theories (or even 
                                                
44 While I do not specifically look for the effects of such, it is possible that exposure to other types of ‘civil 
media’ can reduce the propensity to use incivility; to the extent that political media induces anxiety rather 
than anger, individuals may broaden their subsequent information searches and view alternative views 
more positively than they normally would. By increasing positive assessments of alternative views, as well 
as providing cues for the type of acceptable behavior and language, civil political media might lead to 
greater levels of civility in discourse. 




agenda-setting theories46) adequately explain patterns in media use, then it is unlikely that 
someone who identifies as a liberal will choose to watch Bill O’Reilly, unless they do not 
become upset by O’Reilly when watching him—in which case they would not feel the 
need to retaliate. While I believe that when indiviuals are exposed to upsetting uncivil 
attacks on their side, they will retaliate with incivility, it is unlikely that many will choose 
to be exposed to cognitively displeasing political nformation.    
An alternative hypothesis is that tuning into like-minded political programming 
generates incivility merely by reinforcing preexisting views, and whether or not the 
program includes incivility does not matter. If partisan bias extends beyond the “opinion” 
shows to standard news programs on television—and there is evidence it does (Morris 
and Francia 2010) —and audiences voluntarily tune into these programs because they 
perceive them to reflect their own views—which they appear to do (Dilliplane 2011; 
Iyengar and Hahn 2009) —then a comparison between viewership of “uncivil” and 
“civil” partisan news is possible.  Thus, I expect that only exposure to like-minded media 
featuring incivility will affect the use of incivility. 
(H2): Exposure to uncivil like-minded political media will induce the use of incivility 
when offering political opinions, but exposure to like-minded political media lacking 
uncivil elements or uncivil discordant media will not induce the use of incivility 
Audiences tend to be consistent in their viewership of olitical media (Dilliplane, 
Goldman, and Mutz 2012). When changes in exposure do occur, what might account for 
it? Two scenarios seem likely. One is that a number of idiosyncratic and non-systematic 
reasons, such as gaining or losing access to cable television, having a change in schedules 
                                                
46 Agenda setting effects likely reflect deliberate choi es on behalf of knowledgeable, sophisticated 
individuals, who seek out political media that aligns with their preexisting political philosophies (Miller 




so certain programs can or can no longer be viewed or listened to, or the attraction to a 
particular news story (i.e., elections or scandals) ffect whether viewers are exposed to 
uncivil political media. Prior (2007) notes that with the increase in cable television 
choices, passive exposure to television news has declined, but news viewership “in terms 
of control and degree of choice…is dwarfed by the Int rnet… [which can be] customized 
to a greater extent,” (111-112). Under this scenario, viewers might simply be seeking 
partisan news (or news in general), and the effect of hange in exposure on the propensity 
to utilize incivility is likely to be significant.  
Another possibility is that a psychological jolt (or let-down) increases (or reduces) 
the motivation to talk about politics and tune into (or tune out) uncivil political media. In 
this case, when people are in a certain mood,47   they are more likely to self-expose 
themselves to uncivil political media and use incivility when expressing opinions, but the 
exposure should still reinforce and strengthen the impetus, motivation, and ability to use 
incivility. In both cases, the propensity to utilize incivility should increase with exposure 
to uncivil media. 
Data 
 To test my hypotheses, I used data from the 2008 National Annenberg Election 
Survey Online dataset.48 Respondents interviewed for the online dataset were drawn from 
KnowledgePanel, a random sample of US households who agree to complete periodic 
Internet-based surveys on a variety of topics, and complete the surveys over the Internet. 
                                                
47 It is not clear what “mood” it is which draws people into like-minded incivility. Would it be ebullience? 
Or frustration? 
48 The NAES online panel started in October 2007 with a random probability sample of about 30,000 
people. Respondents were re-interviewed another four times throughout 2008, during the primary, election, 




The 2008 NAES study has a panel component that asks individuals repeatedly throughout 
the 2008 election season to provide verbatim examples of what they particularly like and 
dislike about Barack Obama and John McCain.49 The NAES questions are beneficial due 
to both their open-ended nature and the fact a range of answers is possible. An adequate 
answer does not require an uncivil response, yet some provided one nonetheless. As 
respondents entered in their own answers for the verbatim questions, the spelling, 
punctuation, and capitalization in all the answers were completed by the individuals 
themselves, providing an unfiltered and untainted colle tion of respondents’ views as 
they intended them. 
 Furthermore, using panel data is advantageous as an rgument can be made for 
causality over correlation (Allison 2009; Finkel 1995). As I wished to determine if use of 
incivility in language changed when exposure to uncivil media changed, the panel data 
allowed me to look at individuals whose exposure changed between waves. The NAES 
question, defining regular use of media as tuning in within the last month, provides a 
measure of reported media exposure immediately preceding each wave. Thus, what can 
be measured is the effect of the change in media exposure between waves. While cross-
sectional analyses provide estimates of the “changes” in an independent variable on 
“changes” in the dependent variable based exclusively on inter-unit variations at a single 
point in time, panel data analysis allows for the dir ct detection of the determining factors 
of individual-level variation (Allison 2009; Finkel 1995, 5).  
                                                
49 The exact wordings of the questions were: “Is there anything in particular that you like or dislike about 
[Barack Obama/John McCain]? If so, please fill in the boxes below.” All respondents who gave a 
thermometer ranking score for the candidates (on a scale of 0-100) in response to a previous question were 




  The NAES asked panel respondents who claimed to have eard about the 
presidential campaign from television news or radio pr grams (which was around 90% of 
sample) which programs they watched in the last month.  This measure, which asks 
respondents about whether they have viewed specific pol tical programming, has been 
found to very reliable by Dilliplane, Goldman, Mutz (2012), and generally avoids many 
of the issues the plague self-reports of media exposure. Respondents are constrained to 
reporting simply what they have recently watched—and while this may mean 
significantly more exposure for some than it does for others, it is consistent with my 
hypothesis that any recent exposure is enough to have an effect. If exposure to uncivil 
media everyday has more of an effect than exposure onc a week, then conflating all 
those exposed into a single “exposed” category provides a conservative estimate of the 
effect, given that any exposure has some effect. The NAES list of media is nearly 
comprehensive of national television programming in 2008 likely to feature some 
analysis of the 2008 election. The list also asks about exposure to nearly every major (and 
not so major) nationally-broadcast conservative talk r dio program.  
 While there were five waves in all, only waves 2, 4 and 5 asked respondents about 
their typical media exposure. Wave 2 took place from January 1, 2008 to March 31, 
2008, and wave 4 took place throughout the 2008 general election season, with 
interviews conducted from August 29th through November 4th. Wave 5 took place during 
the immediate post-election period, from November 5 through January 31. Respondents’ 
interviews were spaced in thirds, in order to let time pass between wave interviews; a 




during the first third of all subsequent waves.  At least a month passed between 
respondents’ wave 2, wave 4, and wave 5 interviews. 
Methodology 
 To make reading through and coding the verbatim responses a feasible task, I 
randomly selected 15 percent of these observations o u e, resulting in 2,514 units and a 
total of 6,387 verbatim answers included in the analysis.50 To control for experimenter’s 
bias, two research assistants and I independently eva uated the open-ended responses.51 
Unlike previous studies of political incivility that have gauged its presence in text and 
speech, this study is not evaluating campaign materials, candidates’ speeches, or media 
coverage—which are all more or less the polished work of professionals and generally 
rather homogeneous in scope and topic. Rather, the aw, unfiltered quality of 
respondents’ responses that make the data so compelling also includes misspellings, poor 
grammar, limited punctuation, and incomplete thoughts. Use of computer programs that 
cannot take context into consideration is therefore impractical. Human coders can take 
context into account, however. We used the Incivility Index (Table 2-1) to identify 
instances of incivility, and calculations of intercoder reliability of the coding indicate 
substantial agreement concerning what comments qualified as uncivil. The percent 
agreement between all three coders was 91 percent, and a calculation of Krippendorff's 
                                                
50 As the subsample was random, the panel is unbalanced; as discussed below, this is not a problematic. 
51 The research assistants were told that the goal was to have a conservative estimate and were thus 
instructed to give the benefit of the doubt to civility—comments they felt were on the borderline should not 
be marked as uncivil. To ensure that there were three independent analyses of the responses, the research 
assistants were instructed not to discuss specific responses or types of responses amongst each other or with 




alpha52 produces a coefficient of 0.72, which is acceptable, especially considering the 
heterogeneous and crude nature of the responses (Krippendorff 2004).  
 If a comment violated one or more of the criteria, it was deemed uncivil. In order 
to make the process as objective as possible, only c mments that clearly and 
unambiguously qualified as incivility under one or more of the criteria definitions were 
deemed uncivil. When a comment seemed “borderline,” th  benefit of the doubt was 
given to civility, thus creating a conservative measure of incivility. This is consistent with 
my definition of incivility, in which uncivil claims must be deliberate and obvious. A 
description of common uncivil claims by criteria can be found in A1 4-1 in Appendix 1. 
 Overall, about 20.6 percent of the responses evaluated qualified as uncivil. 
Having one wave in the analysis take place early in the election year during primary 
season, a second during the heart of campaign season, and the final after the election 
raises the questions as to whether there are differenc s in pre- and post-election 
tendencies to be uncivil. Perhaps people are less attentive to the election earlier in the 
year, and, following the election, partisans from both sides begin the “healing process” 
after the long and bitter campaign. The percentage of r spondents who used incivility in 
each wave suggests there could be some truth to this. In wave 2, about 13 percent of 
respondents used incivility in their answers. The percentage nearly doubled to 25 percent 
in wave 4, before dropping to 22 percent in wave 5.  
 It is also possible that the levels of incivility n political media are not constant 
throughout the election year. Yet, it is likely that some amount of incivility is constant in 
                                                
52 Krippendorff’s alpha is a conservative estimate of intercoder reliability beyond that which can be 
ascribed to mere chance. It is appropriate regardless of the number of coders, levels of measurement, 





certain types of media all of the time, and that individuals exposed to it will react to the 
incivility with some consistency. Still, while the “uncivil media” effect may be constant, 
it may also be nonlinear. This might mean that media lites do not produce the same 
amount and type of uncivil political talk throughout the panel study period, or that those 
exposed react to it somewhat differently throughout these periods. I cannot rule this out. 
It is necessary, then, to control for campaign season effects. First, I will explain how I 
distinguished between “civil” and “uncivil” political media.  
Exposure to Uncivil Political Media in 2008 
 What does the literature tell us uncivil media should look like?  Sobieraj and 
Berry (2010) conceptualize and measure examples of xtreme incivility in politically-
oriented news media. In doing this, they devised a helpful “road map” to determining if a 
media source tends to be uncivil, identifying thirteen manifestations in language and 
behavior, including name calling, misrepresentative exaggerations of views and actions, 
and mockery.53 Sobieraj and Berry also describe a method for creating n “outrage score” 
for four types of media (newspapers, television, radio, and blogs) and identify the “most” 
uncivil current examples for each type of media. The elements used by Mutz and Reeves 
(2005) in their “recreation” of civil and uncivil mediated political discourse to 
differentiate uncivil discourse from polite, civil discourse were hostility, rudeness, 
emotionality, and quarrelsome discussions. Together, se studies provide a theoretical 
guide to identifying media that include uncivil discourse. For media to include such 
elements as mockery, hostility, and character assassination, the programming’s host, 
                                                
53 The thirteen elements include insulting language, name calling, emotional display, emotional language, 
verbal fighting/sparring, character assassination, misrepresentative exaggeration, mockery, conflagration, 




hosts, or guests need to have opinions and need to at the very least take a negative view 
towards some persons, policy, or institutions (as opposed to standard news programs, for 
example, where news is merely read and very little opinionated commentary is offered).  
The Project for Excellence in Journalism54 releases annual reports featuring 
content analyses of different forms of media, including cable television news, network 
television news, local television news, newspapers, online news, magazines, and radio. 
The 2009 PEJ report (which reviews media throughout 2008) 55 reports that prime-time 
cable news programming was dominated by shows in whch “commentators and pundits 
dissect and magnify the one or two biggest developments that lend themselves to debate 
and disagreement.”  Talk radio programming, dominated by conservative commentators, 
consisted of hosts attacking policies and vilifying targeted individuals. Among all the 
comments on conservative talk radio in 2008 made about Hillary Clinton, for example, 
30 percent emphasized the idea that she did not have any hard core beliefs, and 15 
percent revolved around the idea that she was personably unlikable (Project for the 
Excellence in Journalism 2009). The report also noted that “prime-time cable in 2008 
closely resembled talk radio with pictures” in that bo h “placed a premium on high-
octane opining and polarizing.” The dominance of punditry and polarizing commentary 
in prime-time cable news and talk radio suggests that these media fit the bill as the 
quintessential uncivil political programming. This is consistent with the content review of 
various media by Sobieraj and Berry (2010) which found that nearly all pundit-themed 
cable news and political talk radio programs consistently include some uncivil “outrage,” 
                                                
54 The PEJ is a non-profit research organization associated with the Pew Research Center. 
55 As explained below, the data in my analysis are from 2008, so I am concerned with what qualified as 




and on average contain significantly more incivility than other “opinionated” media, like 
blogs and newspaper columns. 
To make more rigorous distinctions between the various television programs 
featured in the NAES survey, I utilize two studies which have previously dichotomized 
the programs into political and non-political categories (Dilliplane et al. 2012) and 
grouped the programs by partisanship (Dilliplane 2011) (see A1 4-2 in Appendix 1 for 
more details). For a more nuanced understanding of the effects of exposure to uncivil 
political media, it is helpful to know if certain formats are more effective than others in 
inducing the use of incivility.56 I initially created seven groupings of television programs: 
pundit cable news, standard cable news, partisan talk shows, non-partisan talk shows, 
network news, satirical news, and pure entertainment. The breakdown of programs by 
category can be seen in Table A2 4-3 in Appendix 2.  
To determine whether each type of political programming qualified as uncivil 
media, I utilized two measures. A full explanation of both measures is included in A1 4-2 
in Appendix 1, but I will overview the measures here. The purpose was to simply divide 
the political media into civil and uncivil groupings, not to compare levels of incivility 
between uncivil programs, so use of the scores as a continuous or ordinal explanatory is 
not an option. That is, the measures were meant to divide up political programming by 
looking for elements likely to be prevalent only in u civil political media, but not gauge 
the overall level of incivility in each program,  
The first measure involved searching via Lexis Nexis for reports in major world 
publications of particular types of uncivil incidents occurring on the various programs, 
                                                
56 As previously mentioned, the emotionality and opinion-oriented formats of pundit cable news and talk 




which were examples of the modes of incivility found to be most common in political 
television (Sobieraj and Berry 2010). By tabulating the unique number of uncivil events 
that made the mainstream news throughout the period during which the panel survey took 
place and dividing the total by the amount of hours of the program’s estimated airtime, a 
sense of the prevalence of incivility on each program can be made. Eight programs that 
had scores above average were qualified as uncivil. 
 There are some problems with relying on “hearsay” to determine if a program is 
typically uncivil. For one, if a program is usually uncivil, it might not be newsworthy if 
something uncivil occurs, but it would be if the same event occurred on a typically civil 
program. Furthermore, this measure does not help to determine if the levels of incivility 
on programs differed between periods during the election year. Thus, I used a second 
measure to evaluate the level of incivility in the actual content of the programs during 
each wave. To do this, I used Lexis Nexis to search the transcripts of the various 
programs for some common examples of incivility that fell under criteria 1, 2, and 3 of 
the Incivility Index. Unfortunately, complete transcripts (or any at all) were not available 
for some of the programs,57 including two talk show programs deemed uncivil by the first 
measure. Nonetheless, this measure allows me to evaluate the accuracy of the “hearsay” 
measure and determine in incivility in political media varied over the course of the 
election year.  
For each program, I tabulated the occurrences of incivility and divided them by 
the average amount of words in each transcript per hou of programming, to get a 
                                                
57 Shows perceived to have a conservative bias but did not have full transcripts included FNC’s Fox & 
Friends, FNC’s  Fox Report with Shepard Smith, FNC’s Geraldo At Large, FNC’s Studio B with Shepard 
Smith, and FNC’s Your World with Neil Cavuto. Shows without transcripts perceived to have a liberal bias 




standard score of the amount of incivility per hour. Programs with above-average scores 
across the waves were marked as uncivil. The six programs marked as uncivil under this 
measure were the same six (minus the two uncivil talk shows) that were marked as 
uncivil under the “hearsay” measure. This consistency gives me confidence in the 
accuracy of the measures. 
The averages across programs for each wave indicate that there were differences 
in the amount of incivility on these programs between waves, with wave 4—taking place 
during the heart of campaign season, featuring the highest average. Wave 2, which took 
place during the primaries, had a slightly lower aver ge, and wave 5, which took place in 
the period following Election Day through January 2009, averaged the lowest level of 
incivility.  Nonetheless, even during the periods in which waves 2 and 5 took place, the 
programs marked as uncivil were not devoid of incivility, and were consistently the top 
six “perpetrators” within each period. Thus, exposure to the programs during each period 
likely had the hypothesized effect. A change from no exposure in wave 4 to exposure in 
wave 5 will still have an effect--albeit perhaps with not the same potency as a change 
from no exposure in wave 2 to exposure in wave 4.  
Based on these two measures, six pundit cable news programs and two partisan 
talk shows were marked as uncivil. In addition to the elevision programs, I designated 
twelve talk radio programs as uncivil; the listing of these programs is included in Table 
A2 4-4 in Appendix 2, and the rationale for coding them as uncivil in included in A1 4-2 
in Appendix 1. To measure the impact of a change in exposure to these three types of 
programs, I created dichotomous variables for exposure to uncivil pundit cable news and 




is not backed by any previous theory.58 In addition, I generated dichotomous measures of 
exposure to civil cable news, network news, satirical news,59 National Public Radio,60 
and entertainment programs. 61 The only predictors I expect to positively affect the use of 
incivility are the uncivil media types, although it is possible that exposure to civil 
programs may have a negative impact on incivility use. 
Exposure to Like-minded and Disagreeable Uncivil Media 
 I also hypothesized that a change in exposure to like-minded uncivil media would 
lead to an increased propensity to use incivility, but a change in exposure to both like-
minded civil media and disagreeable uncivil media would not. To test this hypothesis, I 
divided the uncivil media programs into “conservatie uncivil media” and “liberal uncivil 
media” sub-groups, utilizing the groupings created by Dilliplane (2011) (programming 
qualifying as either is indicated as such in Table A2 4-1 of Appendix 1). Then, using 
respondents’ partisan identification (partisans were those who identified as a strong, 
weak, or leaner partisan), I identified if they were xposed to media that either aligned 
with their partisan orientation, contrasted with their views, or was neutral programming. 
To test the hypothesis, I created dichotomous measur s of exposure to like-minded 
uncivil media, like-minded civil media, and disagreeable uncivil media. Because party 
identification was measured over time, these measurs can take into account how 
                                                
58 These programs can be qualified as “soft media” which ave previously been found to be ineffective in 
influencing political opinions (Prior 2003). See A14-2 for more details. 
59 I separate out satirical news from other partisan media, as such has been found to be effective in 
generating cynicism about mainstream partisan viewpoints, rather than reinforce them (Baumgartner and 
Morris 2006; Warner 2007); a more in depth discussion of the satirical news programs is included A1 4-2. 
60 Specifically, exposure to the program All Things Considered. See A1 4-2 for more information. 
61 I initially broke down these variables further: civil cable news was divided up into partisan, pundit 
programs and standard, “neutral’ programs, and civil network news was divided into standard network news 
broadcasts, network news magazines, and Sunday morning roundtables. As these smaller groups were 
insignificant and combining them has little effect on the size and significance of coefficients, I usethese 




individuals’ attachment to party may have shifted over the course of the campaign and 
panel study. I also created dichotomous measures of xposure to, disagreeable uncivil 
media, disagreeable civil media, nd neutral civil media as controls. 
Fixed-Effects Approach 
 To test the effect of change in exposure to uncivil media between the waves on 
the propensity to offer an uncivil response, I employed a fixed-effects model. Fixed-
effects models are the standard for panel data analysis, as the method can ensure that 
results are not biased by an omitted variable, and will minimize the chances that the 
relationship between changes in exposure to uncivil media and changes in use of 
incivility is misidentified as causal when it is in fact an endogenous relationship (Allison 
2009). While questions of spuriousness limit the ability of cross-sectional analyses to 
establish causality, fixed-effects models focus on the change occurring within 
individuals, allowing for much stronger cases for causal effects. Time-invariant variables 
(i.e., gender) are differenced away in such models, as they cannot help to predict a 
change in the dependent variable62 (Greene 2002; Hausman and Taylor 1981). The fixed-
effects method instead controls for potential confou ding effects of all unobserved time-
invariant variables by using each person as his or her own control (Allison 2009).  
However, fixed-effects logistic regression results in ignificant observations being 
dropped from the analysis when there is a lack of intra-group (or “within-group”) 
variation (Allison 2009; Hausman and Taylor 1981).  Furthermore, fixed-effects methods 
with limited dependent variable models are less effici nt (compared to random effects 
                                                
62 A way around losing these time-invariant covariates in fixed-effects models is to interact them with 
period effects (i.e., waves). Since the fixed-effects method controls for these factors (by using each 




and GEE models) as  between-individual variation is ignored; the focus on within-person 
can lead to fairly large standard errors, as there is limited variation in dichotomous 
dependent variables.  Allison (2009), however, sees th  sacrifice of efficiency to reduce 
bias as well worth it, as fixed-effects provides the best test for causality excepting 
experimental methods. The result for my analysis is a focus on individuals who differed 
from wave to wave, which allows for a test of the hypotheses. As I show below, the 
stable cases that are dropped have the expected relationship with uncivil political media 
exposure (the consistently exposed had the highest rate of incivility use, and the 
consistently unexposed the lowest, with “changers” falling in the middle). Additional 
information on the inappropriateness of random-effects and lagged dependent variable (or 
dynamic) models for this analysis can be found in A1 4-3 in Appendix 1. 
Results 
Looking at the raw means, there is evidence of campaign effects on the use of 
incivility, but differences persisted among those exposed to uncivil political media in all 
three waves.63 Among those who were consistently exposed to uncivil media throughout 
all three waves, the average rate of incivility was 22.3 percent in wave 2, 40.1 percent in 
wave 4, and 32.7 percent in wave 5. Each of these rates were higher than the rates for all 
respondents in each wave (12.6 in wave 2, 24.9 in wave 4, and 22.0 in wave 5), and much 
higher than the rates of those respondents were remain d unexposed to uncivil pundit 
news and talk radio throughout each wave (7.7 in wave 2, 17.4 in wave 4, and 12.8 in 
                                                
63 For the wave 2 period, a familiarity factor with the candidates and campaign may influence the 
propensity to offer uncivil comments. A Pew Research Center (2007) study in the fall of 2007, taken two
months before wave 2 began, found that only 62 percent ould name Barack Obama as a Democratic 
presidential candidate, and a mere 24 percent named John McCain as a Republican candidate. The visibility 
of both candidates likely increased throughout the primary season and as the general election began. During 
the earlier months of wave 2, however, particular ideas about either candidate in the press and in the minds 




wave 5). This suggests that a consistent relationshp between uncivil media exposure and 
use of incivility existed across waves, but that overall rates of incivility were the lowest 
before the start of the general election campaign, and the highest during the time 
immediately preceding the election.  
Among those who were consistently uncivil across the waves, the mean exposure 
rate to uncivil media was 33 percent—meaning about one-third of the responded who 
used incivility across all three waves corresponded w re exposed to uncivil political 
media. The same rate for those whose comments did not feature any incivility across all 
three waves was 12 percent, less than one 1 in 8. Usurprisingly, given the theoretical 
expectations, the rate of exposure for those who varied in their use of incivility 
throughout the waves fell in between the rate of the two consistent groups, at 21 percent. 
The differences between each group mean paired together were significant (p=0.000). 
To further evaluate the relationship between use of incivility, uncivil media 
exposure, and the wave periods, I conducted a cross-sectional analysis to see if a 
relationship between exposure to uncivil news existd in the waves independently and in 
pooled form. Note that these models lack the causal leverage that fixed-effects models 
(presented below) have, but can provide some insight into the relationship between media 
usage and incivility within the different waves. I include measures of exposure to the 
other types of media, as well measures of age, gender, education, and political interest64 
in the models. The results of the logit regression analyses can be seen Table 4-1. 
Exposure to both uncivil pundit cable news and uncivil talk radio had statistically 
significant positive relationships with use of incivility in waves 2 and 4, and uncivil 
                                                
64 The gauging of political interest was part of an opti nal public affairs profile in which nearly all NAES-





pundit cable news was significant in wave 5 as well—however talk radio was not. In the 
pooled data, both pundit cable news and talk radio had positive, significant relationships 
with use of incivility. While talk radio not reaching significance in wave 5 is curious, its 
performance in the pooled model strongly suggests that a relationship between exposure 
to its content and use of incivility exists.65  Uncivil talk show exposure was not significant 
in any of the wave or pooled models, suggesting these types of (“soft media”) programs 
have no relationship with the use of incivility. 
Additionally, several other media variables reached significance. A pair of media 
types had positive relationships with incivility: NPR in waves 4, 5, and the pooled data, 
and satirical news in wave 4 and the pooled data. Both entertainment programs and civil 
talk shows had negative relationships with incivility in waves 4 and the pooled data. 
Additionally, females (all waves and pooled data), more educated people (4, 5, and 
pooled), Republicans (4, 5, pooled), conservatives (2, 5, and pooled), and older people (4 
and pooled) all were more likely to use incivility. It is important to note, that this cross-
sectional analysis suggests that these variables are related to the use of incivility—but it 
does not provide evidence that exposure to any of these types of media increases the 




                                                
65 Different media effects between the waves may be due to the differences in the degree to which uncivil 
media was uncivil, and the degree to which audiences became aroused by it, before, during and after the 
election. For instance, those who were uncivil following conservative talk radio exposure before the 
election might be less willing to talk about the elction at all in wave 5. Differences in may also be to the 
unbalanced nature of the data, where two-sided censoring results in a slightly different set (and smaller 




Table 4-1: Cross-Sectional Analysis on Determinants of Use of Incivility 
 
Variables Wave 2 Wave 4 Wave 5 Pooled 
     
Uncivil Pundit News 0.41** 0.58*** 0.87*** 0.63*** 
 (0.211) (0.129) (0.154) (0.087) 
Uncivil Talk Radio  0.36* 0.50*** 0.13 0.45*** 
 (0.212) (0.133) (0.160) (0.084) 
Uncivil Talk Show  0.03 -0.00 -0.14 -0.04 
 (0.204) (0.129) (0.147) (0.086) 
Civil Talk Show  -0.22 -0.30** -0.20 -0.25*** 
 (0.191) (0.119) (0.134) (0.079) 
Civil Cable News  0.22 0.04 0.05 0.08 
 (0.209) (0.126) (0.150) (0.085) 
Civil Network News  -0.03 0.01 -0.15 -0.08 
 (0.215) (0.127) (0.147) (0.081) 
Satirical News  0.38 0.31** 0.20 0.32*** 
 (0.234) (0.143) (0.161) (0.095) 
NPR 0.04 0.30** 0.32** 0.21** 
 (0.263) (0.151) (0.163) (0.094) 
Entertainment Programs -0.24 -0.39*** -0.17 -0.34*** 
 (0.200) (0.114) (0.137) (0.074) 
Gender (Male to Female) 0.39** 0.28*** 0.31** 0.26*** 
 (0.172) (0.106) (0.121) (0.067) 
Age (18 and up) 0.00 0.01** -0.00 0.01** 
 (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) 
Education  0.05 0.08** 0.08** 0.09*** 
 (0.054) (0.033) (0.039) (0.021) 
Party Identification (7 cat, R-D) -0.05 -0.07** -0.09** -0.10*** 
 (0.051) (0.031) (0.037) (0.017) 
Ideology (7 cat, C-L) -0.19** -0.04 -0.11* -0.06*** 
 (0.081) (0.047) (0.057) (0.022) 
Political Interest (0-3) 0.39*** 0.09** 0.23*** 0.12*** 
 (0.119) (0.045) (0.069) (0.033) 
Constant -4.55*** -1.82*** -1.52*** -1.87*** 
 (0.757) (0.313) (0.355) (0.192) 
     
Observations 1,773 2,514 2,100 6,387 
Adj. R-squared 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 
     
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Note: Table reports unstandardized log-odd coefficints from logistic regression models. 




 Fixed-effects models, however, allow me to evaluate the relationship between 
changes in media exposure with changes in the propensity to use incivility, eliminating 
many spurious associations. The lack of within-group variation for a portion of panel 
respondents results in those units being dropped from the analysis, and consistency across 
waves was common; in the fixed-effects models, the number of observations decreases to 
2,052 and the number of groups to 752. While this is a smaller sample, the analysis is 
focused on individuals who underwent some “change” between waves in the variables 
included in the model, and on how changes in exposure to uncivil news affects use of 
incivility in political talk. Additionally, I do not find any evidence of this biasing the 
effects in any way; given that those who remained consistently unexposed to uncivil 
partisan media had the lowest levels of incivility, and those who were consistently 
exposed to incivility had the highest rate, the removal of stables cases should 
underestimate the effect of exposure, if there is any bias at all. 
Included in the first fixed-effects model testing the impact of general uncivil 
media are the dichotomous measures of exposure to uncivil pundit cable news, uncivil 
talk radio, and uncivil talk shows, as well as measures of exposure to civil talk shows, 
civil cable news, civil network news, satirical news, National Public Radio, and 
entertainment programs. As noted, time-invariant demographics (gender, agend 
education) do not need to be controlled for in the fix d-effects models.66 The NAES, 
however, asked respondents about their partisan and ideological orientations to politics in 
each wave, which results in varying identifications over time. As the strength of partisan 
                                                
66 Additionally, including these variables interacted with the waves has little impact on the size and 
direction of the other coefficients in the model, although some of the significance of the wave variables is 




and ideological orientations impact media habits and opinion change (i.e., Zaller 1992), I 
include both party identification and ideology in the models. 
To control for the differences in the levels of incivility in political media at 
different points in the election season, as well as reduced interest in the election and 
politics among the electorate during the wave 2 and 5 periods, I include dummy variables 
for both of these waves in the model,67 68 a technique that can efficiently control for a 
number of time-varying influences (Dilliplane, Goldman, and Mutz 2012). Because the 
fixed-effects models analyze only within-group variation, it is unnecessary to make a 
distinction between when in the wave each interview was conducted. As political interest, 
which likely varies throughout the campaign, was not continuously gauged throughout 
the waves, I interact the measure taken before the first wave of interviews began with the 
waves.69 
The results of the first fixed-effects model supply strong support for my first 
hypothesis. Column 1 of Table 4-2 shows the effects of changes in the various types of 
media exposure, along with party identification, ideology, and controls for waves 2 and 5 
on the use of incivility. Both exposure to uncivil pundit cable news and uncivil talk radio 
had a significant positive effect on the propensity to utilize incivility. None of the other 
media variables in the model were close to significance, including, notably, exposure to 
uncivil talk shows. This is not especially surprising—despite the fact that programs like 
                                                
67 Dummy variables for the two waves allow me to gauge the impact of the particular time periods. Wave 4 
is left as the baseline wave to avoid collinearity. Including dummies for any two of the three waves ha no 
impact on the other coefficients in the model.  
68 Additionally, as the strength of partisan identification has been found to fluctuate in response to 
campaign events (i.e., Gerber, Huber, and Washington 2010; Allsop and Weisburg 1988) the time-varying 
measures of partisan and ideological orientations may capture the effects of campaigns on attitudes and 
behavior. 
69 This measure will essentially gauge how interest in politics before campaign season, likely reflecting 
“true” interest in politics uninfluenced by the campaign, affected the propensity to use incivility as election 




The View and Fox & Friends feature uncivil partisan displays, both shows are likely best 
qualified as “soft news” which feature significant amount of apolitical information (see 
discussion in A1 4-2 Appendix 1), and have been foud to have a limited impact on 
political knowledge (Prior 2003). This idea is supported by the data, in that the size, 
direction, and significance of the “uncivil” talk show coefficient are very similar to that 
of “civil” talk shows. 
Additionally, civil cable news, NPR, and satirical news exposure were 
insignificant. While people who watch these programs ight use incivility (as reflected 
in the cross-sectional analysis), changes in exposure do not have an effect on individuals’ 
propensity to do so. This reflects the fact the civil able news programs included in the 
analysis, while partisan at times, feature substantially less emotionality and “example” 
uncivil behavior to mimic.  
Changes in exposure to civil network news and entertainment programs did not 
have any impact on the use of incivility. The insignificance of network news (as well as 
NPR) suggests that becoming exposed to more traditional journalism does not induce 
more civil political talk—although this finding desrves additional analysis. The 
insignificance of entertainment exposure is not surprising—although it is unclear how 
this relates to Prior’s (2007) thesis that entertainment viewing is attached to reduced 








Table 4-2: Effects of Changes in Uncivil Media Exposure on Use of Incivility 
 
Variables Column 1 Column 2 
   
Uncivil Pundit News 0.55*** (0.197) -- 
Uncivil Talk Radio  0.36* (0.230) -- 
Uncivil Talk Show  -0.12 (0.197) -- 
Civil Talk Show  -0.27 (0.207) -- 
Civil Cable News  -0.08 (0.180) -- 
Civil Network News  -0.16 (0.183) -- 
Like-minded Uncivil Pundit News -- 0.48*** (0.184) 
Disagreeable Uncivil Pundit News -- 0.07 (0.197) 
Like-minded Civil Cable News -- 0.08 (0.200) 
Disagreeable Civil Cable News -- -0.23 (0.198) 
Neutral Civil News -- -0.18 (0.183) 
Satirical News  0.08 (0.216) 0.10 (0.214) 
National Public Radio -0.12 (0.219) -0.11 (0.217) 
Entertainment Programs 0.07 (0.165) 0.09 (0.166) 
Party Identification (7 categories) -0.03 (0.079) -0.06 (0.087) 
Ideology (7 categories,  0.00 (0.031) 0.00 (0.031) 
Political Interest*Wave 0.03* (0.018) 0.03* (0.018) 
Wave 2 -0.96*** (0.127) -0.97*** (0.127) 
Wave 5 -0.41*** (0.116) -0.42*** (0.115) 
Observations 2,052 2,052 
Groups 752 752 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Note: Coefficients are unstandardized log odds ratios from logistic fixed effects models, reflecting intra-






 Although campaign effects have been found to influence partisanship, and in turn 
political behavior and attitudes (Gerber, Huber, and Washington 2010), changes in 
political orientation did not affect the propensity to use incivility. However, both of the 
dichotomous wave variables were significant, indicating that respondents were less likely 
to utilize incivility in waves 2 and 5 compared to wave 4, which took place during the 
heart of election season. Also significant was the political interest-wave interaction, 
which had a positive effect on the use of incivility, indicating that having an interest in 
politics early in the election year influenced the propensity to use incivility as the 
campaign wore on. 
The positive, significant relationships of uncivil pundit news and talk radio with 
the use of incivility, and the insignificance of the other media variables, provide support 
for my first hypothesis. However, it is useful to understand how large an impact a change 
in exposure to both has on uncivil talk. To interprt the substantive significance of the 
fixed-effects coefficients, I calculated the predicted probabilities70 of using incivility 
when a change in exposure to uncivil pundit cable news, talk radio, or both took place.  
Figure 4-1 displays these changes in graphic form. With exposure to uncivil 
pundit news, the probability of using incivility increases from about 39 percent to a 
probability of 53 percent—a change of 14 percentage points. For talk radio, the 
probability of using incivility increased by 8 percntage points, moving from about 43 
percent with no exposure, to 51 percent with exposure. It follows that a change in 
exposure to both of these types of programs should impact incivility even more. 
                                                
70 I calculate the predicted probabilities using the observed value approach (Hanmer and Kalkan 2013), 
which involves holding each of the other independent variables at the observed values for each case in the 





Displayed in Figure 4-2 is the effect that a change i  xposure to both talk radio and 
uncivil pundit cable news has on incivility use. The effect of this change is indeed quite 
large, with the probability of using incivility increasing from about 38 percent with no 
exposure to over 59 percent with exposure. This is a difference of over 20 percentage 
points, and represents a 53 percent increase in theuse of incivility. 
Figure 4-1: Effects of Change in Uncivil Pundit News and Talk Radio Exposure on 
Probability of Using Incivility. 
 
 
Note: Probabilities reflect intra-group change in the propensity to utilize incivility with exposure to pundit 
cable news and talk radio (separately). 
 
These effects are significant for a number of reasons. First of all, media effects are 
notably hard to detect, even with samples significantly larger than the one used in this 
analysis (Zaller 2002). A larger sample might reveal even larger effects. Furthermore, 
time-variant exposure to other sources of political ncivility—most obviously via the 
Internet and interpersonal discussions—are not possible to control for with this data, so 
there may be cases where those who are deemed “incivility” free were being exposed to 




incivility, meaning exposure to some of these programs could have impacted the 
propensity to use incivility without exposure to the uncivil programs. Such exposure is 
still likely to affect the likelihood of using incivility, and a more precise, continuous 
measure of incivility in media might illustrate an even stronger relationship between 
uncivil media exposure and use of incivility; the same thing might be said for the levels 
of incivility in respondents’ verbatim comments.  
Moreover, the measure of media exposure is accurate but conservative, in that it 
cannot take into account the effect that the amount of exposure has on the use of incivility 
(Dilliplane et al. 2013)—recent exposure could mean once or twice within the last month, 
or nightly exposure. On top of all of this, if we assume it is mostly strongly partisan, 
politically aware people who self-select in uncivil partisan media exposure,71 the size of 
the change in probability is even more impressive—given that they are the least likely to 
have their political attitudes influenced by change-inducing political messages, even 
when the message is congenial (Zaller 1992, 127-128). What these changes in probability 
of using incivility reflect is a strong connection between exposure to uncivil political 
media and the use of incivility. 
One question is why talk radio seems to have a smaller impact than pundit news. 
The small amount of within-person change in talk radio exposure likely makes it difficult 
to detect the effect--only 18 percent of respondents included in the fixed-effects models 
(and just 15 percent in the entire subsample) underwent a change in exposure to talk radio 
throughout the three waves. The measurement of exposure time may be too imprecise 
(for example, perhaps many talk radio listeners only have brief exposure during a 
                                                
71 The descriptive statistics included in Table A2 4-5 in Appendix 2 show that uncivil political media users 
tend to be more partisan and ideological than non-users, and are overall more politically active, as 




commute), and something may be said for the visual timuli that are a part of uncivil 
political television in inducing uncivil reactions (Mutz and Reeves 2005). A larger 
sample with more precise measurement of exposure might detect a larger effect. 
As my second hypothesis states, it should only be exposure to like-minded uncivil 
political media which affects the likelihood of using incivility, as individuals should 
select into uncivil media which reinforces preexisting views. Furthermore, a change in 
exposure to civil like-minded incivility should not have an impact. To test this 
hypothesis, I estimated the effect that changes in xposure to uncivil like-minded media, 
uncivil disagreeable media, civil like-minded media, civil disagreeable media, and civil 
neutral media all had on the propensity to use incivility. Exposure to satirical news, 
National Public Radio,72 and entertainment programs were also included in this model, 
as were the time-varying political orientation measure , wave dummies, and political 
interest interacted with the waves.  
Column 2 of Table 4-2 displays the results. Exposure to like-minded uncivil 
political media was the only media measure to reach statistical significance, indicating 
that becoming exposed to uncivil media congenial to one’s partisan identification had a 
positive effect. This confirms the hypothesis that it is self-exposure to like-minded 
uncivil political media which influences the use of incivility. The wave dummies were 
again significant, indicating that early in the campaign season (wave 2) and the post-
election period (wave 5) the propensity to use incivility was lower. The coefficient on 
political interest interacted with the waves was also again significant and positive. 
 
 
                                                




Figure 4-2: Effect of Change in General Uncivil Media Exposure and Like-minded 




Note: Probabilities reflect intra-group change in the propensity to utilize incivility with exposure to general 
uncivil political media (pundit cable news and political talk radio) and like-minded uncivil media (uncivil 
media that expresses views in accordance with an individual’s partisanship). 
 
 A change in exposure to “civil” like-minded media w s not significant at 
conventional levels, suggesting that reinforcement of preexisting views alone does not 
lead to a greater propensity to use incivility. This is despite the fact that even the partisan 
media qualified as “civil” included some incivility by my measures—some more than 
others. Yet less uncivil behavior to mimic—in both scope and volume—makes exposure 
to these like-minded “civil” programs less potent in producing incivility as the like-
minded uncivil media. Furthermore, it is worth notig that few pundit-themed 
programs—where the program’s host offers opinion—qualified as “civil” under my 
measures. It is likely, as previous studies suggest, tha  the emotionality of political 
punditry is particularly effective in influencing the opinions and behavior of audiences. 




 As it is unlikely that individuals choose to be exposed to media that promote 
views that conflict with their opinions and induce discomfort, the insignificance of a 
change in exposure to uncivil disagreeable pundit news make sense; another context, in 
which individuals are involuntarily exposed to uncivil attacks on their “side” could 
provide insight into how individuals react to uncivil political messages about their in-
group. As expected, neither, disagreeable civil cable news nor civil neutral news had a 
significant effect on incivility use. 
The change in the predicted probability of using incivility when becoming 
exposed to like-minded uncivil political news is shown in Figure 4-2. A change in 
exposure produces a 32 percent increase in the probability of using incivility, rising 12 
percentage points from about 37 percent to about 49 percent. Again, in the context of 
impreciseness of the exposure measure, the difficulty in detecting media effects in 
smaller samples, and the consistency in attitudes among politically aware individuals, this 
change is large. These results provide significant support for the overarching “mob 
effect” hypothesis, as exposure to like-minded uncivil discourse does seem to spur the 
use of incivility. Hearing arguments which reinforce preexisting views and which also 
feature vitriol and vilifications of the out-group seems to affect the use of incivility by the 
audience. Whether this effect is due to emotional stimulation, mimicry, or both, cannot be 
determined with this analysis, but previous research suggests both likely occur. I will turn 
to this issue myself in the chapters to come. 
In sum, a change in exposure to uncivil political media increases the probability 
that a person will use incivility. This occurs, however, only with exposure to like-minded 




conservative, to the extent that measures of exposure and levels of incivility are 
imprecise. Yet these increases can result in significa tly higher levels of incivility in 
political conversations and interactions. Assuming a larger sample and more precise 
measurements might detect even larger effects, it is clear that exposure to uncivil political 
media can affect the tone of political talk en masse. 
Discussion 
 The nature of the political programming of the “new media” era, designed to be 
hyperbolic and intense, and to emphasize conflict and disagreement, allow various shows 
to compete for ratings in a disaggregated and competitive media market. Such programs 
aim to stir the emotions of members of their audiences, who tune in in order to receive 
news and commentary that align with preexisting politica  views, to maximize the chance 
that viewers stay tuned and return again to the show. H wever, the uncivil elements used 
to do this have effects on the way those exposed talk politics, and the mass interaction 
capabilities that have come with “Web 2.0” adds signif cance to how people talk politics. 
Incivility, as this analysis shows, breeds more incivility. The differences in the use of 
incivility between when one is exposed to uncivil po itical media and when one is not are 
enough to alter the tone of political discourse en masse; if the individuals who 
experienced a “change” in exposure to uncivil news had avoided these types of media, 
then any type of political discussion they engaged in would have featured significantly 
less incivility, resulting in a multitude of political conversations that were more civil, 
conciliatory, and deliberate.  
A divided public utilizing incivility will have negative repercussions for both 




derived from political discourse, and if fruitful negotiations among elites require some 
openness to alternative views among the public, then exposure to uncivil political media 
does a great disservice to the democratic process. Given the supposition that incivility 
hinders the pro-deliberative attitudes, polarization is ultimately reinforced and the quality 
of policy is reduced.  
In this chapter, I hypothesized that exposure to uncivil political media induces 
individuals to utilize incivility when given the chance to offer political opinions. I also 
hypothesized that it is only like-minded uncivil media exposure which induces the use of 
incivility, and not disagreeable uncivil media or like-minded “civil” media. To test these 
hypotheses, I designed an index that included four criteria of incivility, and identified 
open-ended responses from a 2008 panel data set that included one or more of these 
criteria. Measuring the effect of within-group changes in media use on within-group 
changes in the use of incivility, I find support for both hypotheses. That selective 
exposure to like-minded media results in a greater propensity to use incivility provides 
support for the “mob effect” hypothesis.  
This analysis has some limitations. First and foremost is the question of how 
much of the change in the propensity to use incivility that exposure alone accounts for. 
Certainly, most people will not tune into uncivil political media if it does not appeal to 
their political sensibilities. But, as previous studies of media effects have shown, 
exposure to uncivil political media can affect attitudes and behavior, including 
reinforcing and intensifying preexisting views, and framing arguments and issues of 
concern. Uncivil messages delivered by trusted elites grant them legitimacy, and recent 




while fixed-effects methods used are uniquely effectiv  in controlling for spuriousness, it 
cannot be ruled out that most or all of the impact comes from the stimulation of uncivil 
“attitudes” by another source, and the resulting change in exposure to uncivil media is 
largely endogenous to the use of incivility in political opinions.73  
Relatedly, this analysis does not take into account the effect that interpersonal 
political conversations and interactions have on use of incivility—where the “retaliation 
effect” might be expected to occur. Exposure to (like-minded) uncivil political 
programming may be a catalyst for a chain reaction of uncivil discourse among the 
general population, where incivility by some induces others to join in or retaliate in the 
same uncivil fashion. Furthermore, if use of incivility is indeed impacted by uncivil 
media, this analysis is unable to determine whether exposure simply legitimizes and 
increases the salience of uncivil talk, thus leading those exposed to mimic this behavior, 
or if the use of incivility by those exposed are true emotional reactions—or some 
combination of both. In the next chapter, I turn to experimental methods to better 






                                                
73 Note, however, that the election does not seem to have influenced viewership of uncivil media. Virtually 
the same percentage of Republicans (just under 60 percent) and Democrats (just under 40 percent) tuned in 
to uncivil political media in each wave. This is not t  say that feelings about the candidates, the election, 
and politics did not change with the events of the election—but the election did not appear to systemaically 




Chapter 5:  Emotional and Behavioral Reactions to Incivility 
Online  
 
Social media has changed political communication. Historically, it has been a top-
down process, with media and political elites disseminating political messages to the 
public. The interactive elements of Web 2.0 have transformed political communication 
into a horizontal process, where members of the public can communicate with and 
influence each other. This development has led scholars to consider the potential 
possibility of a digital public sphere (Dahlgren 2005; Dahlberg 2001), where the mass 
public can deliberate on policy and politics from the comforts of the living room. 
Indeed, the “infrastructure” for a digital public sphere is sufficient. The various 
social media platforms through which people can broadcast their political opinions (the 
comments section under online news articles, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, etc.) all 
provide opportunities for non-elites to interact wih mass audiences of complete 
strangers. These same interactive elements allow everyday people to not only disseminate 
political information, but to affect the political ttitudes and behavior of others.  The 
anonymity and limited constraints on expression that online communication provides 
results in considerably more uncivil behavior than in face-to-face interactions (Borah 
2013; Papacharissi 2002). Limited social cues and a sense that there are no repercussions 
for one’s behavior means people feel far less restricted in interpersonal communication.   
In this chapter, I argue that the presence of incivlity in online political 
expressions by members of the mass public can induce negative emotions and anti-




rather than active speakers in digital political discussions, the ubiquity of incivility in 
online political discussions can lead to a more anti-deliberative public.  
Scholars estimate that the presence of incivility in online political commentary is 
widespread and common (Sobieraj and Berry 2010; Borah 2013), and experimental 
studies on incivility in the blogosphere show that exposure to uncivil commentary 
induces certain attitudinal responses. Borah (2013) and Thorson et al. (2010) find that 
people view political blog commentary featuring incivility as less credible than civil 
commentary, and that the perceived credibility of objective new stories is boosted when 
they are juxtaposed to partisan uncivil blog posts. Borah argues that the uncivil 
manipulations increase perceptions of hostility, and fi ds that the presence of incivility in 
blog posts also reduces political trust and efficacy. These studies establish the power of 
uncivil political messages in online settings to affect information processing.  
 In this chapter, I address how exposure to uncivil talk affects people’s willingness 
to use incivility and deliberate, as well as the rol  that emotions and affective ties play in 
this dynamic. I employ an experiment in which exposure to an uncivil post on a message 
board is manipulated, to test a series of questions: 
1. Do general feelings of anger increase with exposure to uncivil treatments? 
2. What role do affective ties (that is, partisan-based allegiance) to the target of uncivil 
attacks play in determining people’s reactions? 
3. Do reprimands of incivility perpetrators increas with exposure to uncivil treatments 
when the message is disagreeable, and are reprimands induced by feelings of anger 




4. Does the use of incivility increase with exposure to uncivil treatments, and is use of 
incivility induced by feelings of anger?  
5. When the uncivil message is like-minded, is there evidence of anger directed at the 
target of uncivil comments? 
6. Does the potential for deliberation decrease among those angered by the message? 
The experiment reveals that the uncivil versions of the post, which attack a policy 
proposal made by President Obama, lead to increased feelings of aversion and decreased 
deliberative attitudes among Democrats (exposed to “ isagreeable incivility”), while 
inducing Republicans (exposed to “like-minded incivility”) to increase their use of 
incivility in their own posts.  
Incivility and Deliberative Potential 
I have argued that incivility affects the way that individuals process political 
information, as well as their willingness to engage in deliberation. To the extent that 
incivility can induce anger and aversion, it will reduce consideration of alternative 
viewpoints (MacKuen et al. 2010). Additionally, exposure to uncivil political discourse 
may reduce satisfaction with political discourse more generally. Stromer-Galley and 
Muhlberger (2009), using an online deliberative experiment, find that higher satisfaction 
with deliberative exercises increases the motivation to engage in deliberation in the 
future.  Moreover, satisfaction increases the perceived legitimacy of decisions made 
through deliberation.  Dissatisfaction with deliberation is not boosted by the amount of 
disagreement that occurs; those who report significant disagreement in their political 




collective decisions are legitimate. This suggests that another factor —which I contend is 
the presence of incivility in discourse—is responsible for reducing deliberative potential. 
I expect that exposure to incivility can reduce deliberative potential by affecting 
people’s attitude towards deliberation in both of these ways. If a political message angers 
individuals, I expect that they will act more as “partisan combatants” than they will 
“deliberative citizens.” If what people see and hear in political discussions largely 
offends them, it is likely they will be dissatisfied with the discussion. I predict that 
dissatisfied participants should be less likely to consider alternative views and to want to 
engage in future deliberative exercises.  
Main Hypotheses 
MacKuen et al. (2010) find that individuals who exprience aversion are less 
willing to compromise in political debates, retreat to prior attitudes, and limit information 
searches to sources that reinforce these attitudes. Substantial research links incivility to 
negative political emotions, but not to feelings of aversion specifically. My goal is to 
make the connection between exposure to incivility, feelings of aversion, and anti-
deliberative attitudes. My overarching hypothesis i that exposure to online incivility will 
lead to reduced deliberative attitudes and more anti-deliberative behavior. 
H1. The presence of political incivility in online interactive settings will induce anti-
deliberative attitudes and behavior 
To test this overarching hypothesis, I will test the following hypotheses: 
H1A. The presence of political incivility in online interactive settings will induce anger  
H1B. The presence of political incivility in online interactive settings will induce 




H1C. Those angered by the presence of political incivility in online interactive settings 
will have lower deliberative potential  
As Sobieraj and Berry (2011) argue, in text-based communication, “the deliberate 
use of uppercase letters, multiple exclamation points, enlarged text, and so on” 
constitutes “shouting,” and are emotional, common forms of incivility in online political 
discussions. As emotional displays, these tactics communicate an idea to the reader: the 
poster really believes in what he is saying. The content of the message is not just uncivil, 
but the way the message is delivered is uncivil as well. I expect that histrionic, 
emotionally-charged incivility will be particularly effective in inducing anger, incivility, 
and critiques of the messenger. The reason for the stronger effect is the addition of 
displays of emotion, in the form of capitalized words and multiple exclamation points.  
H1D. Emotionally-strident incivility is particularly effective in inducing anger, use of 
incivility, and critiques of the messenger 
A nuanced understanding of the effect that incivility has on deliberative attitudes 
requires that a distinction be made between exposure to disagreeable incivility and like-
minded incivility. In the following, I outline my hypotheses in regards to how those 
exposed to either “type” of incivility should react. 
The Retaliation Effect: Disagreeable Incivility and Perpetrator Aversion 
The “retaliation effect” assumes that when an individual is exposed to 
disagreeable incivility—or incivility which targets her or her in-group—she will likely be 
offended. Sociological research on “everyday” incivility shows that the most common 




at a specific target: the perpetrator of incivility and his or her actions. I refer to this 
phenomenon as “perpetrator aversion.”  
The uncivil behavior of one person can affect how those exposed to this behavior 
engage in subsequent interpersonal interactions. Individuals angered by incivility directed 
at them or their in-group often respond by retaliating and sanctioning the perpetrator of 
incivility (Phillips and Smith 2004; Smith et al. 2010). Retaliation refers to instances 
when offended individuals “return the favor,” and act in an uncivil manner towards the 
person who was uncivil to them. If retaliation occurs, this means more uncivil 
behavior—potentially reducing the chances of any deliberative behavior and further 
escalating unpleasant situations. 
Sanctions involve critiquing or reprimanding the uncivil pertrator out of anger; 
they are substantively different from providing a negative evaluation of an argument or 
comment, because they represent feelings that a comment is not just factually wrong, but 
ethically wrong.74  In political discourse, this means that sanctions can potentially shift 
the discussion away from the topic at hand to that of the personal characteristics of the 
messenger. Sanctions can therefore lay the foundation for a discussion that is less about a 
particular topic and more about the traits and behavior of the people discussing the topic. 
As Phillips and Smith (2004) argue: 
From the Durkheimian perspective incivility is a breach of the normative order 
that rends the fabric of the collective conscience. It generates powerful primary 
emotions such as anger and outrage. These lead in turn to interventions in the 
                                                
74 Confronting individuals about the errors in their behavior and thinking could theoretically be helpfu for 
deliberation—for one, this lets individuals know tha  their behavior is unacceptable, allowing them to 
correct their behavior. But it is not guaranteed that sanctions point out the misdeeds of an uncivil 
perpetrator; the responses can be restitutive, critiquing the perpetrator generally without focusing on his or 
her use of incivility. For instance, if you tell me that the capital of Kansas is Wichita, I would disagree with 
you and tell you the correct answer is Topeka. However, if you tell me that the capital of Kansas is Wichita 





form of negative sanctions which, no matter how graduated in intensity, at some 
level express disapproval and exact a restitutive vengeance. 
 
While Philips and Smith are referring to uncivil behavior in face-to-face interactions, 
there is evidence of these same types of behavioral reactions occurring on the online 
world, when individuals are uncivil in online forums (Papacharissi 2004; Lee 2005) 
 If exposure to disagreeable incivility in online political communication does 
induce perpetrator aversion, I expect that there will be higher levels of anger, increased 
propensity to use incivility in political opinions, and more sanctions of uncivil 
perpetrators among those exposed. 
H2: Exposure to disagreeable incivility will induce “perpetrator aversion” in which 
anger, use of incivility, and critiques of the uncivil perpetrator will all increase  
Self-reported feelings of anger are one way I can measure whether perpetrator 
aversion occurs with exposure to disagreeable incivility.  Another way is to look at 
reprimands of the messenger. Critiques of uncivil perpetrators clearly reflect feelings of 
aversion (you do not critique behavior that you think is acceptable), and should also 
indicate reduced deliberative potential. I hypothesiz  that both self-reports of anger and 
the reprimanding of an uncivil perpetrator should be associated with a decreased 
willingness to deliberate.   
H3: Perpetrator Aversion, as measured by self-reports f anger and reprimands of a 
messenger, will be associated with reduced consideration of disagreeable messages and 
satisfaction with discourse 
Like-minded Incivility 
When people adopt incivility following exposure to a like-minded (or 




in the previous chapter suggests a “mob effect” exists. What is not clear is if the “mob 
effect” is the result of negative emotions. When individuals use incivility when they are 
exposed to uncivil attacks on the “other side,” is th a result of an emotional reaction, in 
which they become angered upon being “reminded” howbad the other side is (“target 
aversion”)? Or is it simply a mimicking effect, whereby witnessing like-minded 
individuals utilize incivility legitimizes and inspires others to adopt uncivil language, 
without a change in anger? I will briefly overview the theoretical argument for both cases 
here. 
A number of studies look at the “sorting” phenomenon of the Internet age, in 
which people cocoon themselves into like-minded echo chambers which reinforce their 
preexisting views (Prior 2009;  Sunstein 2009; Jamieson and Capella 2009; Stroud 2008, 
2010). Sunstein (2009), reflecting on the pervasive practice of political-oriented Internet 
sites providing links to other like-minded sites, writes, “[o]ne of the most striking facts 
here is that when links to opposing sites are provided, it is often to show how dumb, 
dangerous, or contemptible the views of the adversary really are.” Hearing these 
arguments may not only reinforce the beliefs you hold, but also reinforce your contempt 
for the other side by hearing how “bad” they and their actions are. Uncivil rhetoric is very 
effective in sending this point home. Individuals agree with the commentary of the 
perpetrator and become “riled” up in anger. For insta ce, a conservative Republican who 
tunes into Rush Limbaugh and hears about all the bad things Barack Obama is up to may 
become genuinely angry with Obama—the target of Limbaugh’s incivility. 
Thus, I believe that another type of “anger” may play a role in affecting the 




This anger is not directed at the perpetrator of inciv lity, but rather the target of the 
perpetrator’s comments. I refer to this phenomenon as “target aversion.” My third 
hypothesis provides a test of the “target aversion” effect:  
H4A: Exposure to disagreeable incivility will induce “target aversion,” in which anger 
and use of incivility will increase 
One of the factors driving “cocooning,” however, is that it is cognitively pleasing 
for people to hear arguments that reinforce preexisting views and denounce views 
opposed to their own. A conservative Republican tunes i to Rush Limbaugh because he 
knows that Obama and the Democrats are bad, and hearing Limbaugh reinforce these 
views is cognitively pleasing. This person may still increase his use of incivility because 
incivility has been legitimized—that is, a like-minded commenter has made uncivil 
remarks about Obama, so it must be okay (or even necessary) to repeat these claims. It is 
unclear if those who identify with the target of an uncivil claim and adopt incivility into 
their own comments are driven to do this by anger with the perpetrator, or are merely 
mimicking (or “recycling”) language that has been entered into a conversation’s lexicon. 
I pose an alternative hypothesis to H4A: 
H4B: Exposure to disagreeable incivility will increase use of incivility but not feelings of 
anger 
If exposure to like-minded incivility does induce anger, this anger should not be 
directed at the messenger. Instead, it should be directed at the target of an uncivil claim 
and whatever “bad” activities they are doing. For example, if conservative Republicans 
become angry while listening to Rush Limbaugh bash Barack Obama, their anger is 




Limbaugh or Limbaugh’s behavior, but they are to Obama and his behavior. Affective 
intelligence theory suggests that when people are averse to political information, they 
close their minds and adopt anti-deliberative outlooks; however, because individuals 
exposed to like-minded incivility agree with the message, I do not expect them to become 
more anti-deliberative—at least for as long as the messages remain congenial. This is a 
critical distinction—the measurements of willingness to deliberate that I present in this 
chapter all revolve around feelings towards a particular political message. Exposure to 
like-minded incivility will therefore not lead to less deliberation.75  
Study Design 
 To test these hypotheses, I designed an experiment where three groups would 
each be exposed to a political post on an online message board. I created three non-credit 
online workshops, each of which featured a message board containing a different version 
of the post76—one for a control group, and one for each of two experimental groups. The 
only element that varied between the posts on each message board was the presence of 
incivility. In the control group, the message took on a civil negative tone, but lacked 
incivility. I added uncivil elements to the messages shown to the two experimental 
groups, one of which also featured histrionic elements. I randomly chose77  Democrats to 
be exposed to a disagreeable message, with Republicans exposed to a like-minded 
                                                
75 However, the tolerance for opposing views should be reduced among those exposed to like-minded 
incivility—I will explore the connection between like-minded incivility and reduced tolerance for opposing 
views in the next chapter. 
76 The message boards were generated through platforms designed by the 
Enterprise Learning Management System (ELMS) Blackboard Academic Suite. Using the ELMS platforms 
was advantageous for this study in that I could have complete control over who had access to the messag  
board and what information could be seen by subjects. 




message; I expect the content of the message to appeal less to individuals whom identify 
with the Democratic Party than to those who identify with the Republican Party.  
 The study population consisted of undergraduate and some graduate 
students of at least 18 years of age, enrolled at the University of Maryland.  I recruited 
participants from class rosters of online summer courses (from all disciplines and all 
majors).78 79 I explained to subjects that they were testing ways to incorporate the use of 
“new media” into online classes, by partaking in a “trial run” of an inter-class message 
board program run by the university called “No Obstacles Limit Terps,”80 or “NOLT.” 
The instructions I sent to them explained that the purpose of NOLT was to forge campus-
wide conversations about issues of national importance, and that each person would be 
given a chance to put in his or her two cents in a predetermined, random order. The 
instructions also told subjects that their participation would involve making a pair of 
posts on the message board, one of which had to be in response to a previous post.
Afterwards, they would be asked to provide some brif feedback about their experience 
with the message board.  
After agreeing to participate, I randomly assigned 138 subjects to one of three 
“workshops” (subjects did not know of the workshops ther than the one they were 
assigned to, and could not see who else was in the workshop with them). At this time I 
asked them to complete a pretest questionnaire within the next 48 hours. Through this 
survey I was able to gather demographic information—including partisan identification.  
                                                
78 I recruited from online courses to ensure participants had access to and were familiar with the ELMS 
platform, as well as to minimize the chances that subjects would discuss the experiment with each other. 
79 Students were recruited through an email listserv created by the University of Maryland’s Registrar 
office for the purpose of this study.  Students were offered a $5 electronic gift card in exchange for their 
participation in a “trial run” of a new university communication program. After completing the “trial” in 
full, redemption codes for the e-cards were emailed to each participant. 








Thread Title: This policy is problematic 
 
Thread Content: College is expensive, but this policy will likely have a negative 
impact on economic growth in the long run by adding more to the national debt. I 
think this proposal is probably a typical election year attempt at trying to mobilize 
support among undecided voters. The bottom line is that I’m skeptical of its 
ability to ease Americans’ financial burdens, and I think it will probably be more 
helpful to president Obama in reaching out to young voters. 
 
 
Experimental Group 1 (E1): 
 
Thread Title:  This policy is ridiculously problematic 
 
Thread Content: College is expensive, but this policy will likely have a disastrous 
impact on economic growth in the long run by adding more to the national debt. I 
think this proposal is probably a shameful election year attempt to trick undecided 
voters through lies. The bottom line is that I’m skeptical of its ability to ease 
Americans’ financial burdens, and I think it will probably be more helpful as 
socialist propaganda for president Obama in reaching out to naïve young voters. 
 
 
Experimental Group 2 (E2): 
 
Thread Title: This policy is RIDICULOUSLY problematic 
 
Thread Content: College is expensive, but this policy will likely have a disastrous 
impact on economic growth in the long run by adding MORE to the national 
debt!!! I think this proposal is probably a shameful election year attempt to trick 
undecided voters through lies. The bottom line is that I’m skeptical of its ability 
to ease Americans’ financial burdens, and I think it will probably be more helpful 




Following completion of the survey, I sent each participant an email explaining 
that he or she would be the second person to post on the board (subjects were unaware 




have another 48 hours to make their posts in response to an article made available to read 
in the workshop. After they made their posts, I instructed participants to complete a brief 
“feedback survey” about their NOLT “experience.” 
 The article I posted in the workshops was an edited version of an actual article 
published online by the media platform GOOD.81 The article concerns a policy proposal 
made by President Obama to help relieve student debt; I shortened the article from its 
original version and removed some temporal references (i.e., “end of the year”). Before I 
told participants it was their time to post on the m ssage board, I added the first “post” 
(the experimental stimulus) to the discussion board, un er a gender-neutral fake name. 
This post was the only post on the message board respondents were able to see, in 
addition to their own. Each of the three versions of this post can be seen in Table 5-1. The 
uncivil elements included in the experimental group message boards are underlined in the 
text of experimental group 1 (E1) and experimental group 2 (E2) in Table 2 (but did not 
appear underlined in the actual experiment). In the control group message board (CG), 
the post consisted of an argument that is negative of both Barack Obama and the student 
debt relief policy, but lacks any uncivil elements. The “poster” argues that the policy will 
have a negative impact on long-term economic conditions by adding to the national debt, 
and that Obama likely sees the policy as a way to mobilize young voters in an election 
year.  
In the first experimental workshop (E1), I added some uncivil elements to this 
post, falling under criteria 1 and 2 of the incivility index, in an effort vilify and radicalize 
the policy and Obama. The post now describes the policy as not just having a negative 
                                                
81 GOOD is essentially an online magazine. It can be viewed h re: http://www.good.is/everyone. the article 




impact on economic conditions, but likely to have a disastrous impact. No longer just 
attempting to mobilize young voters, the post characterizes Obama’s behavior as a 
“shameful election year attempt to trick undecided voters through lies…[the policy] will 
probably be more helpful as socialist propaganda for president Obama in reaching out to 
naïve young voters.” 
 The differences that exist between the E1 post and the post added to the 
experimental group 2 (E2) message board are four instances of histrionic incivility 
(Criterion 3 in my incivility index). Three words have been capitalized (“ridiculously,” 
“more,” and “socialist”), and three exclamation points were added to the end of a 
sentence. The use of words in all uppercase letters and multiple exclamation points have 
been identified as the digital equivalent to shouting (Sobieraj and Berry 2010). These 
elements make the E2 post a more histrionic, dramatic presentation of the uncivil claims 
included in the E1 post. As hypothesis H1D states, I xpect the E2 stimulus to be more 
effective in inducing reactions than the E1 post. 
Sample 
   Methodologists commonly claim that experiments whose samples are comprised 
of college students have weak external validity, as results cannot be generalized to larger 
populations (Sears1986).  An increasing amount of research, however, suggests that 
convenience samples (specifically student populations) are not necessarily problematic 
for external validity (Druckman and Kam 2011)82 if the sample does not differ from the 
type of people likely to encounter a stimulus in the “real world.” My sample is made up 
                                                
82 A Druckman and Kam (2011) argue, if the stimulus trea ment effect is homogenous across the 
population, or if the use of a convenience sample means the experiment has high levels of “mundane 
realism”—defined by Aronson et al. (1985) as “the extent to which events occurring in the research setting 




of  mostly younger people, and consists of undergraduate students and some graduate 
students; since political social media users tend to be younger people with at least some 
college education,83  my sample is appropriate for investigating the eff ct of incivility in 
online political discourse.  
Of the original 138 recruited, 109 of the subjects completed the pretest survey by 
the deadline; the remaining participants were dropped from the study. This left 38 
subjects in the control group, 34 subjects in the first experimental group, and 37 in in the 
second experimental group. Of the 109 subjects who advanced to the message board 
stage, 92 completed the “post” assignment and the post-stimulus “feedback” survey.84 
Among those who completed the trial in full, 33 were in the control group, 30 in E1, and 
29 in E2. The average age of my sample was about 23,85 and 72 percent were female.86 
Around two-thirds of the sample identified as a strong, weak, or leaning Democrat, with 
the remaining third identifying as strong, weak, or leaning Republicans.87 More details 
about the full sample and each group can be found in a table of means (Table A2 5-1) 
included in Appendix 2.  
                                                
83 The Pew Internet and American Life Project regularly sks national samples of Americans about their 
Internet use and their exposure to political content on the Internet. A November 2010 survey, conducted 
during the 2010 Midterm elections, asked 2,257 adults about what two media they relied upon the most to 
get information about the campaigns and elections. The survey found that, “[d]emographically, political 
social media users are younger and somewhat more educated than other internet users. Two in five (42%) 
are under the age of 30 (vs. 22% for the rest of the online population) and 41% have a college degree (34% 
of other internet users have graduated from college)” (Pew Research Center 2011). 
84 A total of 97 subjects completed the “post” assignme t, but five of these subjects did not complete the 
post-stimulus feedback survey. 
85The sample consisted of mostly upperclassmen (no freshmen, and only 12 percent of the sample were 
sophomores), as well as some graduate students. The inclusion of some graduate students produced a much 
larger age range (18-63) than is typical of student populations, and over 15 percent of the sample was aged 
24 years or older. 
86 As shown below, there was no difference if reactions to the stimuli between males and females, so I do 
not believe the smaller amount of males in the sample to be problematic. 
87 Given that recent polling  has found the State of Maryland to be the “most Democratic state” in terms of 
partisan identification, having a sample that is 33 percent Republican is a positive outcome. For more 






Methodology and Measures 
 As with the panel data analysis presented in the last chapter, a research assistant 
and I independently coded the open-ended responses for incivility. Posts that violated one 
or more of the four uncivil criteria included in the incivility index were coded as uncivil. 
We had the same answers for 90 percent of the responses, and a calculation of 
Krippendorff's alpha88 indicates the measure is reliable.89 When subjects’ original post or 
response post contained incivility, they were coded as “1” in the uncivil measure. If they 
did not use incivility in either post, they were coded as “0.”  
 To measure anger, I use an item from the post-stimulus “feedback” survey, which 
asked participants how angry the other posts they saw on the message board made them 
feel.90  As a manipulation check, I also asked about fear—or how afraid the other posts 
made subjects feel--to ensure that the emotional reactions induced by the stimuli are 
limited to anger.91 The scale for both the “anger” and “fear” variables was 0-3, with 3 
representing extreme fear or anger. I dichotomize the anger variable into “0” for reports 
of feeling no anger or a little angry, and “1” for feeling somewhat angry or extremely 
angry.92  
                                                
88 Krippendorff’s Alpha is a conservative estimate of intercoder reliability that measures the level of 
agreement between coders beyond that which can be ascribed to mere chance. 
89 The coefficient was 0.732, which is above the acceptable alpha. 
90 For the “anger” question, the options were “Extremely angry,” “Somewhat angry,” “A little angry,” and 
“Not angry at all.” For the “fear” question, the options were “Extremely afraid,” “Somewhat afraid,” “A 
little afraid,” and “Not afraid at all.”  
91 In contrast to feelings of anger, when a message gen rates “fear” and “anxiety,” it can induce openness to 
alternative viewpoints (Valentino et al. 2008; MacKuen et al. 2010). Thus, it is important to ensure the 
experimental stimuli did not generate feelings of fear.  
92 Dichotomizing anger (and fear) in this way makes substantive and methodological sense. By collapsing 
the four ordinal categories into two—little or no anger versus some or more anger—interpretation of 
changes in anger with exposure to the stimuli, as well as the effect of anger on other measures, is made 
easier. Keeping the anger and fear measures to two categories also makes it possible to use parametric 
difference of means tests, such as the Tukey WSD method. Nonparametric means tests, such as the Mann-
Whitney-Wilcoxon method and the Kruskal-Wallis test, do not all for comparison procedures between 




Relying on individual reports of anger is one way to measure aversive emotional 
reactions to the stimuli. Another is to look at how subjects reacted in their posts. An 
established anger-induced reaction to incivility is the sanctioning or reprimanding of an 
uncivil perpetrator (the “original poster,” referred to as the “OP” henceforth). In some 
ways, this may be a more accurate measure of feelings of aversion than self-reports of 
anger. Rather than declaring that they are angry, those who reprimand the OP are 
demonstrating aversion to the OP and his post.  
My objective was to identify posts in which a subject’s response was not 
completely focused on the argument put forth by the OP or the larger topic at hand, but 
posts in which specific personal qualities, behavior, and traits of the OP were negatively 
assessed. For example, two subjects made the following statements in response to the OP. 
The first was made by a subject in the control group, and the second by a subject in EG 1.  
(1) I disagree with you. In fact I think this policy would have the opposite effect. 
By easing the burden of loans and debt it would allow more Americans to 
have degrees increasing America's productivity as well as allowing those with 
degrees to not go under financially. Had this policy been implemented earlier 
we might have been able to avoid some of the housing foreclosure crisis. 
People would have naturally had more money to pay mortgages. 
 
(2) I can't see to well over there is that Mitt Romney??? I know we have freedom 
of speech but, try not to slander the president, he is still the president.  He is 
not trying to trick young voters, he isn't lying and its (sic) not propaganda. 
What is propaganda is what you said, for the other camp.  You took an issue 
that was proposed by one side slanted it to look bad for one side and then 
promoted it. Basic definition of propaganda. Let’s try and focus on the issue? 
 
In the first case, the responder expresses disagreement with the OP, and puts forth a 
substantive defense of the policy. In the latter case, the OP’s behavior becomes the topic 




slandering the president, slanting an issue, spreading propaganda, and not focusing on the 
issues (while also utilizing incivility). In this response, no substantive discussion of the 
proposal takes place. I expect these sorts of critiques, aimed at the OP himself, to increase 
with exposure to incivility. In identifying critiques, my research assistant and I were in 
agreement 95 percent of the time, producing a Krippendorff’s Alpha of about 0.81, which 
suggests the measure is reliable. 
 I also consider how willing those who use incivility or reprimand the OP are to 
deliberate. If both these reactions are anger induce , then I expect that the potential to 
engage in deliberation should be reduced. To measur the potential to deliberate, I 
recreate measures used in previous studies to capture deliberation. As Stromer-Galley and 
Muhlberger (2009) find that satisfaction with policy discussions determines how willing 
people are to deliberate in future discussions, one way to measure deliberative potential is 
to measure satisfaction with policy talk.  Additionally, MacKuen et al. (2010) measure 
the amount of consideration given to opposing viewpoints93 to determine how 
deliberative people are being. I created a deliberative potential measure, using two 
questions from the post-stimulus “feedback” survey, which asked participants how 
satisfied they were with the points expressed in the “other posts” they saw on the 
message board, and how much consideration they gave to th  other posts.94 The scale of 
the deliberative potential measure ranges from 0-6, with 6 indicating high potential. To 
borrow from the language of MacKuen et al. (2010), an individual with a score of 6 on 
                                                
93 To measure consideration of opposing viewpoints in a web-based experiment, MacKuen et al. (2010) 
look at the number of Internet pages subjects visited that professed a view opposed to subjects’ preexisting 
ones. My measure of consideration is slightly different, as I ask subjects directly how much consideration 
they gave to the views expressed on the message board.  
94 For the “satisfaction” question, the options were “V ry satisfied,” “Somewhat satisfied,” “A little 
satisfied,” and “Not satisfied at all.” For the “consideration” question, the options were “A lot of 




this measure is expected to act as a “deliberative citizen,” while an individual with a 
score of “0” is expected to act more in line with a “p rtisan combatant.” 
Results 
Anger, as I hypothesize in H1A, should be higher among the groups exposed to 
uncivil messages. Figure 5-1 shows the differences in the mean scores95 for anger and 
fear between subjects exposed to incivility and those exposed to the “civil” control 
message. The difference between the anger mean (on a scale of 0-1) for subjects exposed 
to either “uncivil” message and subjects in the control group is 0.21 percentage points 
(significant at the 0.01 level). However, when I break the experimental subjects into 
group 1 and group 2, it is the histrionic elements of group 2 which appear to be driving 
up feelings of anger. The difference in means betwen experimental group 1 and the 
control group is 0.14 points (significant at the 0.10 level). The difference between the 
mean score for those in the histrionic group (group 2) and the control group, however, is 
0.28 points (significant at the 0.01 level). That the difference in anger between the 
histrionic group and the “civil” control group is larger than the difference between group 
1 and the control group makes sense, given the emotionally-strident elements included in 
the group 2 stimulus; this is consistent with the expectations of Hypothesis H1D. 
 Also featured in Figure 5-1 is a comparison between th  fear means between 
subjects in the “uncivil” groups and those in the “civil” control group. As expected, the 
                                                
95 The significance of difference in means for all analyses in this chapter was calculated using the Tukey’s 
WSD method, unless otherwise noted. As groups with unequal sample sizes and variances were compared, 





uncivil posts did not lead to more fear.96 Uncivil discourse (particularly the comments 
featuring histrionics) did make people more angry. This finding, along with the lack of a 
relationship between the uncivil stimuli and fear, provide support for Hypothesis H1A: 
the presence of political incivility in online settings generates anger specifically, and not 
negative emotions more generally. 
 
Figure 5-1: Differences in Means of Reported Feelings Towards Original Post between 










































Experimental Group 1 Experimental Group 2 Combined Experimental Groups
 
*Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference in means is statistically significant at the 0.10 level.  
**Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i means is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
***Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i  means is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
Note: The significance of differences in means for each comparison was confirmed using Student’s t-tests 
with Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom, due to the unequal samples sizes and variances of groups being 
compared. 
  
If the perpetrator aversion (H2) and target aversion (H3A) hypotheses are 
accurate, then feelings of anger should increase for both Democrats and Republicans who 
                                                
96 In fact, fear is (very) slightly higher in the control group than in the experimental group 1, and is les  





are exposed to uncivil messages. However, anger only increased among Democrats. As 
they were exposed to a disagreeable message, increased anger among Democrats suggests 
that perpetrator aversion is occurring.97 As shown in Figure 5-2, the difference in means 
between Democrats in E1 and Democrats in the “civil” control group is 16 percentage 
points, rising from 8 percent to 24 percent—although this difference does not reach 
statistical significance. However, the difference in anger means between “histrionic” 
group Democrats and control group Democrats is 42 percentage points (significant at 
0.01). This means that 50 percent of Democrats exposed to the histrionic incivility 
expressed anger with the message board post.  
Among Republicans in the experimental groups, there are not significant 
increases in anger.98 While the means are slightly higher in the experimntal groups than 
in the control group (11 percentage points higher in E1and 9 percentage points in E2), 
these differences are not statistically significant. This suggests that target aversion is not 
occurring, as Republicans’ anger is not increasing as the attacks on the “other side” 
become more hyperbolic. Hypothesis H3A—which states that anger should increase 
among Republicans due to increased aversion towards Obama and the policy--can 




                                                
97 Had anger increased among Republicans as well, this could indicate Republicans also felt aversion for 
the perpetrator—even though the message was “like-mnded.” If this was the case, however, sanctioning of 
the perpetrator should also increase among Republicans. Increased anger among Republicans, without an 
increase in sanctions, would indicate “target aversion” was occurring. As anger did not increase 
Republicans (and, as shown below, sanctions did not either), this point is moot. 
98 As shown in Figure A2 5-1 of Appendix 2, the mean anger score among Democrats was significantly 
larger than that or Republicans in the experimental groups, especially in E2. An extended discussion of 




Figure 5-2: Differences in Means of Anger towards Original Post between Control Group 




*Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference in means ix statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
**Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i means is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
***Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i  means is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Note: The significance of differences in means for each comparison was confirmed using Student’s t-tests 
with Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom, due to the unequal samples sizes and variances of groups being 
compared. 
 
Incivility and Critiques 
 I also hypothesize in H1B that exposure to an uncivil post will lead subjects to use 
incivility in their own comments.  As shown in Figure 5-3, use of incivility does appear 
to increase with exposure to the uncivil stimuli. The incivility mean in experimental 
group 1 is 18 percentage points higher than the control group mean of about 9 percent 
(significant at the 0.10 level). The difference betw en the histrionic group 2 mean and the 
control group mean is, at 36 percentage points, even larger, and significant at the 0.01 




higher than those in the “civil” control group (sign ficant at 0.01), representing a 200 
percent increase.  
 Also displayed in Figure 5-3 are the differences in the rates of critiquing the 
original poster (on a scale of 0 to 1) between the “uncivil” groups and the “civil” control 
group. The means for both experimental groups 1 and 2, as well as the combined 
experimental group mean, are around 20 percentage points higher than the mean for the 
control group (with the group 1 change significant t he 0.05 level and the group 2 and 
combined group differences significant at the 0.01 level). This indicates that reprimands 
of the original poster increased with exposure to the uncivil messages, and is consistent 
with the expectations of Hypothesis H1B.  
Figure 5-3: Differences in Means of Use of Incivility and Critiques of Original Poster 
Between the Control Group and Experimental Groups 
 
*Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference in means ix statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
**Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i means is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
***Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i  means is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Note: The significance of differences in means for each comparison was confirmed using Student’s t-tests 





Are the upticks in incivility and critiques consisten  across the partisan spectrum? 
Hypothesis H2 states that Democrats’ use of incivility and critiques should increase with 
exposure to disagreeable incivility. Hypothesis H3B, the “mimicry” hypothesis, states 
that Republicans’ use of incivility should increase with exposure to like-minded 
incivility, even as their anger levels and critiques of the OP do not. 
Figure 5-4 shows the effect of the experimental stimuli on Democrats’ 
propensities to use incivility and critique the messenger. On the one hand, the 
percentages of Democrats in the experimental groups using incivility (23 percent in group 
1 and 28 percent in group 2) are not that much higher than that of the control group 
Democrats (9 percent). While the E1 Democratic mean is 16 percentage points higher 
than the Democratic mean in the “civil” control group, and the E2 Democratic mean is 19 
percentage points higher, neither of these differences are statistically significant. These 
differences may perhaps reach significance with a larger sample, and the 17 percentage 
point difference between Democrats in either “uncivil” group and the control group did 
reach statistical significance (at 0.05). There is thus a mixed bag, leaving it unclear if 
exposure to disagreeable incivility stimulates “retaliatory” uncivil comments.  
On the other hand, there are significant changes in Democrats’ propensity to 
critique the OP with exposure to the uncivil message . While 7 percent of Democrats in 
the control group critiqued the messenger, Democrats in either “uncivil” group had a 
mean 27 percentage points higher than control group Democrats (significant at 0.01). The 
group 1 Democratic mean is 24 percentage points higher, and the group 2 (histrionic) 




differences significant at 0.05). These results indicate that Democrats are expressing their 
aversion to the disagreeable incivility, by reprimanding the uncivil perpetrator.99 
Figure 5-4: Differences in Means of Use of Incivility and Critiques of Original Poster 
Between the Control Group Democrats and Experimental Group Democrats 
 
*Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference in means ix statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
**Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i means is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
***Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i  means is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Note: The significance of differences in means for each comparison was confirmed using Student’s t-tests 
with Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom, due to the unequal samples sizes and variances of groups being 
compared. 
 
For Republicans, exposure to incivility induced thenear inverse when it came to 
using incivility and critiquing the original poster.100 Around 33 percent of Republicans in 
group 1 used incivility, compared to 11 percent of Republicans in the “civil” control 
group. As displayed in Figure 5-5, this difference of 22 percentage points does not reach 
                                                
99 While a higher percentage of Democrats in the E2 group critiqued the OP than in the E1, the difference 
between the two means is not significant. This may indicate that the histrionic message, in this case, did not 
generate more critiques than the uncivil message lacking histrionics. I further discuss the different ffects 
that the E1 and E2 stimuli have on critiques below.  
100 The differences in means between Democrats and Republicans in each group also suggests that 
Democrats increased their use of critiques with exposure to uncivil stimuli—especially the E2 prompt—
while Republicans increased their use of incivility. These differences can be seen in Figure A2 5-2 in 




statistical significance. The difference between Republicans exposed to the histrionic 
uncivil message (E2) and control group Republicans, however, is 62 percent (significant 
at 0.01). This means that nearly 73 percent—almost two-thirds—of Republicans in the 
histrionic group used incivility in their posts. Exposure to the histrionic uncivil 
message—containing the use of capitalized words and multiple exclamation points—
seems to be particularly effective in generating uncivil responses among Republicans. 
Republicans exposed to incivility were not more likely to critique the messenger than 
those exposed to the civil message.101  
 
Figure 5-5: Differences in Means of Use of Incivility and Critiques of Original Poster 
between the Control Group Republicans and Experimental Group Republicans 
 
*Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference in means ix statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
**Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i means is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
***Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i  means is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Note: The significance of differences in means for each comparison was confirmed using Student’s t-tests 
with Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom, due to the unequal samples sizes and variances of groups being 
compared. 
                                                
101 The differences between Republicans in the experimental groups and control group (11 percentages 




 Republicans are using incivility more when exposed to the uncivil messages, but 
they are not becoming angrier and are not critiquing the original messenger. This is 
consistent with the “mimicry” hypothesis (H4B)—exposure to like-minded incivility 
increases the use of incivility among Republicans, but did not generate feelings of anger 
or aversion. If anger had increased among Republicans (and critiques had not), this would 
be evidence of like-minded incivility generating anger towards the target of the uncivil 
messages (in this case, Obama and his policy). But the mimicry hypothesis assumes that 
exposure to an uncivil comment by someone with like-minded views legitimizes uncivil 
talk—without generating a strong emotional reaction.  
 Because incivility increased among Republicans, but they did not become 
angrier, there is reason to believe that their use of incivility is not an emotional reaction. 
Instead, Republicans are mimicking the uncivil langua e of the “like-minded” messenger. 
Evidence of mimicry is found in the verbatim responses of Republican subjects, as well: 
in many cases, the incivility used by Republican subjects was similar or identical to the 
uncivil phrases included in the uncivil stimuli. Emotionally-strident incivility, like that 
included in the group 2 stimulus, was present in only 10 percent of uncivil responses 
among group 1 subjects, but was present in 28 percent of group 2 uncivil responses. 
Probit Models of Incivility Exposure, Anger, and Behavioral Reactions 
To better understand the relationships between exposure to incivility with 
partisanship, feelings of anger, use of incivility, and reprimands of the original poster, I 
created a series of probit regression models.  The first model examines what effect 
exposure to the experimental stimuli has on the propensity to utilize incivility in the 




coded as “1”). I include dummy variables for participation in both the E1 and E2 groups 
in the model, as well as partisan identification (seven categories, with strong Democrats 
coded as “1” and strong Republicans coded as “7”). Additionally, age, gender (with 
males coded as “0” and females coded as “1”), and rce (with whites coded as “0” and 
non-whites coded as “1”) are included as control variables.  I also created a probit model 
which regresses the inclusion of a critique of the OP (with no reprimand in a post coded 
as “0” and the inclusion of a reprimand coded as “1”) onto the same set of control 
variables.  
As shown in Column 1 of Table 5-2, exposure to the incivility in experimental 
group 1 and the histrionic incivility of experimental group 2 both have a statistically 
significant positive effect on the propensity to utilize incivility. Partisan identification is 
also significant, indicating that being Republican has a positive effect on the use of 
incivility. Column 2 of Table 5-2 shows that participation in experimental group 1 and 
experimental group 2 also positively influenced the propensity to critique the original 
poster, and partisan identification had a negative, significant relationship with poster 
reprimands, indicating Democratic identification has a positive effect on use of critiques; 
no other variable, excepting age,102 has a significant relationship with original poster 
critiques. 
In order to explore the role of emotion in affecting behavior, I created two 
additional models, which included the same set of variables as well as the addition of 
reported feelings of anger towards the original post (0-3) as an independent variable. As 
                                                
102 Age also has a positive, significant effect, suggesting that as age increased, so did the use of incivil ty. 
This perhaps may be due to older individuals being upperclassmen or graduate students, who are more 
comfortable with expressing themselves in a bold in manner on a “university-run” message board having 
been accustomed to the university, as well as being more sure of their own position on the policy (and o  




shown in Column 3 of Table 5-2, the inclusion of sel -r ported anger did not have a 
significant effect on the use of incivility. In fact, the size of the coefficient and its 
significance remains largely unchanged from the model in Column 1, with exposure to 
the experimental stimuli, Republican partisan identification, and age all remaining 
positively associated with the use of incivility. The addition of self-reported anger into 
the critique model tells a different story. As shown in Column 4, feelings of anger with 
the original post have a positive, significant effect on critiques of the original poster. 
Also, the effect of group 2 participation and Democrati  Party identification is reduced in 
Column 4 with the addition of self-reported feelings of anger in the model. 
To get a better sense of the connection between feeli gs of anger among 
Democrats and the propensity to critique the original poster, I calculated predicted 
probabilities103 of reprimanding the OP, based on the probit model in Column 4 of Table 
5-2, for nine categories: Strong Republicans in the control group, group 1, and 
experimental group 2, Strong Democrats in each of te three groups, and “Not angry” 
Strong Democrats in each of the groups. By “Not Angry” Democrats, I am referring to 
Democrats who did not report being “somewhat” or “extr mely” angry with the original 
post.104  
The predicted probabilities for each category are displayed in Figure 5-6. The 
results show that in each of the groups, the predict  probability of Strong Republicans 
using incivility is very low,105 with the differences between the groups not reaching 
                                                
103 I use the observed value approach; see Hanmer and K lkan (2012). 
104 To model this effect, the dichotomous anger variable was set to “0”, whereas for the predicted 
probabilities of general Strong Democrats and Strong Republicans, the anger variable was set to its 
observed value (Hanmer and Kalkan 2012).  
105 The probability of a Strong Republican in the contr l group critiquing the original poster was miniscule 
(less than one percentage point), and, the probabilities of Republicans in experimental groups 1 (about 5 




statistical significance. In the control group, thedifference between the probability of 
Strong Democrats and Strong Republicans critiquing the OP is also not significant. In the 
experimental groups, Democrats’ probabilities of critiquing the OP increase significantly 
—jumping to 42 percent in group 1 and 43 percent in group 2—and are statistically 
significant from Democrats in the control group and Republicans in all three groups. This 
indicates that disagreeable messages that lack uncivil elements—such as the control 
group message—are not enough to induce reprimands.   
 
Table 5-2: Use of Incivility and Critiques of Original Poster 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Incivility Critique Incivility Critique 
     
Anger -- -- -0.28 0.51** 
 -- -- (0.212) (0.218) 
Group 1 0.85** 1.38** 0.89** 1.22** 
 (0.416) (0.569) (0.420) (0.583) 
Group 2 1.29*** 1.40** 1.45*** 0.99* 
 (0.416) (0.575) (0.437) (0.615) 
Age 0.04* 0.01 0.05** -0.00 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) 
Gender 0.08 0.38 0.14 0.24 
 (0.355) (0.453) (0.360) (0.478) 
Party ID 0.19** -0.29*** 0.15* -0.18* 
 (0.082) (0.108) (0.087) (0.114) 
Race 0.29 -0.36 0.18 -0.19 
 (0.350) (0.394) (0.361) (0.425) 
Constant -3.12*** -1.74** -3.11*** -1.86** 
 (0.788) (0.826) (0.789) (0.860) 
     
Observations 92 92 92 92 
Adj. R-squared 0.19 0.22 0.21 0.29 
Coefficients are probit. Standard errors in parenthses 







Figure 5-6: Predicted Probabilities of Critiquing the Original Poster By Experimental 
Condition and Party Identification 
 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities are calculated using the observed value approached (Hanmer and Kalkan 
2012). The error bars are 90 percent confidence intrvals, calculated through the method of statistical 
simulation (Herron 1999). 
 
  The critical finding, however, is that among Democrats who did not report being 
angry, the predicted probabilities of critiquing the poster are much lower. In group 1, the 
probability of critiquing the OP among “not angry” Democrats is 13 percentage points 
lower than all Democrats in group 1. In group 2, the “not angry” probability is 23 
percentage points lower (over 50 percent) than all group 2 Democrats. This finding 
affirms previous research on “every day” incivility which asserts that there is a strong 
connection between feelings of anger and reprimands; when those exposed to 
disagreeable incivility did not report being angry with the post, they were significantly 
less likely to critique the uncivil perpetrator. In fact, the difference in probabilities 
between Democrats who were not angered by the post and Republicans does not reach 
statistical significance in any of the groups. Despite the fact that use of incivility did not 
increase significantly among Democrats in the experim ntal groups, perpetrator aversion 




levels of anger and had greater propensities to criique the messenger than Democrats in 
the control group and Republicans.106 
Feelings of Aversion and Deliberative Potential 
 The results above suggest that perpetrator aversion—anger with the original 
poster—is occurring with exposure to the disagreeable uncivil messages. Additionally, 
exposure to like-minded incivility is not inducing feelings of anger or aversion. I expect 
that, as stated in hypothesis H3, willingness to deliberate should fall among those 
exposed to disagreeable incivility (Democrats). Expressed feelings of anger provide one 
measure of aversion, and I expect anger to be associ ted with lower willingness to 
deliberate. Moreover, if reprimanding the original poster is more than just a calm 
response, but represents a display of aversion to the content in the posts, then those who 
reprimanded the OP should have a reduced willingness to engage in pro-deliberative 
behavior as well. 
 I have identified how much consideration an indiviual gave the original post (on 
a scale of 0-3), as well as their overall satisfaction with the message board experience (0-
3), as measures of deliberative potential.  Combining the consideration and satisfaction 
measures together produces a deliberative potential scale of 0 to 6, with a score of “6” 
indicating a person is likely to act like a “deliberative citizen,” and an individual with a 
score of “0” likely to act like a “partisan combatan .” Figure 5-7 displays the differences 
in means between those who reported being “somewhat” or “extremely” angry with the 
                                                
106 Additionally, the connection between self-reported anger and critiques of the OP, as well as the lack of a 
relationship between anger and incivility, can be se n in Figure A3 in Appendix 2. The figure shows a 
significant difference in the percentage who critiqued the OP among those who were angry and not angry 
(35 percentage points, significant at 0.01)—but no significant difference in the use of incivility between the 




original post and those who did not, as well the difference in means between those who 
critiqued the original poster and those who did not, on the three measures.  
 The results in Figure 5-7 show that those who report d feeling somewhat or 
extremely angry gave (very) slightly more consideration to the post than those who did 
not report feelings of anger--but the difference is not significant. Subjects who felt 
angered by the original post, however, were less sati fied than those who were not 
angered (with the difference in means between the groups significant at the 0.05 level).107 
The satisfaction mean among the non-angry is one-third lower108 than the average score 
is for those who were angry. When the consideration and satisfaction scores are 
combined (on a 0-6 scale), anger reduces the potential to deliberate by 0.61 points, a 
reduction of about 15 percent (significant at the 0.05 level).109  
Critiquing the perpetrator, which demonstrates aversion to the content of the 
original post, had a much stronger negative influence on deliberative potential. Those 
who critiqued the original poster averaged a consideration score nearly half a point lower 
(on the 0-3 scale) than those who did not critique the poster, significant at the 0.01 level. 
Critiquing the OP is connected to an even larger reduction in satisfaction with the whole 
message board experience, dropping the average satisfaction score from 2.0, to an anemic 
0.87—a difference of 1.13 points, significant at the 0.01. 
 
 
                                                
107 Due to the ordinal nature of each of the deliberative potential measures used, the nonparametric 
Kruskal-Wallis test was used to determine if the difference in means for each measure between individuals 
who expressed or displayed aversion to the original post and those who did not were significant. Because 
the independent variables are binary, and the effects of each are analyzed separately, no additional pairwise 
comparison are necessary.  
108 Subjects who were not angry had a mean score of about 1.95 (on the 0 to 3 scale), 0.67 points lower than
the anger mean among those were angry 








* The Kruskal-Wallis test determines that the difference in means is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
** Kruskal-Wallis determines that the difference in means is statistically significant at the 0.05 level 
*** Kruskal-Wallis determines that the difference in means is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
 
  
In the combined deliberative potential measure (the consideration and satisfaction 
measures put together), the difference between those who critiqued the OP and those who 
did not was large. The average score among those who did not sanction the messenger 
was 4.37 points—which is on the high-end of the 0 to 6 scale. The mean falls to 2.73 
among subjects who critiqued the poster—1.63 points lower those who did not sanction 
the OP. This shows the connection between sanctioning the messenger—a demonstration 
of aversion to his behavior—and willingness to delib rate. Those who are averse to the 
content of a message are less likely to engage in dl berative behavior.  
Why do critiques have a stronger and more consistent effect on the deliberative 
potential measures than self-reported feelings of anger? One explanation is that critiques 




poster’s behavior. Self-reported feelings of anger can indicate target aversion as well—
and perhaps some subjects were indeed reporting anger with the subject of the post rather 
than the messenger. Another explanation is that critiquing the poster represents an even 
stronger aversion to the post than reports of feeling angry with the content. After all, it is 
one thing to say someone has angered you when you think that person  is cannot perceive 
your answer, but it is  much more confrontational and extreme to call out that person on 
that behavior and express your dissatisfaction directly to them—even in a digital setting.  
These results show that critiquing the original poster is associated with reduced 
potential to act as a “deliberative citizen.” Indivi uals who were angered enough by the 
post to sanction the OP were less likely to consider th  views expressed in the message 
and were substantially less satisfied by the “discus ion.” This means subjects were less 
likely to consider the content of the message in the original post and recognize it as a 
legitimate point. Those who reported high levels of anger were also less satisfied with the 
message board experience than those who reported a li tle or no anger with the post. 
Effects of Exposure to Histrionic Elements 
Finally, hypothesis H1D states that emotionally-strident incivility will be 
particularly effective in inducing the reactions described above. Specifically, I expect the 
histrionic E2 stimulus to be more effective in inducing emotional and behavioral 
reactions than the E1 stimulus. The results provide substantial support for this hypothesis. 
As displayed in Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2, the group 2 (histrionic) stimulus was far more 
effective in inducing anger (among Democrats) than t e group 1 stimulus. In figures 5-3 
and 5-5, the larger effect of the group 2 stimulus in inducing incivility (among 




group and those in experimental group 1, as well as Democrat and Republicans, are not 
even significant at conventional levels for some comparisons. 
 Figure 5-8: Effect of E2 Stimulus on Democratic Delib rative Potential 
 
 
* The Kruskal-Wallis test determines that the difference in means is statistically significant at the 0.10 level 
**Kruskal-Wallis determines that the difference in means is statistically significant at the 0.05 leve 
*** Kruskal-Wallis determines that the difference in means is statistically significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Additionally, the probit models displayed in Table 5-2 show that that E2 stimulus 
induced higher levels of anger, incivility, and critiques (when not controlling for anger) 
than the stimulus in experimental group 1. The strong connection between exposure to 
the emotionally-strident E2 stimulus and feelings of anger can be seen in Column 4, as 
anger usurps some of the predictive power of participation when it comes to critiques of 
the uncivil perpetrator in the second experimental group, but not participation in 
experimental group 1 (as shown in Figure 5-1, levels of anger in group 1 were not as 
significantly different from levels of anger in the control group). Furthermore, as 
displayed in Figure 5-6, manipulating the levels of anger is particularly effective in 
increasing or decreasing the probability of critiquing the poster among Democrats 




Given that the histrionic E2 stimulus is particularly effective in inducing 
perpetrator aversion, it follows that the E2 stimulus should have reduced E2 Democrats’ 
willingness to deliberate. Indeed, as displayed in Figure 5-8, the increased feelings of 
aversion among Democrats in E2 led to significantly lower deliberative potential. E2 
Democrats had a mean deliberative score that was 0.90 points lower than control group 
Democrats, and 0.98 points lower than E2 Republicans. There are not statistically 
significant changes in deliberative potential among Republicans in the experimental 
groups or Democrats in E1 from their control group counterparts. As the histrionic 
stimulus reduced Democrats’ deliberative potential by roughly a point on the 6 point 
scale, I can conclude that the more emotionally-strident stimulus does induce stronger 
reactions, in support of hypothesis H1D. 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 Based on the results above, I find support for my overarching hypothesis, H1, that 
the presence of political incivility in online interactive settings induces anti-deliberative 
attitudes and behavior. I also find that those exposed to disagreeable incivility and like-
minded incivility displayed different types of anti-deliberative reactions. In response to 
exposure to disagreeable incivility, subjects (in this case, Democrats) indicated feelings 
of anger with the message board post, reprimanded the uncivil perpetrator, and decreased 
their deliberative potential, all at rates greater than those in the control group and those 
exposed to like-minded incivility (in this case, Republicans).  
When the target of uncivil attacks is not associated with an individual’s partisan 
attachment, there is a different set of reactions. Republicans increased their use of 




indicating a “mob effect” is occurring. Republicans’ adoption of incivility in their own 
comments seems to be a mimicking effect—as self-report d feelings of anger was not 
connected to the use of incivility, there is no evid nce that target aversion is occurring. 
This finding is not all that surprising; even though they are being reminded of how “bad” 
the other side is, attacks on the other side are cognitively pleasing for partisans to hear--
perhaps even comforting--as it reinforces their world view. However, respondents were 
asked if the post made them angry, not if they specifically felt any anger towards the 
targets of the post (President Obama and his policy). In the next chapter, I will examine 
experimental data to see if target aversion occurs when those exposed to like-minded 
incivility are asked about targets of uncivil attacks directly. 
 The mimicking effect makes sense from a theoretical stand point. Witnessing 
someone cross the “incivility line,” and not witnessing any admonishments of that 
behavior, gives license to adopt the language by legitimizing its use. If the language does 
not bother a person, but is instead cognitively pleasing to hear and she can detect no 
consequences for using it, then she would be rationl t  suppose that there is nothing 
wrong with adopting that language. This means more incivility in political discussions, 
which means more chances for those who identify with a arget (in this case, Democrats) 
to become angered.  
As the uncivil elements in the experimental groups induced reprimands among 
Democrats, the negative effect that incivility has on political talk is clear: incivility can 
offend and anger individuals when it is their “side” that is the target. When this is the 
case, the likelihood of reprimanding a perpetrator of incivility rises, and with that the 




aversion occurs with exposure to disagreeable incivility, and that perpetrator aversion is 
connected to reduced deliberative potential. 
Although exposure to incivility did not induce self-identified Democrats to 
incorporate incivility into their responses, they were much more likely to become angry 
and reprimand the OP. The resistance to including incivility in these responses is likely a 
function of 1) being angered by the incivility, and therefore recognizing it as 
unacceptable, and 2) being unwilling to use unacceptable language as part of a program 
trial (which they believed) the university was orchestrating. Additionally, respondents 
experienced with classroom discussion boards may have also had greater knowledge of 
deliberative etiquette, and were resistant to retaliating in the same fashion that upset 
them. This was not without consequences, as deliberativ  potential was reduced among 
these individuals.  
 The emotionally-strident elements that I included in the group 2 stimulus appear 
to be especially effective at inducing reactions to incivility. For Democrats, whose “side” 
was targeted by the incivility, this meant more emotional responses. For Republicans, 
who do not appear to have felt any type of aversion to the targets of the post, exposure to 
the “histrionic” group 2 stimulus provided additional uncivil behavior to mimic—that is, 
there is a greater variety of “sanctioned” uncivil behavior to copy. This is evidenced by 
larger presence of “histrionic” incivility in the comments of those exposed to the group 2 
stimulus than among those exposed to the “calmer” group 1 message.  
I think there is also something to be said about the ability of emotionally-strident 
displays of incivility to grab attention. How many more people noticed the uncivil 




shouting, the text-based histrionics ensures people pay attention to what you are saying, 
and might explain the increased rate of mimicking ucivil behavior with group 2 
exposure. Incivility’s ability to grab attention is why many elites use it to mobilize 
supporters (Herbst 2010). However, this comes at a cost—while people may pay more 
attention to your comments when you make use of histrionics, you are also more likely to 
induce anti-deliberative behavior within your audienc . 
My use of the pronouns “you” and “your” in the above sentence is not accidental. 
In the “YouTube era,” each of us now has the power, through social media, to broadcast 
our political opinions to large audiences. The ability to do this opens up doors for a 
digital public sphere. However, as the results I have shown in this chapter indicate, once 
incivility enters a political conversation, the poten ial for effective deliberation declines 
significantly. Consideration and satisfaction are essential elements for effective 
deliberation. However, there are many ways to measur  deliberative potential, and in the 
extensive, heterogeneous online world, different cotexts may produce different results.  
In the next chapter, I will build on these results, by utilizing some different measures of 
deliberative potential in another experiment, as well as exposing both Democrats and 








Chapter 6:  Like-Minded and Disagreeable Incivility 
 
In the previous two chapters, I presented evidence that exposure to uncivil 
political media increases the propensity with which people use incivility in political talk, 
and that when encountering incivility in online settings, people can react by retaliating or 
sanctioning the uncivil “perpetrator.” There are cave ts to these findings, however. So 
far, the evidence suggests that the use of incivility increases only with exposure to like-
minded incivility that targets the out-group. Additionally, the connection between this 
“mob effect” and emotion is unclear; the results included in the last chapter suggest 
people are mimicking like-minded incivility, but not reacting out of feelings of anger 
towards the target of an uncivil attack. 
 Additionally, the results presented in chapter 5 do not find evidence that those 
exposed to disagreeable incivility (incivility targeting one’s in-group) retaliate with more 
incivility. Instead, individuals tended to respond by critiquing of the uncivil perpetrator. 
Elements of message board experiment setting—such as being part of a “university” 
project--may have deflated the use of incivility in retaliation. The experiment also 
exposed one group of partisans (Democrats) to disagree ble incivility, and another group 
to (Republicans) to like-minded incivility, leaving open the possibility that partisans of 
different stripes might react to incivility types in different ways. Furthermore, while a 
connection between feelings of aversion and anti-deliberative attitudes was established in 
the last chapter, willingness to deliberate can be a tricky concept to measure. Finally, 
while the chapter 4 findings connect exposure to uncivil elite messages with use of 




Conducting another experiment in a different type of setting, with different measures of 
aversion and deliberative potential, allows me to further assess and expand on my 
previous findings. 
 In this chapter, I present the results of an experiment conducted on a large, 
national sample as a part of the 2012 Cooperative Congressional Study. Exposure to 
disagreeable incivility and like-minded incivility was manipulated for both Democrats 
and Republicans. Additionally, the messages that subjects were exposed to were said to 
actual statements made by elites in both parties.  This experiment provides a direct test of 
the effect that exposure to uncivil talk has on individuals’ willingness to compromise, as 
well as a test of the effect that “elite”-based incivility has on the way non-elites engage in 
political discourse. 
Theory 
To briefly recap from previous chapters, political psychology research finds that 
different emotions determine when people rely on their partisan predispositions, and 
when they turn away from them and consider alternative views. When partisans feel 
anxious, they tend to forgo reliance on established partisan convictions and are more 
open-minded to new information. When people are angry, however, they tend to base 
their political evaluations more heavily on party identification or preexisting preferences 
(MacKuen et al. 2007; 2011).110Additionally, feeling anger towards an out-group leads to 
a tendency to argue with, oppose, and attack those on the “other side” (Mackie et al. 
2000).  
                                                




What drives anger with the out-group? Substantial research links incivility to 
negative political emotions.111 When people witness like-minded elites making uncivil 
attacks on the “other side,” those people tend to have more negative, visceral feelings 
towards the out-group (Mutz and Reeves 2005; Mutz 2007; Barker 1999, 2002; Hibbing 
and Theiss-Morse 1998; Jamieson and Capella 2009; Owen 1997). Additionally, political 
psychologists have made note of a “boomerang effect” 112—witnessing an attack on one’s 
in-group by an elite of the other party generates defensive anger and lower esteem for 
that elite (Just et al. 2007). As an uncivil attack is one that is intensely negative and 
violates mores, it follows that uncivil attacks on your in-group will be particularly 
effective in inducing anger. 
Hypotheses 
Previous findings suggest that when political elites utilize incivility in comments 
addressing the “other side,” they can generate anger among partisans of both stripes. 
Like-minded partisans will feel more intense anger towards the out-group—a reaction I 
refer to as “target aversion.” Likewise, partisans of the “other side” will become angered 
by the uncivil attacks on their group—which I call “perpetrator aversion.” My first two 
hypotheses will test each of these: 
(H1) Exposure to like-minded incivility induces feelings of anger  
 (H2) Exposure to disagreeable incivility induces felings of anger 
                                                
111 Incivility has been found to heighten arousal and induce negative emotions (Mutz and Reeves 2005; 
Forgette and Morris 2006; Fridkin and Kenney 2008). 
112 For a general discussion of the “boomerang effect” within the negative campaigning literature, see 




Additionally, I will again test the hypothesis that exposure to uncivil comments 
by both like-minded elites and elites within the out-group should induce partisans to 
utilize incivility in their own political comments. 
 (H3): Exposure to uncivil political talk leads to an increased propensity to use 
incivility in political talk.  
Lastly, I will see if exposure to uncivil political talk negatively affects 
deliberative attitudes. I expect that anger, induce by the incivility, will reduce 
willingness to compromise. When elites include uncivil omments about the “other side” 
in their policy discussions, openness to compromise among both sets of partisans should 
decline.  
(H4) Exposure to uncivil political talk leads to a reduced willingness to 
compromise  
Study Design  
 To test these hypotheses, I designed an experiment that was embedded in the 2012 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study and sent to 1,000 individuals.113 Subjects were 
randomly assigned to read one of four short paragraphs (referred to as 1, 2, 3, and 4) that 
were completely fake, but said to be actual statements made by party leaders. Two 
paragraphs were made for each side—a negative but civil statement, and an uncivil 
negative statement. All of the statements address the national debt, and what the “other 
side” needs to do in order to help debt reduction negotiations to move forwards.  
 
                                                
113 The CCES is nationally-representative survey administered by YouGov/Polimetrix. The experiment was 





Table 6-1: CCES Experiment Paragraphs 
Paragraph 1 
 
Recently, a Republican Party leader issued the following statement regarding negotiations to 
reduce the national debt: “What we need from Democrats is for them to show some willingness to 
make cuts to some of the social insurance programs that are important to them and their base, and 
then I think we can move forward and compromise and really address the debt issue. In the past, 
it’s been tough to work together on this issue because there’s been resistance to reducing what 
we’re spending on domestic programs—I think we are c pable of negotiating and doing what’s 




Recently, a Republican Party leader issued the following statement regarding negotiations to 
reduce the national debt: “What we need from Democrats is for them to show some willingness to 
make cuts to some of the nonsense social entitlement programs that they use to get reelected by 
their base, and then I think we can move forward and compromise and really address the debt 
issue. In the past, it’s been tough to work together on this issue because there’s been a pigheaded 
resistance on the left to reducing what we’re spending on these socialist programs—I think we are 
capable of negotiating and doing what’s best for the country, though, when Democrats realize 




Recently, a Democratic Party leader issued the following statement regarding negotiations to 
reduce the national debt: “What we need from Republicans is for them to show some willingness 
to give up some of the low tax rates for corporations, an issue important to them and their base, 
and then I think we can move forward and compromise and really address the debt issue. In the 
past, it’s been tough to work together on this issue because there’s been resistance to increasing 
any taxes on Wall Street—I think we are capable of negotiating and doing what’s best for the 




Recently, a Democratic Party leader issued the following statement regarding negotiations to 
reduce the national debt: “What we need from Republicans is for them to show some willingness 
to give up some of the nonsense low tax rates for greedy corporations, an issue they use to get 
reelected by their base, and then I think we can move forward and compromise and really address 
the debt issue. In the past, it’s been tough to work t gether on this issue because there’s been a 
pigheaded resistance on the right to increasing any taxes on their crooked Wall Street friends. I 
think we are capable of negotiating and doing what’s best for the country, though, when 







Paragraphs 1 and 2 were statements said to be released by a Republican Party 
leader regarding what Democrats need to do to help reduce the national debt. Paragraph 1 
was a civil negative statement, while Paragraph 2 was the same as Paragraph 1, but for 
the addition of uncivil elements.  Paragraphs 3 and 4 were said to be statements released 
by a Democratic Party leader, regarding what Republicans need to do to help reduce the 
national debt. Paragraph 3 was a civil negative statement, while Paragraph 4 was an 
uncivil version of Paragraph 3.  
 The paragraphs can be seen in Table 6-1. In both of the civil statements, the 
leader makes the case that if the “other side” is willing to make cuts to policies which are 
important to them and their base (“social insurance programs” for Democrats, and “low 
tax rates for corporations” for Republicans), then the parties “can move forward and 
compromise and really address the debt issue.” The leader notes that it has previously 
been tough to work on the issue because there’s been resistance to changing the policy 
(“domestic programs” for Democrats, “taxes on Wall Street” for Republicans)—without 
explicitly saying it has been the left or right that is responsible for resisting compromise. 
The leader concludes with, “I think we are capable of negotiating and doing what’s best 
for the country, though, if they are willing to give something.” 
 The differences between the civil version and the uncivil versions of the 
paragraphs were designed to be subtle, and not unlike uncivil comments one side 
typically makes about the other. In the uncivil versions, the leader accuses the other side 
of using a “nonsense” policy to get reelected by their base, of being “pigheaded,” and 
claims negotiations can take place once the members of the other party “realize they are 




policies that Democrats are trying to protect are ref r ed to as “entitlement” programs 
(replacing “social insurance”) and are called “socialist” (replacing “domestic”). In the 
uncivil paragraph delivered by the “Democratic leadr,” Republicans are tied to “greedy” 
corporations and are said to be resistant to increasing taxes on “their crooked Wall Street 
friends” (replacing “Wall Street”).   
Conditions 
 Based on their partisanship and the paragraph they were assigned to read, subjects 
fell in one of four conditions: civil like-minded, civil-disagreeable, uncivil-like-minded, 
and uncivil-disagreeable. Table 6-2 displays the conditions produced by each partisan-
paragraph combination. Democrats exposed to Paragraph 3 nd Republicans exposed to 
Paragraph 1 fell into the civil-like-minded condition. Democrats exposed to Paragraph 1 
and Republicans exposed to Paragraph 3 were in the civil-disagreeable condition. 
Democrats exposed to Paragraph 4 and Republicans expo d to Paragraph 2 were in the 
uncivil-like-minded condition. Finally, Democrats who saw Paragraph 2 and Republicans 
who saw Paragraph 4 were in the uncivil-disagreeable-condition. 
 
Table 6-2: Conditions by Partisanship-Paragraph Combination 


































To measure anger, I asked respondents how angry the debate over reducing the 
national debt made them feel. The wording of the qustion and the multiple choice 
options that respondents had to choose from are standard in affective intelligence 
studies.114 Increased anger among those exposed to a like-minded uncivil message, 
compared to those in the civil conditions, will provide a test of Hypothesis H1. Likewise, 
higher anger among those exposed to a disagreeable uncivil message, compared to those 
in the civil conditions, will provide a test of Hypothesis H2.  
 To test Hypothesis 4, I constructed a “willingness to compromise” score nearly 
identical to that used by MacKuen et al. (2010), which takes into account respondents’ 
answers on three items. Two of the items were multiple choice questions; subjects were 
asked what they think should happen regarding debt reduction, from both their own point 
of view and from the point of view of everyone else.115 For those exposed to the 
statements from the Republican viewpoint (Paragraphs 1 and 2), the options include 
indicating support for Democrats fighting to keep the entitlement programs in place, 
support for both sides finding a compromise solution, or support for cutting entitlement 
programs with taxes not being raised on corporations under any circumstances. For those 
exposed to the statements from the Democratic point of view (Paragraphs 3 and 4), the 
options include indicating support for Republicans fighting to protect low tax rates for 
corporations, support for both sides finding a compromise solution, or support for low tax 
                                                
114 The exact wording of the first question was, “Thinking about the statement you just read, how do you 
feel about the ongoing debate to reduce the national debt? Would you say the debate makes you feel: 
VERY angry; SOMEWHAT angry; NOT VERY angry; NOT AT ALL angry?”  
115 The question wording to measure willingness to compro ise is borrowed directly from MacKuen et al. 
(2010). The exact wording of the first question was, “From your own point of view, as well as the general 
principles involved, which of these options would you prefer happen?” The second question read, “Now, 
taking into 




rates for corporations being eliminated with no cuts to entitlement programs under any 
circumstances.   
 The third item in in the compromise measure was whether subjects indicated 
willingness to compromise on their own. Following each paragraph, subjects were asked 
to state, verbatim, their overall thoughts regarding the debt reduction debate.116  The 
open-ended answers appear just as the respondents typed them in, providing (as in the 
previous analyses included in chapters 4 and 5) an unfiltered look at respondents’ 
thoughts as they intended them.   
 Like MacKuen et al. (2010), responses in which an individual offered, or 
expressed a desire to find an alternative solution to the two polarized positions were 
coded as being in support of compromise. In my experiment, nearly all responses coded 
as compromise solutions fell into one of two categories: respondents made clear they 
preferred some specific mix of tax increases and spending cuts, or expressed that they 
wanted the two parties to “come together” (or “work together”) and find a compromise 
solution. 
In the measure used by MacKuen et al. (2010), respondents’ answers were only 
categorized into two types: indication of compromise, and no indication of compromise. 
In reading through the results of the CCES experiment, it became apparent to me that 
using only these two categories was not the most optimal way to code the responses, in 
that there were two clear groups who fell into the “no indication of compromise” group: 
those who clearly sided with one of viewpoint, and those who were neutral about the 
whole debate. For instance, a couple of common refrains were that both sides were 
                                                
116 The exact wording was, “Thinking about the statement you just read, what are your overall thoughts on 




responsible for the debt mess (often stated in more c lorful language), and that the 
subject did not care enough about the debt debate to have an opinion. Even though those 
who made these claims did not actually voice support for compromise, they were not 
necessarily opposed to compromise either, like those who voiced allegiance to one side. 
This, I believe, is an important distinction, and I thus added a third category. 
In the coding of the verbatim responses, if a respondent made clear a preference 
for one side or expressed that she thought one specific side was at fault, her answer 
scored a “0.” If a respondent was neutral about the solution, or unclear about which side 
they think is most responsible for the problem, her response was given a “1.” If she 
expressed a compromise solution or an interest in seeing both sides coming together and 
compromising, her response was given a “2.”  
Using respondents’ answers to the two multiple choie questions, as well as 
whether their compromise score for their open-ended answers, I constructed a 
compromise score, on a scale of 0-4.  Respondents would receive a “4,” for example, if 
they selected the compromise option in both multiple choice questions (1 point for each), 
and expressed support for compromise in their open-ended response (a “2” in the 
response coding).  Subjects’ scores on this scale, in conjunction with their reported 
partisanship, provide a test of Hypothesis 4. 
The open-ended answers will also provide a test Hypothesis 3. I analyzed the 
open-ended responses to determine whether they qualified s uncivil, in accordance with 
the incivility index, as done in the analyses presented in preceding chapters. As in the 
previous measures of incivility use, subjects were coded as “1” if they used any incivility 





 The final sample consisted of 820 subjects117 were exposed to one of the four 
paragraphs. 195 saw paragraph 1, 187 saw paragraph 2, 213 saw paragraph 3, and 225 
people saw paragraph 4. Given that some people indicated no partisan affiliation, slightly 
smaller groups fell under each of the four conditions: 172 people were featured in the 
civil-like-minded condition, 177 were in the civil-disagreeable group, 169 were in the 
uncivil-like-minded group, and 174 saw an uncivil-disagreeable message. The averages 
for a number of demographic measures for the entire sample, as well as each of the 
conditions, are included in Table A2 6-1 in Appendix 2. 
There were some slight differences between the groups n some demographic 
measures, as shown in Table A2 6-1. The uncivil-disagreeable group was slightly more 
“Republican” on the 7-point partisan identification measure than both of the like-minded 
groups, and a bit more conservative than the civil-like-minded group. Additionally, in the 
civil-disagreeable group, the average educational att inment was lower than in the others, 
and the percentage of non-white subjects was slightly higher. These differences were not 
dramatically large, but they were statistically significant. There were no significant 
differences between the groups when it came to age and gender. 
The patterns in the results presented below suggests these differences are not 
likely factors in different results between the groups on the measures of interest; ideology 
and race do not have significant effects on any of measures, and partisan identification 
and education have effects that cannot be explained by these initial group differences. 
                                                
117 As my experiment was included at the end of the survey, there was some attrition from the original 




Furthermore, it does not appear that the content of the messages caused the differences, 
as the attrition occurred earlier on in the survey module.  
Results 
 The debt debate is likely a subject in which most people are frustrated with to 
begin with. Therefore, it is not surprising that feelings of anger were the norm among the 
experimental sample. The overall average anger score was just above a “3,” equating to 
the sample pool, on average, being “somewhat angry” about how debt talks were 
progressing in Washington. Nonetheless, subjects in each of the four conditions differed 
in how angry they felt about the debt debate. For the sake of brevity and parsimony, I 
report just the differences in percentage claiming to be “very angry” for each condition 
comparison.118 Subjects in the two uncivil conditions reported higher levels of anger than 
subjects did in the two civil conditions (the difference significant at 0.05). In the uncivil 
groups, about 43 percent of subjects reported being “very angry” about the debt debate, 
compared to 32 percent in the civil groups.119   
However, the effect that incivility has on anger vaied with whether the measure 
was like-minded or disagreeable. The level of anger was significantly higher when the 
uncivil message was also disagreeable; an uncivil comment, when it is aimed at a 
person’s side, is more incensing then when directed a  the other side. Nearly 49 percent 
of those exposed to an uncivil disagreeable message reported being “very angry” about 
the debt debate, compared to 38 percent of those expos d to an uncivil like-minded 
                                                
118 However, the statistical significance of differencs for the anger measure, as well as the analyses to 
follow, was determined using the Kruskall-Wallis method.  
119 Overall, the average anger score on the 4-point scale among people was 3.04 in the civil conditions, and
3.14 in the uncivil conditions. This difference was significant at 0.05. When restricting the comparison to 
just partisans (leaving out self-identified “independ nts”), this difference is larger, with those in the civil 




message. On the other hand, 37 percent of respondents who read a civil disagreeable 
message reported being “very angry,” while just 29 percent of those exposed to a civil 
like-minded message said the same.    
 
Figure 6-1: Percentage Who Were “Very Angry” About the Debt Debate, by Condition 
 
  
Note: Bars represent the percentage of subjects in each condition who said they felt “very angry” about the 
debate over federal debt reduction. 
 
 Whether the message was both civil and like-minded mattered. The fact that there 
was no significant difference in anger among those exposed to an uncivil like-minded 
message and civil disagreeable message illustrates this well. Taking a civil-likeminded 
message and either adding incivility or making it disagreeable increases anger, and to a 
similar degree. This suggests that when a message i not n accordance with our views, or 
is negative of our in-group, it can anger us. On the other hand, the presence of incivility 
can increase incivility even when the message is “like-minded” and negative towards the 




vilify the opposition leads to higher levels of anger than when the message lacks uncivil 
elements. Thus, there is some support for my first hypothesis--that exposure to like-
minded incivility induces feelings of anger—in that those who saw a civil-like-minded 
message were less angry than those who saw an uncivil-like-minded message at a 
statistically significant level. But this finding comes with the caveat that a civil-
disagreeable message has about the same effect on anger.
When the message is both uncivil and disagreeable, however, anger increases the 
most. There was a 20 point difference in the percentage that reported being “very angry” 
about the debt debate between those exposed to an uncivil disagreeable message (49 
percent) and a civil like-minded message (29 percent). This is strong support for 
“perpetrator aversion”—hearing an uncivil attack on our in-group induces a significant 
increase in anger, and supports my second hypothesis—that exposure to disagreeable 
incivility induces feelings of anger.  
Incivility   
 Those who were exposed to either uncivil message wer more likely to use 
incivility than those exposed to the civil messages. While close to one quarter (24 
percent) of people in the uncivil groups used incivility, far fewer in the civil groups did 
the same (14 percent). Exposure to the uncivil messages equals a 58 percent increase in 
probability of making an uncivil remark. Additionally, there is a connection between 
incivility use and feelings of anger.  I conducted a probit regression to test the effect of 




education, partisan identification, and ideology.120  The results, included in Column 1 of 
Table 6-3, confirm that anger has a significant positive effect (at 0.000) on use of 
incivility. The only other variable that had a significant effect was education, which had a 
small, positive impact on incivility use at the 0.1 level; this might hint towards political 
awareness or sophistication having an impact on incivility use.  
These general connections between use of incivility wi h exposure to the uncivil 
messages and anger support my hypotheses. However, I also expect that whether the 
message attacks your in-group or out-group should make a difference. In Figure 6-2, I 
display the mean incivility use among partisans in each of the four conditions.  
 Differences in incivility use emerge among people exposed to like-minded and 
disagreeable messages. While slightly more people in the uncivil-like-minded group used 
incivility than in civil-like-minded group (about 21 percent versus about 17 percent), the 
difference is not significant. When the message is like-minded, incivility does not seem 
to make people more likely to use incivility than they would if it was civil. The 
interesting finding, however, is not the comparison between the two like-minded groups, 
but the comparison of either group to the civil-disagreeable group. Those in the uncivil-
like-minded group were more likely to use incivility than those in the civil-disagreeable 
group, in which 13 percent use incivility--a difference of about 8 percentage points 
(significant at 0.05). But there was not a statistically significant difference between those 
in the civil-like-minded group and those in the civil-disagreeable group.  
                                                
120 Age (Zukin et al. 2006, Wattenberg 2008), education (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993), and gender (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996, Kaufman and Petrocik 1999) are each 
understood to be factors which influence political opinions and behavior, and thus their presence in the 
model is necessary to isolate the effects of uncivil media exposure. Likewise, partisan identification, race, 
and ideology are well-established influences on politica  behavior (i.e., Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; 




Table 6-3: Predictor of Incivility Use and Willingness to Compromise 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Incivility Compromise 
   
Anger 0.55*** -0.21*** 
 (0.078) (0.043) 
Age -0.00 -0.00* 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
Gender -0.02 0.16** 
 (0.110) (0.077) 
Education 0.07* -0.07*** 
 (0.038) (0.026) 
Partisan Identification 0.02 -0.03 
 (0.033) (0.022) 
Ideology -0.03 -0.00 
 (0.064) (0.045) 
Race -0.05 -0.02 
 (0.154) (0.103) 
Constant -2.77***  
 (0.423)  
Cut 1   
Constant  -1.72*** 
  (0.280) 
Cut 2   
Constant  -1.24*** 
  (0.278) 
Cut 3   
Constant  -0.46* 
  (0.276) 
Cut 4   
Constant  0.37 
  (0.279) 
   
Observations 803 803 
Adj. R-squared 0.09 0.02 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
Note: The coefficients presented in Column 1 are the results of a probit regression, predicting use of 
incivility (0-1) with standard errors in parentheses. The coefficients presented on Column 2 are the results 






It is noteworthy that the civil-like-minded group falls in-between the civil-
disagreeable group and uncivil-like-minded group, stati tically different from neither 
when it comes to incivility use. That the like-minded groups do not differ from each other 
suggests that perhaps that both like-minded message—which critique the other side—
increase the extent to which people use incivility. The uncivil-like-minded message, 
however, increased incivility enough to make a distinction from the civil-disagreeable 
message. While this is one case concerning one particul ly high-profile issue, this 
finding suggests that hearing a message which attacks he other side primes people to be 
uncivil, but it is the addition of uncivil elements that fully pushes them into uncivil talk.  
Figure 6-2: Percentage Who Used Incivility, by Condition 
 




Incivility, however, makes a huge difference when it comes to disagreeable 
messages. The group with the highest percentage of incivility use was the uncivil-




rate about 19 percentage points higher than the group with the lowest percentage of 
incivility use, the civil-disagreeable group (12 percent). Incivility use in the uncivil-
disagreeable group was also about 10 percentage points higher than the rate of use in 
uncivil-like-minded group, and 14 percentage points higher than in the civil-like-minded 
group—both differences statistically significant.  
Why did the uncivil-disagreeable messages induce far more incivility use than 
their civil counterparts, but the uncivil-like-minde  messages did not? There are two 
potential explanations. One is that the two like-minded messages were too similar for 
them to have distinct effects, and making the civil-l ke-minded message slightly less 
hyperbolic, or by tuning up the amount of incivility n the uncivil-like-minded message, 
more of a distinction between the groups may occur. As this experiment took place 
immediately after the 2012 election, people did not need much in the way of 
encouragement to attack the other side. Perhaps both the like-minded messages were 
hyperbolic enough to influence political talk. This would explain why uncivil like-
minded media, which is very hyperbolic and distinctive from “civil" media (Sobieraj and 
Berry), was found to induce incivility use (as demonstrated in chapter 4).  
A second may be that like-minded messages simply do not induce emotional 
reactions, and instead increase incivility by leading people to “mimic” like-minded 
behavior. More hyperbole might raise the rate of incivility use in the uncivil-like-minded 
group closer to that of the uncivil-disagreeable group, by providing more “incivility” to 
mimic. This would explain the low level of incivility use in civil-disagreeable group: 




and unlike the uncivil-disagreeable group, there is l s  negative emotional arousal121 
stimulating retaliation.  
Determining which of these two cases is correct is tricky. On the one hand, 
incivility use by those in the civil groups appears to be due less to emotional arousal than 
in the uncivil groups, indicating that the uncivil-like-minded group did induce anger.122  
However, while the rate of “very angry” incivility users in the uncivil-like-minded group 
is about the same as in the uncivil-disagreeable group, the overall lower rates of anger in 
the like-minded group indicates that the message was less successful in inducing anger, 
and, hence less successful in inducing incivility, than the uncivil-disagreeable message.  
This hints to the idea that uncivil-like-minded messages do not induce incivility 
use through anger. Recall from the previous chapter that while those exposed to an 
uncivil-like-minded post on the message board used incivility at a greater rate than those 
exposed to a civil-like-minded post, incivility use was not tied to feelings of anger.123 
Recall also that only the uncivil post that featured emotional elements--use of capitalized 
words and exclamation points—had a significant effect on incivility use by like-minded 
partisans (Republicans); the post lacking the elements did not have a statistically 
significant effect. This points to the idea that like-minded uncivil messages lead people to 
mimic the behavior, and adopt uncivil phrases and tctics (i.e., use of capitalized words 
and exclamation points) when denouncing the “other side.” From this perspective, like-
                                                
121At least in terms of anger. It is possible that the civil-disagreeable messages, which points out the 
shortcomings of one’s own side with little hyperbole, actually induces some anxiety in people, which 
would not induce them to be uncivil.  
122 Whereas 62 percent of those in the civil-like-minded group who used incivility also reported being “very 
angry,” the number rises to 68 percent among those who used incivility in the uncivil-like-minded group. 
Among the disagreeable groups, this distinction is again larger: a full 70 percent of uncivil users in the 
uncivil-disagreeable group reported being “very angry,” compared to just 61 percent of users in the civil-
disagreeable group. 
123 The results from chapter 4, which examine the effect of tuning into uncivil political media, also indicate 




minded messages should not generate more “target aversion” than already exists—these 
messages tap into preexisting aversion, and provide uncivil “tools” with which to launch 
attacks on the other side. But there needs to a cert in number and variety of incivility 
instances for this to occur. The lower level of incivility use in the CCES experiment 
among the civil-like-minded group is likely due to the “restrained” use of incivility in the 
message that lacked emotional elements; like the non-hyperbolic message used in the 
message board experiment, the CCES message did not feature capitalized words and 
exclamation points. 
In simple terms, there was not a lot of incivility to mimic. In fact, in being a 
“report” of what a partisan leader said, the message was robbed of what might be its most 
powerful elements—it lacked the visual and verbal stimulants that come with uncivil 
partisan talk on television and radio, and lacked the digital equivalents of both that show 
up in many online interactions, in the forms of capit lized words and extended 
punctuation. These sorts of uncivil elements, as Herbst (2010) and others argue, likely 
pull in the attention of a like-minded audience. They pay more attention, and hence 
remember the phrases and behavior utilized. When it comes time for them to offer their 
own political opinions, this type of political talk remains on the “top of the head” (Zaller 
1992) and is easily replicated.  
It might be too simple, however, to conclude that rather than upsetting partisans, 
like-minded uncivil messages are cognitively pleasing to see, hear, and read. Anger was 
still higher in the uncivil like-minded group than in the civil like-minded group, and the 
connection between anger and incivility use was stronger in the former than in the latter. 




distinct variations in uncivil like-minded messages, is necessary to completely sort this 
out.   
Uncivil disagreeable messages, however, do induce ang r—even when they lack 
histrionic elements. In the message board experiment pr sented in the previous chapter, 
this did not translate into larger increases in use of incivility (but did induce reprimands 
of the message poster). Outside of the message board, in the more “private” survey 
environment of the CCES experiment, anger did translate into increases in incivility 
use—and quite significantly. Those angered by the atacks on their side retaliated by 
adopting uncivil tactics in their own messages. When you are a partisan, and vitriolic 
comments are directed at your “side,” you are more likely to get angry and return the 
favor. Generally, the connection between exposure to incivility and use of incivility 
provides support for my third hypothesis; however, this comes with the important caveat 
that uncivil-like-minded messages were far less influential than uncivil-disagreeable 
messages. 
Compromise 
 Overall, openness to compromise was lower in the uncivil groups than in the civil 
groups. Partisans and independents exposed to an uncivil message averaged a 
compromise score of 1.62, on the 0-4 scale, while tose in exposed to a civil message 
averaged a score of 1.76. The different of 0.14 points falls just outside of significance at 
the 0.10 level. Among partisans, however, whom the uncivil messages should resonate 
with (and who made up about 88 percent of the sample), this difference was more 
apparent. Whereas partisans who saw a civil message averaged 1.75 on the 5-point 




lower, at 1.55 (a difference significant at 0.05).  The debt debate is a topic many already 
have strong opinions about; that the uncivil stimul, consisting of a few subtle changes to 
one single short paragraph, reduced people’s willingness to compromise highlights the 
power of incivility. These additions, magnified throughout a half hour program, a blog 
post, or numerous postings on Facebook, would likely lead to a sharper decline in 
compromise. Increasing the hyperbole, and adding histrionic elements—which I have 
previously shown to be very influential and are common to most uncivil political 
media—would also strengthen the effect.  
As found in previous studies, anger is clearly driving reduced willingness to 
compromise. Whereas those who reported being “not at all ngry” or “not very angry” 
averaged a compromise score close to “2” on the 0-4 scale,124 the average was a bit under 
1.3 for those who reported being “very angry” (the difference was significant at 0.001). 
An ordered probit regression, which includes the same control variables as in the 
incivility use model included in Column of Table 6-3, confirms the strong negative 
influence that feelings of anger have on openness to compromise on the debt issue.125 The 
results of the ordered probit regression are included in the Column 2 of Table 6-3.126   
Unlike previous studies, this analysis connects feelings of anger to exposure to 
uncivil messages. In the uncivil groups, 91 percent of those who reported no willingness 
                                                
124 The actual average for those who reported no anger was 1.92, and for those who said they were not very
angry, the average was 2.14.  
125 Additionally, replacing anger in the model with a measure of being in one of the uncivil conditions (“0”
if in a civil condition, “1” if in an uncivil condit on) shows that partisans exposed to an uncivil message had 
lower levels of compromise, even controlling for the various demographic factors.  
126 Though not reported in this model, the predictor which has the strongest effect on reducing willingness 
to compromise is incivility use. This variable saps the predictive power of both being in an uncivil 
condition and anger. As using incivility is likely an effect of both these predictors and endogenous to low 
willingness to compromise, this result is not unexpected; had there been no relationship between the two, or 
if incivility use had a positive relationship with compromise, this would raise questions about my theory. 
Instead, it provides further confirmation that exposure to incivility, via anger, can induce anti-delib rative 




to compromise were also “somewhat” or “very” angry—very few people reported no 
willingness to compromise while also not feeling any ger. On the other hand, only 37 
percent of those who indicated high willingness to compromise (a “4” on the 0-4 scale) 
were “somewhat” or “very” angry about the debt debat . This same relationship existed 
among people exposed to the civil messages, with 89 percent of people who reported no 
willingness to compromise being “somewhat” or “very” angry. The difference, however, 
is that levels of anger were significantly higher in the uncivil groups—particularly the 
uncivil-disagreeable group--and therefore compromise was lower on average. 
The higher levels of anger in the uncivil groups, and the strong tie between 
feelings of anger and a reduced willingness to compr ise indicate that uncivil messages 
have the ability to reduce a deliberative spirit in political talk. I next look at whether the 
message is like-minded or disagreeable makes a difference in the effects of incivility on 
compromise. Figure 6-3 displays the average compromise score (0-4) for each of the four 
conditions.  
Among the four conditions, the average compromise score was lowest in the 
uncivil-disagreeable group, where the average score was 1.54. The average score among 
those in the uncivil-like-minded condition at 1.57 was the second lowest. Willingness to 
compromise was 1.74 in the civil-disagreeable condition, and the highest in the civil-like-
minded condition, which had an average score of 1.76. Comparing the differences in 
means between groups, only the difference between the uncivil-disagreeable mean and 
the civil-like-minded mean meets a conventional leve  of statistical significance (at 0.10). 




disagreeable condition is close to significance, as is uncivil-like-minded condition with 
both of the civil conditions.127  
Figure 6-3: Average Compromise Score, by Condition 
 
Note: bars represent the average score on the 0-4 compromise measure. 
 
These group averages do not differ much from the averages of all partisans who 
saw a civil message (1.75) and all partisans who were exposed to an uncivil message 
(1.55), a difference that was significant. It is therefore reasonable to assume that both 
like-minded and disagreeable uncivil messages lowers illingness to compromise, and 
that the differences between the conditions would reach significance with larger samples.  
 
 
                                                
127 Interestingly, when partisan “leaners” are dropped from the analysis (leaving “weak” and “strong” 
partisans),  the difference between the uncivil-like-minded group with civil-like-minded group reaches 
significance (at 0.05) and the difference between th  uncivil-like-minded group and the uncivil-
disagreeable group gets closer to significance—but the relationships between the uncivil-disagreeable 
group and civil groups does not improve. This may suggest that strength of partisanship matters more when 




Table 6-4: Predictors of Willingness to Compromise, by Condition 
 Civil Civil Uncivil Uncivil 
VARIABLES Like-Minded Disagreeable Like-Minded Disagreeable 
     
Anger  -0.25*** -0.32*** -0.13 -0.22** 
 (0.100) (0.108) (0.090) (0.105) 
Age 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.01 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Gender 0.15 0.18 0.18 0.19 
 (0.178) (0.166) (0.183) (0.171) 
Education -0.18*** 0.05 -0.12** -0.05 
 (0.059) (0.060) (0.059) (0.057) 
Partisan Strength (1-4) -0.11 -0.25** -0.30*** -0.03 
 (0.099) (0.099) (0.101) (0.102) 
Democrat-Republican  0.29 -0.39* -0.54* -0.34 
 (0.225) (0.241) (0.275) (0.232) 
Ideology (1-5, L-C) -0.13 0.11 0.08 0.03 
 (0.102) (0.100) (0.111) (0.105) 
Race (0-1) 0.19 0.02 0.02 -0.39 
 (0.232) (0.204) (0.240) (0.271) 
Cut 1      
Constant -2.11*** -2.26*** -2.54*** -2.09*** 
 (0.636) (0.639) (0.692) (0.651) 
Cut 2     
Constant -1.73*** -1.71*** -1.97*** -1.60** 
 (0.630) (0.633) (0.685) (0.647) 
Cut 3     
Constant -0.81 -1.12* -1.10 -0.70 
 (0.625) (0.631) (0.676) (0.640) 
Cut 4     
Constant 0.16 -0.34 -0.42 0.16 
 (0.633) (0.630) (0.676) (0.644) 
     
Observations 172 175 168 174 
Adj. R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.03 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10 
 
The coefficients presented above are the results of an rdered probit regression, predicting willingness to 
compromise (0-5), with standard errors in parentheses.  
 
Given that the uncivil-disagreeable condition was much more influential than the 




interesting that the uncivil-disagreeable position did not have a significantly more 
powerful effect on willingness to compromise than the like-minded condition. Was the 
connection between anger and reduced compromise weaker in the uncivil disagreeable 
condition than in the uncivil-like-minded? It actually appears to be the opposite. Table 6-
4 displays four ordered probit models for each condition, to see if anger (and other 
predictors) has different effects on compromise in the different conditions. I include the 
same control variables as in the previous models prented in this chapter. However, I 
break up partisan identification into two separate variables, in order to isolate the effects 
of partisan strength and partisan identification.128 
In the civil-like-minded, civil-disagreeable, and uncivil-disagreeable conditions, 
anger has a significant negative effect on willingness to compromise. However, it is not 
significant in the uncivil-like-minded condition. Figure 6-4 shows the change in 
probability of being unwilling to compromise (a “0” on the 0-4 scale) with a move from 
not being angry at all to being very angry for each of the four conditions.129  This change 
in anger increased the probability of not compromising by 20 to 25 percentage points in 
each of the conditions but the uncivil-like-minded condition; in that condition, the change 
was only 11 percentage points and insignificant.  This means there is a large difference in 
the effect of anger on compromise between the two uncivil conditions—the effect of 
going from not being angry to very angry is 75 percent greater in the uncivil-disagreeable 
condition. 
 
                                                
128 “Partisan strength” is a four category variable, ranging from “weak” to “strong” partisan, while 
“Democrat-Republican” is a dichotomous variable, with “0” indicating the respondent is a Democrat, and
“1” indicating the respondent is a Republican. 




Figure 6-4: Change in Compromise as Predicted by Change in Anger 
 
 
Note: Bars represent the change in predicted probability of being unwilling to compromise (a “0” on the 
compromise measure) with a move being “not angry at all” o “very angry.” 
 
While both uncivil conditions lower willingness to c mpromise, anger is only the 
main driving factor in the uncivil-disagreeable condition. Instead of anger, partisan 
strength (1-3) is a strong, significant predictor in the uncivil-like-minded condition, with 
stronger partisanship associated with decreased willingness to compromise.130 The 
Democrat-Republican dichotomous variable is also significant, indicating that 
Republican identification is associated with lower illingness to compromise.  Education 
is also significant, indicating that years of schooling reduced compromise. 
Republican identification is also significantly associated with reduced willingness 
to compromise in the civil-disagreeable and uncivil-l ke-minded conditions. Indeed, 
overall, and in three of the conditions, Republicans had significantly lower compromise 
scores on average; however, in the civil-like-minded condition, Republicans actually 
                                                




have a slightly higher compromise score (1.80 versus 1.72), although the difference does 
not reach significance. This relationship deserves further analysis, but I will lay out a 
couple of potential explanations. One is that unwillingness to compromise is seen as a 
positive quality among contemporary Republican identifi rs. The rise of the Tea Party 
movement and its message of “no compromise” (Skocpol and Williamson 2012) has 
perhaps resonated with Republicans in the electorate. Another factor may be that the debt 
debate is simply more important to the average Republican than it is to the average 
Democrat, and therefore Democrats are more willing to concede. Replacing the debt issue 
with one that Republicans care less about than Democrats might see this relationship 
reversed. These partisan positions become activated in any condition that is either uncivil 
or disagreeable.131 
In addition to the uncivil-like-minded group, partisan strength was also significant 
in the civil-disagreeable group, and education was significant in the civil-like-minded 
group. In these groups as well, both partisan streng h and education had negative effects 
on willingness to compromise. Yet only in the uncivil-like-minded condition were both 
negative and significant. This suggests that in the uncivil-like-minded condition, political 
sophistication is driving reduced compromise: educated partisans, likely aware of the 
politics surrounding the debt debate and more passionate about their positions, are more 
likely to be activated by like-minded messages; as Z ller (1992, 127-128) notes, 
reception of a political message increases with political awareness, and the message has a 
higher rate of acceptance when it is like-minded.  
                                                
131 Why the Democrat-Republican variable is not significant in the uncivil-disagreeable model is unclear, 
although it is reasonable to assume that the higher lev l of anger among all partisans in the condition makes 




It is not surprising then that partisan strength and education are significant in the 
uncivil-like-minded model. For some, like-minded messages that blame the out-group are 
cognitively pleasing to hear. It is politically aware strong partisans for whom uncivil 
messages should be the most appealing.132 Perhaps they feel some enjoyment when 
witnessing a leader bash opponents; a harshly worded message that leaves little room for 
ambiguity may bring satisfaction to partisans more than any other type of message. But 
this is merely reaffirming what like-minded partisan  more or less believe; rather than 
generating new feelings of anger, the uncivil like-minded messages tap into preexisting 
views, strengthen resolve, and reduce uncertainty. These messages also send instructions 
about how to engage with the other side; when a like-minded “leader” conveys the bad 
behavior of the “other side,” it causes people to put on their partisan lenses and reject 
compromise. When hyperbolic, uncivil elements are added, these messages become even 
more powerful. The other side is not just in the wrong—they are really bad, perhaps in an 
immoral sense.  
These results provide support for my fourth hypothesis, as exposure to uncivil 
messages reduces willingness to compromise. However, anger only appears to be driving 
reduced compromise in the disagreeable condition. In the like-minded uncivil group, the 
mimicking effect appears to reduce compromise. Just as incivility use rose among those 
exposed to an uncivil-like-minded message without feelings of anger increasing, the 
uncivil-like-minded message affects deliberative attitudes without necessarily inducing 
anger. Still, it is difficult to dismiss anger as a complete non-factor, as with incivility use, 
“target aversion” may occur among some. The higher rat  of anger in the group, 
                                                
132 Likely, how valid the message is perceived to be also increases; as Zaller (1992, 127-128), reception of 
a political message increases with political awareness, and the message has a higher rate of acceptanc 




compared to the civil-like-minded group, indicates hat some sort of aversion is occurring 
with exposure to the uncivil like-minded message. What this all suggests is that the 
connection between like-minded incivility and anti-deliberative attitudes is a complicated 
one. These messages may not affect every partisan in the same way, unlike uncivil-
disagreeable messages, for which the negative relationship between anger and 
compromise is much clearer. To make sense of this, in the next section I compare these 
results to the analyses presented in the previous chapters.  
Discussion 
 Anger can drive anti-deliberative attitudes. Consistent with findings in a number 
affective intelligence studies, the experiment above shows that strong feelings of anger 
are related to low willingness to compromise. Throughout this project, I have considered 
whether incivility in political discourse induces anger, and in turn affects deliberative 
attitudes. I have addressed related questions as well: Do we get just as angry (and thus 
less open-minded) when exposed to uncivil messages that attack the other side as we do 
when we receive messages that attack our own side? And can uncivil messages induce 
anti-deliberative attitudes and behavior through means other than anger? 
 I have presented evidence that strongly suggests tha  we get angry when someone 
on the “other side” makes an uncivil attack on our in-group--which I refer to as 
“perpetrator aversion.” In both the message board experiment presented in chapter 5 and 
the CCES experiment presented in this chapter, the addition of incivility to a disagreeable 
message increases anger. In the message board experiment, this led to reduced 
satisfaction with the discussion and reduced consideration of the view included in the 




own message board posts. In the CCES experiment, exposure to an uncivil disagreeable 
message led to an increase in the use of incivility, as well as reduced willingness to 
compromise on the issue being discussed (the national debt).  
The connection between uncivil like-minded messages, anger, and anti-
deliberative attitudes is less clear. On the one hand, there is evidence that the addition of 
incivility to a like-minded message increases the us of incivility by those exposed to the 
message. The analysis included in chapter 4 shows that tuning into like-minded uncivil 
media increases incivility use, and the message board experiment backs the claim that 
like-minded incivility boosts uncivil political talk. Yet, in the message board experiment, 
anger does not appear to be driving the increase in incivility use, and deliberative 
potential did not decrease among those exposed to the uncivil like-minded message.  
The CCES experiment provides some limited evidence that some “target 
aversion” is occurring. While there was not significantly more incivility use in the uncivil 
like-minded message than in the civil like-minded message, the ties to feelings of anger 
were stronger. Additionally, higher levels of anger and lower levels of willingness to 
compromise in the uncivil group also suggest that an emotional reaction to the like-
minded incivility occurred. However, the use of incivility among both like-minded 
groups was dwarfed by the use of incivility in the uncivil-disagreeable group. 
Furthermore, while anger has a negative relationship with willingness to compromise, the 
relationship is not significant; measures of political awareness instead have a significant 
negative effect on compromise. 
What these analyses demonstrate is that the effects of uncivil like-minded 




both “target aversion” and a “mimicking effect” occur. Some people become angry upon 
hearing about the bad things the other side is doing, a d react by closing their minds to 
their ideas. Others will simply find the like-minded analysis pleasing, and mimic the 
uncivil behavior without becoming angrier. The extent to which both case happens, and 
whether a person falls into the first category or second, likely depends on variables like 
the focus of the message—discussion of the debt may infuriate some, while others will 
become angrier over issues like immigration. The lev ls and type of incivility may 
matter, too--the combination of histrionic incivility and the discussion of the national 
debt might have a different effect than a combination histrionic incivility and student loan 
debt relief. Also, importantly, how much does it matter who the messenger is and the 
manner in which people respond to the messenger? Did people react to an uncivil 
disagreeable message differently when the messenger was believed to be a random 
student on a messenger board than they did when the messenger was believed to be a 
party leader? Did the difference in the sense of privacy—an online forum versus a 
survey—have an effect as well? 
In future analyses, it will be helpful to make distinc ions between types of uncivil 
like-minded messages. First off, the degree to which the message is uncivil—specifically, 
whether it contains emotional elements—appears to make a difference. Both the 
disagreeable uncivil messages in the CCES experiment and in the message board 
experiment that lack histrionic elements fail to boost incivility use significantly. The 
message board experiment post that includes histrionic elements—capitalized letters and 




additional uncivil elements mean more uncivil behavior to mimic—which is why use of 
incivility increases without increases in anger. 
The effect of uncivil disagreeable messages seems much ore straightforward; in 
both experiments, exposure to uncivil messages attacking your side meant increased 
anger and reduced deliberative potential. However, th  experiments differed in the extent 
to which this produced increased use of incivility. As I predicted at the end of chapter 5, 
the different setting (and more heterogeneous demographics) led to an increased use of 
incivility with exposure to the message in the CCES experiment, whereas this did not 
occur in the message board experiment. Time and place, perceived audience, whose 
message you are responding to, the exact content of the message—all of these things 
potentially will alter the effects of an uncivil message. There are many combinations to 
try, each potentially producing somewhat unique results. Who acts in what way and when 
will vary. But what is clear and not in doubt is tha  the addition of incivility to political 
talk is influential on political deliberation. In each of the analyses I have included in this 
project, it has boosted the use incivility. In both experiments, overall levels of anger 
increased and willingness to deliberation declined when incivility was added to political 
messages. Political discourse changed, and not for the better.  
The incivility I incorporated into the experiments is mostly subtle. Claims were 
slightly more hyperbolic than in the “civil” versions, and even the civil messages were 
negative towards one side. Likely, the negativity of the civil messages had an effect that 
positive messages would not have. That the addition of a few hyperbolic elements to the 




demonstrates the power of incivility and that the distinction between negative and uncivil 
political talk is an important one to make.  
Additionally, the uncivil messages used in this experiment were fairly watered-
down compared to political talk common to talk radio, cable television, and online 
discourse. Along with a general increase in uncivil political talk in media (as I discuss in 
chapter 3), Sobieraj and Berry (2011) argue that extreme, histrionic incivility has made 
its way into political blogs, television, and radio. As shown in the message board 
experiment, the post that included histrionic elements was the most influential. By 
operationalizing incivility in the manner I did, my analyses may be underestimating the 
effect of incivility—or at least underestimating the effect that more “outrageous” types of 
incivility that many are exposed to on a daily basis has on political attitudes and beliefs. 
On a day to day basis, political incivility may curb effective deliberation to a greater 
extent than shown in this project. Future analyses should investigate the effects of 
“outrage” incivility through experimental means. I expect that the extremity of attitudinal 
and behavioral reactions increases with the extremiy of the incivility.  
Some important distinctions are also probably lost in using a binary measure for 
incivility use. Just as some political messages in media may be more outrageous than 
other uncivil remarks, some political talk by the public is likely more outrageous than 
other types. By making such a distinction, future analyses may further make clear the 
connection between uncivil messages, anger, and use of incivility. In the next chapter, I 
will reflect on this and other directions that future research on the effects on uncivil 




Chapter 7: Conclusion and Directions for Future Research 
 
 A picture is said to be worth a thousand words. For Arizona Governor Jan 
Brewer, a picture of her waving her finger in the face of President Barack Obama 
translated into thousands of campaign dollars. Similarly, Representative Joe Wilson 
gained fame and a steady stream of campaign donations after calling the president a liar 
on live television. Reflecting on these incidents i an interview with National Public 
Radio, former longtime House member Lee Hamilton notes, “When you do show 
disrespect, when you yell out at the State of the Union or you shake your finger at the 
president, you get a lot of support. You raise a lot of money and get a lot of plaudits and 
emails for standing up.”133 Echoing Hamilton in the same NPR piece, political scientist 
George Edwards notes that the current political climate incentivizes attacks on politicians 
from the other party, while discouraging collaboration and compromise.  
 These anecdotes illustrate how an anti-deliberative, hyperbolic spirit among the 
public can reinforce these same sorts of attitudes within government. When the voting 
public scorns compromise and rewards incivility, public officials take note. In a political 
climate already dogged by polarization, having politicians chasing fame and fortune 
through acts of incivility threatens to accelerate, extend, and prolong partisan conflict. 
Additionally, an anti-deliberative public is more likely to elect representatives who 
espouse anti-compromise beliefs (Wolf et al. 2012). The result is more partisan gridlock.  
I have argued that anti-deliberative attitudes among the public are sustained and 
exacerbated by uncivil political talk. With political information, appeals to emotion can 
                                                





affect the political behavior of those exposed, andthe manner in which they process 
political information (Marcus et al. 2000; Brader 2006; MacKuen et al. 2010). Because 
incivility can induce feelings of anger, it can reduce people’s willingness to consider 
views alternative to their own. Furthermore, even when it fails to offend, exposure to 
incivility can provide particular phrases, tactics, and arguments to mimic, and can 
sanction the use of incivility more generally. The rise of the Internet, which allows people 
to share their political thoughts with masses of strangers across the country means that 
every person with a laptop or a smartphone has the ability to induce anti-deliberative 
attitudes among their fellow citizens at any time, any place.  Incivility may not be the 
origin of partisan polarization, but it can make it much worse. 
Incivility and Democratic Efficiency 
 Outside of affecting governmental processes, incivlity in mass political discourse 
limits public deliberation. Deliberation has been called “essential to democracy” (Page 
1996) and viewed as a means to generating and tapping the “wisdom of the multitude.” 
But political talk in it of itself cannot produce the positive democratic outcomes 
attributed to deliberation, even when the discussant  re informed, interested participants. 
These results are the fruits of self-reflection, a refinement of views, compromise, 
listening, and consideration of alternative opinions. For discourse to produce these 
things—that is, for political talk to become political deliberation—civility is needed. 
 Certainly, a conversation devoid of emotion and passion is not desirable. And 
conflict is a central, critical aspect of debate and democracy. Incivility, however, adds 
another dimension, which stifles listening and reflection—the very reason discourse is 




it is equally absurd to aim at making proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either 
cannot be cured by persecution,” (Hamilton et al., 1787/1788). This has a ring of truth to 
me; it seems there are few worse ways to convert people whose views you believe are in 
the wrong than to attack them in a vitriolic manner. I am by no means suggesting that 
those who utilize incivility are inadvertently limiting the potency of their own arguments. 
Oftentimes, incivility is used in arguments for strategic purposes, where obstinacy is a 
goal (Herbst 2010). Incivility is used as a spark,  mobilizer, a way to rally a base and 
maintain allegiance to shared beliefs within a faction. Political dialogue by elites is not 
made for the purposes of developing new ideas and ge erating consensus—the purpose, 
rather, is to win arguments and elections, and thus dialogue and incivility are used 
strategically.134 
Practically speaking, however, there are repercussion  for the overuse of 
incivility, including the inefficient use of political talk.  Kingwell (1995) (remarking on 
the views of Paul Grice), writes that “conversation is rational to the extent that it involves 
the efficient exchange of information and the goal-directed influencing of other people.” 
An exchange is inefficient, however, if minds are closed by the tone of the conversation; 
points are made, but not considered. Uncivil political talk may succeed in mobilizing the 
base, but it does not win people over to your side.  
The presence of incivility in political talk typically adds no new information, and, 
rather than opening minds to views different from those an individual already holds, 
uncivil elements can close minds and discourage deliberation.  If the purpose of discourse 
is to find common ground and produce innovation through the exchange of ideas, and if 
                                                
134 For example, much literature on voting behavior suggests campaigns are meant to rally a base, as 




incivility in discourse results in a scenario where th re is a lot of talking, but very little 
listening and even less compromise, then exposure to incivility limits the “efficiency” of 
political discourse—lots of energy is expended, but very little return is made. Rather than 
improving society, heterogeneity in viewpoints bogs down American politics.  
I have taken some liberties in describing the relationship between incivility and 
anti-deliberative attitudes. My findings are more nua ced and complicated. These results 
need to be replicated, and more research needs to be c nducted to clear up unanswered 
questions. However, that incivility has negative ramifications for political deliberation 
should not be in doubt. In the next section, I briefly summarize my findings, and describe 
some of these unanswered questions. I will conclude by describing my plans for future 
research, as well as recommending directions other res archers should follow to help us 
understand the impact of uncivil political talk. 
Summary of Findings 
 In chapter 1, I laid out hypotheses that I would test hroughout this project. The 
first hypothesis was that (H1) the use of incivility by the American public when 
expressing political opinions has increased. In chapter 3, I presented evidence that the use 
of incivility by the general public has grown over time, trending alongside an increase in 
partisan polarization and the growth of a high-choie, partisan media environment.  
I also hypothesized that (H2) exposure to uncivil political talk leads to an 
increased propensity to use incivility when offering political opinions. Using panel data, I 
showed in chapter 4 that tuning into like-minded uncivil partisan news increases people’s 




5 and 6 also indicate that, in general, exposure to uncivil political talk induces incivility 
use. These findings support H2, as incivility breeds more incivility 
I also use the experiments to test two “sub-hypotheses” related to H2: (H2A) 
exposure to disagreeable incivility induces the use of incivility in retaliation; and (H2B) 
exposure to like-minded incivility induces the use of incivility. Here things get a bit more 
complicated. In one experiment, disagreeable incivility boosted uncivil political talk, but 
in the other it did not. I attribute this mixed findi g to the different formats and settings of 
the experiments. I also find that exposure to like-minded incivility can boost incivility 
use, but only when the uncivil message includes histrionic elements.  
I also argue that exposure to uncivil political talk can induce feelings of anger, 
which in turn reduce people’s willingness to deliberat  and compromise. In line with this, 
the experiments tested a third hypothesis, central to my theory: (H3) when exposed to 
uncivil political talk, individuals will be less likely to indicate willingness to deliberate. 
With this hypothesis come two sub-hypotheses: (H3A) exposure to disagreeable incivility 
will induce anti-deliberative attitudes; and (H3B) exposure to like-minded incivility will 
induce anti-deliberative attitudes. 
The results indicate that a distinction should indeed be made between like-minded 
incivility and disagreeable incivility. When a message is uncivil and disagreeable, the 
connection between feelings of anger and anti-deliberative attitudes is clear, in support of 
H3A. Using different measures of deliberative potential, both experiments show that 
willingness to deliberate decreased with exposure to disagreeable incivility. Moreover, 




However, there is less evidence of anger’s role in inducing reactions to like-
minded messages. Although, in the CCES experiment, those exposed to uncivil like-
minded talk reduced their willingness to compromise, anger does not appear to be driving 
these reactions. In the message board experiment, like-minded incivility did not have an 
effect on deliberative attitudes. Rather than inducing anger, like-minded incivility seems 
to lead people to “mimic” the uncivil behavior and anti-deliberative attitudes espoused by 
a member of their in-group. Overall, there is not enough support for me to accept H3B. 
When answering the question, posed by H3, if incivility negatively affects 
deliberation, the answer is ‘yes.’ The setting in which political talk takes place, the 
extremity of the incivility, and whether the message is like-minded or not will all make a 
difference. But exposure to incivility reduced satifaction with discourse, consideration of 
opposing views, and willingness to compromise, while also increasing critiques of those 
expressing uncivil opinions.  
Moreover, deliberative attitudes were reduced regarding topics people have 
preexisting opinions about. Many likely have strong feelings when it comes to dealing 
with the federal debt, and are unlikely to compromise to begin with. That deliberative 
attitudes were further reduced by subtle, watered-down uncivil manipulations speaks to 
the power of incivility. Even when the public was polarized to begin with, uncivil 
political talk made the divisions worse. More extreme, emotionally-strident incivility 
would likely produce even larger effects. Alongside its ability to induce more uncivil 
political talk, it is clear that the presence of incivility will make productive, meaningful 




 This research, however, is just scratching the surface. Many questions remain, 
especially about the effects of like-minded incivility. In the next section, I outline some 
directions for future research. 
Future Research 
 First and foremost, the experimental findings need to be replicated, and in 
different ways. The diversity of online settings provides an opportunity to explore online 
incivility in ways far different from the message board experiment. The development of a 
measure of incivility use that takes the extremity (and type) of vitriol into account can 
provide a more nuanced understanding of exposure effects. Future experiments should 
also be conducted with larger samples. It also makes sense to use more specific tests to 
identify the targets of people’s anger; for example, th  use of feeling thermometers might 
reveal changes in affect towards targets when people are exposed to like-minded 
incivility attacking that particular target. Measuring emotional stimulations through 
cognitive neuroscience methodology may also be warranted (see McDermott 2007). 
 Media Research 
More research should be done on uncivil political media exposure, as well. 
Specifically, researchers should consider how people come to choose whether to watch 
more vitriolic, uncivil political media in a high-choice media environment, and when it is 
that they abstain from using uncivil media. Do they n ed to already feel angry or “anti-
deliberative” to willingly tune in? When they do choose to tune in, does this intensify 
emotions and predispositions? 
I think tracking emotions both before and after uncivil media exposure can answer 




(2007), for example, examine how anxiety and anger about political issues affect the 
propensity to tune in to news media. However, the connection between these emotions 
and news use is not completely clear. Furthermore, only a single wave is used, and thus 
the causal direction cannot be determined. Additionally, the type of news media is not 
considered—if anxiety stimulates open-mindedness, then perhaps anxious people tune 
into news that does not necessarily reinforce preexisting views; anger, on the other hand, 
should. My point is not to criticize this research, but to point out the many questions that 
political communication scholars have yet to address. 
Stimulating Civil Discourse 
The Internet democratizes political communication and opens politics and society 
to a plurality of voices. Yet, the value of this is limited if hearts and minds are closed to 
views alternative to preexisting ones. By manipulating exposure to incivility, I have 
shown uncivil discourse can have this effect. A research direction I am particularly 
excited about is to now do the opposite. Instead of figuring how to make people more 
uncivil and anti-deliberative, a critical (if obvious) question is how to stimulate civil 
discourse in the online world, and hence foster pro-deliberative attitudes. 
The key to nurturing deliberative attitudes is limiting the amount of incivility in 
online interactions. However, methods for promoting civil discourse in online settings are 
understudied and inchoate. My first goal is to research and develop strategies that can be 
implemented immediately to encourage civil discourse in online settings. For instance, 




“civil,” 135 and others require users to log in via a social networking site account to reduce 
anonymity. However, there has been no scholarly assessment of these techniques. How 
effective are they in reducing incivility? Do they make a difference? Are certain 
strategies more effective than others?  
I am also interested in studying actions that can be taken by individual users. 
Research in multiple fields136 (including my research presented in chapter 5), have found 
that individuals offended by incivility in online settings reprimand and denounce uncivil 
“perpetrators.”  It remains unclear how effective th se actions are in discouraging uncivil 
discussions. Other behavior, such as mediation by third parties and “diplomatic” 
outreach, may promote civility. Using experimental methods to manipulate the presence 
and content of these techniques in online settings can provide insight into which methods 
are effective, by measuring participants’ reactions. I ternet-based experimental surveys137 
and experiments using message board platforms make such analyses possible. 
Finally, a lack of norms guiding acceptable behavior allows for rampant incivility 
in interpersonal online communication. A more abstract esearch goal of mine is to study 
methods for fostering norms of civility for online interaction.  “Step 1” will be to provide 
preliminary answers to the essential questions of what these norms should be and how 
they can be promoted. This will likely involve an ext nsive literature review of theory 
regarding Internet discourse and “netiquette” to identify a common set of norms, and 
field studies of civility initiatives to evaluate methods of encouraging civility. 
                                                
135 I.e., instructions for commenting on articles featured on the website of the University of Maryland 
campus newspaper, The Diamondback,  lay out rules of conduct, and require commenters to log in via 
email: http://www.diamondbackonline.com/news/national/article_caace00e-982c-11e2-b658-
0019bb30f31a.html 
136 See: Lee (2005); Papacharissi (2004); and the workby the University of Wisconsin’s Social Media and 
Democracy Group: http://smad.journalism.wisc.edu/papers.html. 




 I began this dissertation by noting that there is no shortage of political talk in 
American politics. Moreover, the infrastructure formass political deliberation is in place, 
largely thanks to the rise of social media. There are people using the Internet at this very 
moment to talk politics, yet it is not likely doing much in the way of improving society. 
An essential question for contemporary American democracy is how to foster 
deliberative attitudes so as to transform a cacophony of voices into a cosmopolitan online 
conversation.  I believe civility in political talk is the key—but how to encourage it, and 


































Appendix 1: Additional Information 
A1 2-1: Incivility by Criterion (Chapter 2) 
Identifying Occurrences of Incivility by Each Criterion 
Criterion 1, includes claims that feature name calling, mockery, and character 
assassinations; the inclusion of additional superfluous adverbs and adjectives which add 
no new information, but are purposefully insulting, belittling, and condescending qualify 
as uncivil under Criterion 1. Criterion 2 includes claims that spin and exaggerate in a 
misrepresentative fashion the candidates’ behavior and views; use of  much more 
extreme, inflammatory words or phrases which made the candidates seem more radical, 
immoral, or corrupt but did not alter the central cl im qualify as uncivil under Criterion 2. 
Criterion 3 includes claims that featured emotional language and exaggeration; for this 
criterion, language that suggested the candidates or their affiliations should be feared or 
are responsible for sadness qualifies as uncivil.  This criterion also includes thoughts that 
are purposefully exaggerated through upper-class letters, multiple exclamation points, 
and profanity. The final criterion, Criterion 4, included conspiracy theories. To qualify as 
a conspiracy theory, claims must include accusations of very sinister motives and actions 
that are baseless. Although unreasonable, these claims are presented as factual. Claims 







A1 4-1: Incivility by Criterion (Chapter 4) 
Common Uncivil Claims by Criterion in NAES Data 
 Common claims made up the bulk or uncivil answers for each criterion. Violators 
of Criterion 1 tended to accuse either candidate of being a liar and deceitful, 
untrustworthy, and of running a dirty campaign. Insults involving his race and name 
(such as, “I do not like his color” and “[h]is name sounds like a terrorist name”) were 
directed at Barack Obama.  Common themes of the second criterion included claims that 
either candidate made attempts to appeal to, pander to, o  become ideological and 
religious radicals, as well as claims that they were trying to trick or fool the electorate, or 
do other unsavory things to get elected. Exaggerated claims of his war views (such as, 
“war monger” or “he wants to start WW3”), exaggeratd claims of his perceived move to 
the right (“sold his soul to get elected”; “caved in to the far right extremists”; “he's 
become a radical on the extreme Right”), and exagger ted claims of his temper 
(“volatile” and “has a dangerous temper”) were directed at McCain. 
             Criterion 2 incivility directed at Obam  included exaggerated claims of his 
fiscally liberal views (“Marxist,” “socialist,” “communist”), exaggerated claims 
stemming from his purported choice to not wear a flag pin and a photo of Obama without 
his hand on his heart during the national anthem (“completely unpatriotic” “disrespects 
America”), and exaggerated claims about his social liberalism, particularly abortion 
(“most pro-murder candidate in the history of USA!!!”). Common displays of Criterion 3 
incivility included capitalized letters followed by multiple exclamation points; these 
displays also usually featured one or more examples of profanity. Common examples of 




McCain was a “puppet” and a “Manchurian candidate,” while Obama was accused of 
being a “Muslim” or having “muslim ties,” was an atheist, a racist or disliked white 
people, was born in a foreign country, as well as amultitude of suggestions that he has a 
secret, hidden insidious agenda. 
A1 4-2. Uncivil Political Media in 2008   
Dividing by Partisanship and Format 
The Project for Excellence in Journalism (PEJ), a non-profit research organization 
associated with the Pew Research Center, releases annual reports featuring content 
analyses of different forms of media, including cable television news, network television 
news, local television news, newspapers, and radio. The content analyses of the 2009 PEJ 
report (which reviews media throughout 2008) notes that primetime cable news and talk 
radio stood out among other forms of media when it came to pundit-themed, opinionated 
news—the type of content that is most likely to include uncivil elements. This is 
consistent with the content review of various media by Sobieraj and Berry (2010) which 
found that nearly all pundit-themed cable news and political talk radio programs 
consistently include some uncivil “outrage,” and on average contain significantly more 
incivility than other “opinionated” media, like blogs and newspaper columns. 
Although, according to the 2009 PEJ “prime-time cable in 2008 closely resembled 
talk radio with pictures” in that both “placed a premium on high-octane opining and 
polarizing,” conflating partisanship with incivility is inappropriate when it comes to 
television news—even cable news. Given that political television is more restrained, it 
makes sense to make distinctions between program for at and content. I initially divide 




political television, partisan bias (liberal, conservative, non-partisan), uncivil versus 
“civil” programs, and differences in format. 
Previous studies utilizing the 2008 NAES data have di ided the media in political 
and non-political groupings and by partisan bias (Dilliplane et al. 2013; Dilliplane 2011). 
Dilliplane et al. (2012) determined which of the prog ams included in the NAES survey 
featured political content through content analysis. Dilliplane (2011) identifies 26 
programs (15 with a “Democratic” slant and 11 with a “Republican” slant) that had a 
partisan bias. Dilliplane determined partisan bias utilizing perceptions of bias among 
respondents from the 2008 NAES telephone survey, and Lexis Nexis searches for the 
program host’s name in close proximity to liberal, Democrat, conservative, or 
Republican. My own Lexis Nexis search of program titles news coverage aligns with 
most of these distinctions (with a notable exception, Lou Dobbs Tonight, explained 
below) 
I then divided programs by format. This is an important distinction, as difference 
types of programs can be expected to have different types of effects on audiences. Pundit 
cable news, for example, might be more effective in inducing negative political emotions 
(Sobieraj and Berry 2010). Along with cable news programs, other types of television 
media included in the NAES data regarded as having a partisan bias were the satirical 
news shows (The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, The Colbert Report), and morning “soft 
news” talk shows  (The View, Good Morning America, and Fox & Friends) Dilliplane 
(2011).  
Categorizing the satirical news programs, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart and 




(such as name-calling) and likely to be sympathetic to liberal viewpoints, Daily Show 
viewers have been found to be more cynical of both p litical parties and their candidates, 
rather than unabashed Democrats (Baumgartner and Morris 2006). The Daily Show host 
Jon Stewart is notable critic of uncivil high-octane cable new programming, and played a 
role in CNN cancelling the pundit-oriented program Crossfire (Baumgartner and Morris 
2006), and The Colbert Report was designed to be a parody of shows like the T  
O’Reilly Factor. The argument has been made that both satirical programs qualify as 
“culture jamming,” meant to subvert dominant political messages, as well that of the 
media (Warner 2007). As parodies of the news, they ar  qualitatively something different 
from the news programs they are satirizing, and therefore should be conflated with those 
programs. Nonetheless, they still may induce the use of incivility. Thus, I created a 
separate variable for exposure to either or both satirical programs. 
Also, what to do about talk shows? Although the latnight talks shows the 
Tonight Show with Jay Leno and Late Night with David Letterman likely feature some 
political humor on a regular basis, as well as hosting politicians from time to time, 
previous studies have found neither show has much effect on political opinions (Young 
2004; Baumgartner and Morris 2006). Furthermore, neither was found to have a clear 
partisan slant (Dilliplane 2011). 
Although  daytime talk shows like The View,  Good Morning America, and Fox & 
Friends all were qualified as having partisan biases by Dilliplane (2011), they should not 
be treated the same as pundit cable news programs, mostly because political content is 
likely more sporadic. While transcripts of The View from 2008 are not available, episode 




political, the consistency with which a large portin of its content is political is probably 
low. An episode in which Bill Clinton visited the program in September 2008, for 
example, was sandwiched between an episode with viss from actor Dick Van Dyke and 
gossiper Perez Hilton, with a segment entitled kick-off of "Whoopi Wears a Dress"” and 
an episode with actors Aaron Eckhart and, Robert Wagner; and a Macy's fashion show 
segment. Reviewing the episodes that took place throughout this time, and viewing some 
episodes available on-line, these programs appear to be more political than fellow 
daytime talk shows, but still only occasionally political in the grand scheme of things. 
Like the satirical news programs, I place partisan-lanted talk shows in a separate 
category. Given that these programs are best qualified as “soft news,” it is not clear if 
they will have much effect on influencing political opinions (Prior 2003); but see Baum 
(2003). 
Measuring Incivility in Political Media 
To distinguish between uncivil partisan news and “civil” partisan news,138 I relied 
on two measures. First, I ran a search on Lexis Nexis for reports in major world 
publications for instances of incivility taking place on each program throughout the entire 
period of the NAES survey (January 1st 2008 to January 31st 2009) for each political 
program. The rationale behind this measure is that incidents that if a program is 
consistently uncivil and controversial, some of the more intense instances will become 
news themselves. Sobieraj and Berry (2010) identify various manifestations of uncivil 
language and behavior that can appear in political media, including name calling, 
misrepresentative exaggerations of views and actions, a d mockery. The elements used 
                                                
138 I use the term “civil media” loosely, simply to differentiate these programs from one’s that have high




by Mutz and Reeves (2005) in their “recreation” of uncivil mediated political discourse 
were hostility, rudeness, emotionality, and quarrelsome discussions. Together, these 
studies provide a theoretical guide to identifying media that include uncivil discourse. For 
media to include such elements as mockery, hostility, and character assassination, the 
programming’s host, hosts, or guests need to have opinions and need to at the very best 
take a negative view towards some persons, policy, or institutions—as opposed to 
standard news programs, for example, where news is merely read and very little 
opinionated commentary is offered.  
Among the types of “outrage incivility” that Sobieraj and Berry (2010) found to 
be most common in political television were mockery, misrepresentative exaggeration, 
ideologically extremizing and insulting language, and emotional displays. Not all of these 
are likely to be reported, and conducting a search for all of the idiosyncratic ways each 
media source might do any of these is not possible to do in a rigorous fashion. Instead, I 
searched for reports of incivility likely to be common which reflect these “outrage” types: 
First, Reports of an argument or conflict between guests or between guests and hosts 
were done by searching for the show’s name with the words “argue,” “yell” and 
“interrupt,” as well as their various tenses and parts of speech variations (i.e., “argued,” 
“arguing,” and “argument”). Second, reports of a show’s host or guests making 
accusations or attacks on a political or media figure; “distort,” “accuse,” “bash,” “attack,” 
or “denounce,” as well as their various tenses and parts of speech variations. Finally, to 
help identify additional uncivil incidents that were perceived to have crossed a ‘civility 
line,’ and might account for various types of incivility, I searched for reports of a 




I manually analyzed each result returned in these sarches to check the context 
with which the words or words were used. Additionally, each instance of incivility was 
only counted once, even it was reported by numerous periodicals, to minimize the 
sensationalist factor. Exceptions were that the instances had to be in some partisan 
political context. For example, Barbara Walters sniping Rosie O’Donnell on The View 
did not count, nor did comments made by guests against Iran. To take into account of 
differences in the amount of airtime for each show (ranging from one hour per week to 
several hours per day), the total amount of uncivil incidents reported in the press for each 
program was divided by the estimated total amount of hours the program aired during the 
panel study period (January 1, 2008 to January 31, 2009). This provides a ratio of events 
per hour of programming. To make comparisons easier, th  scores were multiplied by 
100. A score 1.0 indicates that one uncivil incident was reported every per every 100 
hours of programming. 
With the exception of Lou Dobbs Tonight, none of the programs deemed 
politically “neutral” were reported as having any uncivil incidents. The Dobbs 
“exception” is not surprising, due to the high-profile, controversial, and ideological 
nature of Lou Dobbs’s views. While Dilliplane (2011) qualifies this show as neutral, 
there is reason to include it as a show with a conservative/Republican bias. While Dobbs’ 
views may best be qualified as “populist,” the Lexis Nexis search of reports on him 
during 2008 overwhelmingly focus on his immigration views, perceived to align with 
right wing views. 139 Dobbs also generated controversy in 2008 for a show questioning 
Barack Obama’s place of birth, an issue consistent with conservative punditry in 2008. 
                                                
139 See: Stelter, Brian, and Bill Carter. 2009. “Lou Dobbs Abruptly Quits CNN.” The New York Times. 





As selective exposure theory suggests that not all political opinions need to be congenial 
for a viewer to tune in—just the views among most relevant to particular viewers (for a 
discussion, see Stroud 2011, 25-27), and Mr. Dobbs most notable political views can be 
considered conservative, it makes sense to include his program with the other 
Republican/conservative bias programs.  
 Table A2 4-1 displays the scores for each the programs with partisan slants. Given 
that no neutral program (excepting Lou Dobbs Tonight) included any uncivil incidents, 
and I am really interested in making a distinction between uncivil partisan media and 
civil partisan media, I restrict the analysis to just partisan/ideological media from here on. 
Rather than choosing an arbitrary cut-off for the divide between uncivil and “civil” 
programming, shows with above-average scores were selected as uncivil. Eight programs 
(in bold) had scores above the average of 1.15. 
 It is possible that certain programs receive more cverage than others for various 
reasons, and thus relying on reports of incivility s biased; for example, higher-profile 
programs may receive more press coverage and thus higher scores, or programs that are 
not typically uncivil were more likely to make news hen something uncivil happened. 
Furthermore, the previous measure does not take into account differences in the level of 
incivility on a program throughout the campaign season. To evaluate the accuracy of this 
measure, as well as evaluate whether there is consiste cy in incivility over the sampling 
period I employ a second measure of incivility in political media, examining the actual 
content of programs by searching actual transcripts. Unfortunately, transcripts for some 
programs or that encompassed a program’s entire duration140  are not made available. 
                                                
140 For the Fox News Channel program Your World with Neil Cavuto, for example, only the transcripts of 




Still, the availability of complete transcripts for most of the programs allows me to 
complete these two goals. 
 I searched transcripts for three types of incivility, again referencing the list of 
most common uncivil incidents in political television created by Soberiaj and Berry 
(2010). Insulting language, mockery, name calling, belittling, and character assassination 
were all common in Sobieraj and Berry’s content analysis, and fall under Criterion 1 of 
my Incivility Index. To identify these types of incivility I searched for incidents when a 
show’s host, a guest, or an interviewee made referenc  to someone being a “liar,” 
“moron,” or “idiot.” The specific context was not considered, except to ensure the 
reference was not made in jest (“Just to make it simple for an idiot like me, Congressman, 
you`re saying...”), or part of an official report (i.e., “Prosecutors are arguing that the 
accused is a compulsive liar.”).  
Sobieraj and Berry also found misrepresentative exaggeration and ideologically 
extremizing language to be common elements of incivility in political television, which 
pertain to Criterion 2 of my index. To identify these types, I searched for references to 
“radical” or “lunatic” members of the out-group. On Republican slanted shows, I 
searched for references to left-wing/left/liberal radicals, lunatics, or lunacy, and on 
Democratic slanted shows, I searched for references to right-wing/right/conservative 
radical, lunatics, or lunacy. Context was reviewed through manual analysis.  
Finally, Sobieraj and Berry report that emotional displays, emotional language, 
and obscene language were prevalent in political television, which pertains to Criterion 3 
of my index. Because they are on television, most hs and guests refrain from using 
                                                                                                                                      
existed were The View, Fox & Friends, Studio B with Shepard Smith, Fox Report with Shepard Smith, 





obscenity, and when they do, it is not recorded in tra scripts. However, it is possible to 
get a sense of if there is negative emotionality of a show by measuring the amount of 
“lesser” obscenities, such as “damn,” “hell,” or “cap.” Thus, I searched for instances of 
when a show’s host, a guest, an interviewee,  or viewers “calling-in” or “writing-in” 
expresses themselves using “damn,” “hell,” or “crap.” The occurrences of these words 
only counted if they were used to emphasize points; for instance, mentions of Hell in 
theological discussions would not count, nor would discussions of quotes (i.e., discussion 
of Reverend Jeremiah Wright’s infamous “God damn America” quote). Context was 
reviewed through manual analysis. 
  To measure the frequency of these instances of incivil ty, the number of uncivil 
incidents was divided by the total number of words spoken (as reported in the 
transcripts). To standardize the scores, each show’s rate of incivility was then multiplied 
by the average amount of words per one hour of programming for that show. This was 
determined by adding up all the words included in the transcripts for each program within 
each of the wave’s time ranges and dividing it by the total by the amount of shows (or 
episodes) that took place within that same range. If a program’s running time was only a 
half hour in length (i.e., Hannity), then the total amount of words was divided by only 
half the amount of shows. If was more than an hour (i.e., Good Morning America is two 
hours in length), then then number of shows was multiplied by the numbers of hours of 
its running time. The resulting score is the averag number of instances of uncivil 
incidents occurring per hour of programming, with a score of 1.0 indicating that the 




the scores for each program by wave and in throughot all three waves. Additionally, I 
break down the occurrence of incivility by each of the three incivility dimensions.  
The average occurrence of incivility on each of these political programs 
throughout the three waves was 0.59. Programs with a wave average about the average 
were designated uncivil (in bold). The six programs that qualified as uncivil under this 
measure were among the eight programs that were marked s uncivil in the “hearsay” 
measure (transcripts were not available for the remaining two, The View, and Fox & 
Friends, both talk shows). This consistency gives me confidence in the accuracy of the 
measures. 
Talk Radio 
The format of political talk radio leaves little difference between general 
ideological/partisan programs and uncivil ideological/partisan programs. The presence of 
incivility in political talk radio has been well-documented, and previous content analyses 
have established the presence of incivility in most of these specific partisan/ideological 
programs included in the NAES questioning (Barker 2002; Jamieson and Capella 2010; 
Sobieraj and Berry 2010). In 2008, talk radio programming, dominated by conservative 
commentators, consisted of hosts attacking policies and vilifying targeted individuals—
among all the comments on conservative talk radio in 2008 made about Hillary Clinton, 
for example, 30 percent emphasized the idea that she did not have any hard core beliefs, 
and 15 percent revolved around the idea that she was personably unlikable (Project for 
the Excellence in Journalism 2009). The unavailability of transcripts on Lexis Nexis for 
makes tracking the prevalence of particular content over the waves for these programs, 




period (and likely less) than it does political television media. In addition to talk radio 
programs, I include exposure to NPR’s All Things Considered in the analysis; NPR 
programs are perceived to have a liberal bias (Iyengar and Hahn 2009), but are largely 
devoid of incivility (Sobieraj and Berry 2010). The programs are displayed in Table A2 
4-4. 
A1 4-3: Fixed-Effects Argument 
There are both theoretical and methodological re sons for why the fixed-effects 
method is superior to a model including lagged uncivil media exposure variables: 
although I have hypothesized that the relationship between exposure to uncivil media and 
use of incivility in political talk is causal, the r lationship can be considered synchronous, 
as the effect of exposure to uncivil media is immediate and fleeting. Additionally, Achen 
(2001) and Allison (2009) argue that the inclusion of lagged dependent variables as 
explanatory variables can bias the coefficients of other predictor variables, and therefore 
should never be used as such. As a control for spuriousness, the fixed-effects method is 
far more effective. 
While a random-effects model allows for the inclusion of time-invariant variables 
and observations that do not vary across waves, it cannot control for unobserved 
heterogeneity and omitted variable bias, greatly weakening the causal leverage of the 
model (Kohler and Kreuter 2008). A random-effects model is still a viable option, 
however, if it can be shown that the estimates are not biased. To see if this was the case, I 
ran a Hausman test to determine if the estimates the random-effects model produced were 
significantly different from the fixed-effects estimates. The test confirmed that fixed-




(p=0.000) indicating that the random-effects model produced biased results and was thus 
inappropriate to use. The random-effects model did, however, show that changes in 
exposure to uncivil media correlated with an increased propensity to utilize uncivil 
language. As the random-effects model did not drop gr ups that experienced no within-
group variability—the main advantage this approach holds over the fixed-effects 
approach—these effects are meaningful. The results of the random-effects models can be 
made available upon request. 
 
A1 5-1: Additional Discussion of Democratic-Republican Attitudinal and Behavioral 
Differences  
 
  As shown in Table A2 5-1 of Appendix 2, the mean anger score among 
Democrats was significantly larger than that or Republicans in the experimental groups. 
There is a large, significant (at the 0.01 level) difference between the mean anger score of 
Democrats and the mean anger score of Republicans in group 2—Democrats were on 
average half a point (0.41) higher on the one-point  scale. They were slightly more likely 
to be angry than Republicans in the control group as well, and even more likely to be 
angry in group 1, but these differences were not significant. Overall, Democrats in either 
experimental group had a mean anger score that was 0.26 points higher than Republicans 
in the experimental groups, significant at the 0.01 level. 
As shown in Table A2 5-2 in Appendix 2, subtracting the Republican incivility 
mean from the Democrat incivility mean reveals thatRepublicans were more likely to use 
incivility. The difference between Republicans’ and Democrats’ use of incivility in the 
control group was incidental and insignificant at conventional levels; however, 




to use incivility (significant at 0.05). The opposite effect is true for critiquing the original 
poster. The difference between Democrats and Republicans in the control group was 
small and insignificant. As expected, Democrats were on average 21 percentage points 
more likely to critique the original poster than Republicans in the experimental groups. 
As with use of incivility, these differences were only significant in group 2 when the 
experimental group is broken down: Democrats were 18 percentage points more likely to 
critique the poster in group 1, but the difference is insignificant at conventional levels. 
The 24 point difference between the Democrat mean and Republican mean in group 2, 






















Appendix 2: Additional Tables and Figures 
Table A2 4-1: Number of Reported Uncivil Incidents in Partisan Media, Per 100 Hours of 
Programming 
 
Program Score  Score 
Anderson Cooper 360  0.00 Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer  0.00 
Beltway Boys  0.00 Lou Dobbs Tonight 3.24 
BET News1 0.00 MSNBC Live 0.00 
CNN Newsroom/ Headline News2  0.00 Nightline 0,00 
Countdown with Keith Olbermann  4.87 The O'Reilly Factor 4.32 
Fox and Friends  1.89 Out in the Open 0.00 
Fox Report with Shepard Smith  0.00 Situation Room 0.18 
Geraldo  0.00 Special Report with Brit Hume 0.00 
Good Morning America  0.54 Studio B with Shepard Smith 0.00 
Hannity and Colmes 3.78 This Week with George Stephanopoulos 0.00 
Hannity's America  1.80 The View 3.78 
Hardball with Chris Matthews  2.70 Your World with Neil Cavuto 0.54 
Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer  0.00 Program Average 1.15 
 
1Specifically, I conducted a search for uncivil incidents occurring on BET Nightly News. 























Table A2 4-2: Number of Uncivil Incidents in Partisan Media Transcripts, Per Hour of Programming 
 






























Republican Slant              

























































O'Reilly Factor  0.81 0.15 0.56 1.53 0.64 0.18 0.56 1.38 0.30 0.42 0.42 1.14 1.35 






































































































































































































Situation Room 0.14 0.00 0.29 0.43 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.22 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.17 0.27 


































Table A2 4-3: Breakdown of Television Programs by Format, Partisanship, and Presence of Incivility  
 
**Liberal/Democratic Slant            ++Conservative/Republican Slant 
 
Uncivil Pundit Cable News Programs Network 
  
Network News Network 
The O'Reilly Factor++ FNC ABC News Nightline ABC 
Hannity and Colmes++ FNC  60 Minutes CBS 
Hannity's America++ FNC  Frontline PBS 
Hardball with Chris Matthews** MSNBC   20/20 ABC 
Lou Dobbs++ CNN   Dateline NBC NBC 
Countdown with Keith Olbermann** MSNBC   Face the Nation CBS 
Uncivil Partisan Talk Shows Network   Meet the Press NBC 
The View**  ABC   This Week w/ George Stephanopoulos** ABC 
Fox and Friends++ FNC  McLaughlin Group Syndic 
Civil Cable News Network   ABC World News ABC 
Out in the Open (Rick Sanchez)** CNN   NBC Nightly News NBC 
CNN Headline News /Newsroom** CNN   The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer PBS 
Special Report with Brit Hume++ FNC  CBS Evening News CBS 
Your World with Neil Cavuto++ FNC  CBS Morning News CBS 
Geraldo at Large++ FNC  America This Morning ABC 
Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer** CNN   CBS Sunday Morning CBS 
MSNBC Live** MSNBC   Satire  Network 
Studio B with Shepard Smith++ FNC   The Daily Show with Jon Stewart** COM 
The Fox Report with Shepard Smith++ FNC   The Colbert Report** COM 
Anderson Cooper 360** CNN   Entertainment  Network 
Larry King Live CNN   The Tonight Show with Jay Leno NBC 
Reliable Sources CNN   The Late Show with David Letterman CBS 
Beltway Boys++ FNC   CSI: Miami CBS 
Civil Talk Shows  Network   The Simpsons FOX 
The Early Show CBS   Ellen DeGeneres Show Syndic. 
The Today Show NBC   Brothers and Sisters ABC 
Good Morning America** ABC   Oprah Syndic. 
  Law and Order NBC 
  Big Love HBO 

















++ Identified as a conservative-leaning program by the 2009 and 2010 “State of the News Media” annual 
report by the Pew Project for the Excellence in Journalism. 













Talk Radio Programs 
 The Rush Limbaugh Show++ 
 The Sean Hannity Show++ 
 Michael Savage, The Savage Nation++ 
 The Glenn Beck Program++ 
 Bill O'Reilly, Radio Factor++ 
 Dr. Laura Schlessinger++ 
 Laura Ingraham++ 
 The Neal Boortz Show++ 
 The Mike Gallagher Show++ 
 The Mark Levin Show++ 
 Bill Bennett's Morning in America++ 
 The Jerry Doyle Show++ 
 Radio News  





Table A2 4-5: Descriptive Statistics of Uncivil Political Media Users (NAES Data) 
 Conservative Uncivil 
Media 


















































































































Standard deviations are in parentheses. Statistical ignificance of difference in means determined by the 
Tukey WSD method for binary measures, and the Kruskal-Wallis test for ordinal and continuous measures.  

















Table A2 5-1: Table of Means (Message Board Experimnt) 
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Figure A2 5-1: Differences in Means of Reported Feelings of Anger Towards Original 




*Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference in means ix statistically significant at the 
0.10 level 
**Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i means is statistically significant at the 
0.05 level 
***Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i  means is statistically significant at the 
0.01 level 
 
Note: The significance of differences in means for each comparison was confirmed using 
Student’s t-tests with Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom, due to the unequal samples sizes and 



















Figure A2 5-2: Differences in Means of Use of Incivility and Critiques of Original Poster 




*Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference in means ix statistically significant at the 
0.10 level 
**Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i means is statistically significant at the 
0.05 level 
***Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i  means is statistically significant at the 
0.01 level 
 
Note: The significance of differences in means for each comparison was confirmed using 
Student’s t-tests with Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom, due to the unequal samples sizes and 




















*Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference in means ix statistically significant at the 
0.10 level 
**Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i means is statistically significant at the 
0.05 level 
***Tukey WSD Method determines that the difference i  means is statistically significant at the 
0.01 level 
 
Note: The significance of differences in means for each comparison was confirmed using 
Student’s t-tests with Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom, due to the unequal samples sizes and 
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